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Abstract
Quantum field theory (QFT) poses a challenge to the orthodox methodological
framework of the philosophy of science. The first step of investigating a physical
theory, it is commonly assumed, is to specify some mathematical structures which
constitute its formalism. In the case of QFT however this is a highly non-trivial
task. There are a variety of prima facie distinct formulations of the theory: most
strikingly, there is a gulf between the axiomatic formulations of QFT developed by
mathematical physicists and the formalisms employed in mainstream high energy
physics. In recent years this has led to debate about which version of the theory
those interested in the foundations of physics ought to be looking at. This thesis
offers a response to this problem. I argue that we should abandon the search for
a single canonical formulation of QFT and instead take a more pluralistic stance
which allows that different strands of the QFT programme may be appropriate
starting points for addressing different philosophical questions. The overarching
claim of the thesis is that, while the axiomatic approach to QFT may be the right
framework for addressing some internal question raised by the QFT programme,
formulations of QFT which incorporate cutoffs on the allowed momentum states
can express all of the claims that we have any reason to believe on the basis of
the empirical successes of high energy physics. In the course of this discussion
I offer new perspectives on foundational issues like the status of relativity and
unitarily inequivalent representations in QFT. Furthermore, I suggest that QFT
and high energy physics offer fruitful grounds for discussing broader issues in
the philosophy of science, and in particular the challenge of formulating a viable
version of scientific realism.
vii
viii
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Quantum Field Theory and Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 What is Quantum Field Theory? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2.1 Overview of the QFT Programme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.2 Cutoff and Continuum Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.3 The Formulation Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3 Overview of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2 Formulation and Interpretation 21
2.1 In Search of a Methodological Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.2 The Standard Account and its Deficiencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3 Accommodating Theory-World Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.4 Accommodating Variant Formalisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.5 A Look Ahead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3 The Real Problem with Perturbative Quantum Field Theory 43
3.1 Three Worries about the Perturbative Approach to
Quantum Field Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.2 The Perturbative Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2.1 Expanding the S-matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2.2 Perturbative Renormalisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.3 Approximation and Idealisation Distinguished . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4 Perturbative Theory Produces Approximations, Not
Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.5 The Real Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4 Lessons From the Renormalisation Group: Structures and Rep-
resentations 65
4.1 The Contested Status of the Renormalisation Group . . . . . . . . 65
4.2 The Renormalisation Group in Quantum Field Theory . . . . . . 66
4.3 Ultraviolet Fixed Points and the Continuum Limit . . . . . . . . . 70
4.4 Explaining the Success of Perturbative Quantum Field Theory . . 74
ix
4.5 Quantum Field Theories as Coarse-Grained
Representations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.6 Understanding the Significance of the Renormalisation Group . . 89
5 Emergent Relativity 93
5.1 An Apparent Clash with Relativity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
5.2 Approximate Space-Time Symmetries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
5.3 Relativity and the Quantum Field Theory Programme: Internal
and External Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
6 Spontaneous Symmetry Breaking and the Limits of Infinite De-
grees of Freedom 113
6.1 An Explanatory Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.2 Modelling Spontaneous Symmetry Breaking . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
6.2.1 Classical Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
6.2.2 Quantum Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
6.3 Motivating the Deflationary View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
6.4 Spontaneous Symmetry Breaking in Finite Systems . . . . . . . . 132
6.4.1 Approach I: Long Lived Asymmetric States . . . . . . . . 133
6.4.2 Approach II: Instability Under Asymmetric Perturbations 136
6.5 An Epistemic Role for the Limit of Infinite Degrees of Freedom . 141
7 A Realist View of Quantum Field Theory 145
7.1 The View from the General Philosophy of Science . . . . . . . . . 145
7.2 Formulating Scientific Realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
7.3 The Renormalisation Group as a Weapon for the
Realist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
7.4 Underdetermination in the Quantum Field Theory
Programme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
7.5 Future Physics and Fundamentality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
8 Conclusion 171
References 177
x
List of Figures
2.1 Schematic of the relationship between mathematical structures,
physical models, and concrete systems out in the world. . . . . . . 28
3.1 Taking the semi-major axis of an ellipsoid to infinity. Taken from
Norton (2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.1 A ‘majority rule’ blocking procedure on a two valued spin system. 67
4.2 Sketch of the beta function in the case of a) asymptotic freedom,
b) asymptotic safety and c) no fixed point. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.3 The renormalisation group flow of scalar field theories to a surface
spanned by renormalisable parameters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.1 Function with approximate reflection symmetry. . . . . . . . . . . 98
6.1 A double well potential. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
6.2 Expected magnetisation of the two dimensional classical Ising model
in the thermodynamic limit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
6.3 Sketch of P (m) below the critical temperature for a classical Ising
model with small, large and infinite N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
xi
xii
Abbreviations
The following abbreviations are used in this thesis.
QFT — quantum field theory.
QED — quantum electrodynamics
QCD — quantum chromodynamics
SSB — spontaneous symmetry breaking.
KMS state — Kubo-Martin-Schwinger state.
xiii
xiv
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Quantum Field Theory and Philosophy
Quantum field theory (QFT) ought to be of great interest to philosophers. It
certainly has all of the features which scientific realists take to warrant belief in
a scientific theory: it is among the most empirically successful frameworks in the
history of science and purports to explain many features of the physical world,
from the short range of nuclear forces to the existence of anti-matter. It is also
arguably the most fundamental physical theory we currently have at our disposal;
metaphysicians of a naturalistic bent should be taking notice. Furthermore, high
energy physics promises to provide fertile ground for discussions of a plethora of
epistemic and methodological issues, from the status of symmetry principles to
analogical reasoning.
Unfortunately there seem to be serious obstacles facing any attempt to philosoph-
ically engage with QFT. For one thing, there are numerous foundational puzzles
that need to be addressed if we are to draw any substantive conclusions from the
theory. The puzzles posed by unitarily inequivalent Hilbert space representations
and notoriously suspect renormalisation techniques, for instance, both present
difficulties with understanding what the theory is telling us. But QFT also poses
another sort of problem for the philosopher of science. The first step of the
philosophical analysis of a physical theory, according to standard lore amongst
philosophy of physics, is to identify the class of mathematical structures that
constitute its formalism. While there is widespread agreement about how to do
this for well trodden theories like quantum mechanics and general relativity in the
case of QFT this task is far from straightforward. We can find a plethora of prima
facie distinct characterisations of QFT in the physics literature. Most notably,
there is a gulf between the axiomatic formulations of QFT found in the math-
ematical physics literature and the approaches employed in high energy physics
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phenomenology. Identifying the mathematical structures which are constitutive
of QFT becomes a highly non-trivial, and philosophically loaded, task.
This issue has recently come to a head in an exchange of papers between Doreen
Fraser and David Wallace (Fraser, 2009, 2001; Wallace 2006, 2011). These au-
thors have very different views about which version of QFT philosophers ought to
take as their starting point. Fraser advocates the primacy of axiomatic character-
isations of QFT originating in the mathematical physics literature. Conversely,
Wallace argues that if we are interested in what we can learn about the world
from the success of high energy physics, axiomatic QFT is largely irrelevant and
philosophers ought to be looking at the ‘conventional’ formulation of QFT em-
ployed in mainstream physics.
This controversy over the formulation of QFT might seem to dash any hopes
of drawing wide reaching philosophical conclusions from QFT. If we can’t even
agree on what the theory is how can we hope to learn anything about the meta-
physics or epistemology of science from it? This thesis develops a response to this
problem with the ultimate aim of clearing the way for more fruitful interactions
between philosophy and high energy physics. This introductory chapter sets out
the background of my discussion and provides an overview of what is to come.
The next section serves as an introduction to QFT and the problem with pinning
down its theoretical identity. I then provide a summary of the core arguments
(and assumptions) of the thesis.
1.2 What is Quantum Field Theory?
Given the controversy surrounding the formulation of the theory it will be useful
to have a neutral way of speaking collectively about the various approaches to
QFT found in the scientific literature. To this end I will use the term ‘QFT
programme’ in this thesis to refer to all of the theoretical material which can pos-
sibly be construed as falling under the QFT rubric. Understood in this maximally
permissive way the QFT programme will not only include approaches which re-
semble orthodox philosophical characterisations of a scientific theory but also the
kind of computational and approximation techniques that pervade the practice of
high energy physics. This section surveys this theoretical landscape and discusses
why it presents a challenge for the philosopher. §1.1 gives an informal overview
of the QFT programme. §1.2 discusses the construction of QFT systems and
distinguishes between cutoff and continuum models. §1.3 turns to how philoso-
phers have approached the QFT programme and summarises the key points of
contention in the debate between Fraser and Wallace.
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1.2.1 Overview of the QFT Programme
Owing to its multifaceted nature, the QFT programme does not lend itself to
neat summary. I focus here on the approaches to QFT which will play an im-
portant role in the overarching argument of the thesis. Largely for convenience
of exposition, my discussion here follows the historical development of the QFT
programme.1
QFT became a distinct theoretical enterprise shortly after the birth of ordinary
quantum mechanics. One obvious motivation driving its development in these
early days was the need to bring classical field theories into the quantum fold.
In order to obtain a fully quantum description of electromagnetic interactions, in
particular, a quantised version of classical electrodynamics seemed to be required.
A more high minded project which also played a crucial role in the formation of
the QFT programme was the goal of unifying quantum and relativistic physics.
Prima facie this has nothing to do with fields, but attempts to formulate a fully
relativistic version of quantum mechanics turned out to lead to the introduction of
‘matter fields’ corresponding to fermionic and bosonic particles.2 The consensus
which emerged in this early period was that quantum electrodynamics (QED)
ought to be a theory that couples a fermionic matter field, associated with the
electron, to a quantised electromagnetic field.
The formulation of such a theory was beset with theoretical problems however.
While free field theories could be analysed using methods familiar from ordinary
quantum mechanics, interacting theories, like QED, proved to be much more
difficult to make sense of. The first signs of trouble came when physicists at-
tempted to apply standard perturbative methods to QED scattering problems.
Expanding scattering observables in powers of the fine structure constant gave
rise to badly behaved series which contained divergent terms beyond the first or-
der. It was not until after the second world war that any real progress was made
with this problem. In the late 1940’s Dyson, Feynman, Schwinger and Tomonaga
and others showed that the infinities that appear in naive perturbative expan-
sions can be systematically removed via a process which came to be known as
renormalisation.
In many ways this method was a huge success. Renormalised QED perturbation
theory yields results that are not only finite but also in very close agreement with
experimental data. Most famously, perturbative evaluations of the anomalous
1I do not claim to give anything more than a caricature of the complex history of QFT here.
Schweber (1984) is an account of the formation of the perturbative approach to QFT. Cao
(1998) is an account of the history of QFT with an emphasis on conceptual issues. Brown
(1993) is a collection of papers on the history of renormalisation theory.
2Cao (1998) chapter 7 discusses the conceptual development of the notion of matter fields and
second quantisation.
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magnetic moment of the electron are found to agree with the measured value
up to more than 10 significant figures! Furthermore, the perturbative approach
to QFT that was made viable by the invention of the renormalisation proce-
dure continues to dominate the practice of high energy physics to this day. The
perturbative formalism is not without its problems however. For one thing, the
renormalisation procedure was viewed with suspicion by many, including some of
its creators.3 Even putting these worries aside perturbation theory remains an
intrinsically approximate approach to QFT with significant limitations. It rests
on the assumption that interactions are weak which immediately raised worries
about how strong nuclear interactions could be handled in the QFT programme.
More generally, the fact that perturbation theory only yields approximate evalu-
ations of particular physical quantities seems to render it incapable of answering
deeper structural questions about interacting QFTs.
Dissatisfaction with the perturbative approach led to the rise of two new branches
of the QFT programme in the second half of the 20th century. On the one
hand, there was the emergence of the axiomatic approach to QFT in the math-
ematical physics community.4 The idea here was to put QFT on a firm non-
perturbative footing by writing down a set of mathematically precise conditions
that any QFT model could be expected to satisfy. Two main axiomatisations of
QFT on Minkowski space-time resulted from this project. The Wightman ax-
ioms treat quantum fields as operator valued distributions which are required to
have certain relativistic properties: the fields are said to covariant under Poincare´
transformations, a so-called microcausality condition is imposed, and so on. The
other main axiomatisation of QFT, known as the Haag-Kastler axioms, origi-
nates in the algebraic formulation of quantum physics. In this framework QFTs
are characterised by nets of operator algebras over Minkowski space-time which
are required to satisfy similar conditions inspired by special relativity.5 Though
these two frameworks have not been shown to be equivalent in general I will speak
as though they are interchangeable in this thesis—the distinction between them
won’t play an important role in my discussion.
3Feynman (2006, 128), for instance, wrote: “The shell game that we play... is technically called
‘renormalization’. But no matter how clever the word, it is still what I would call a dippy
process... I suspect that renormalization is not mathematically legitimate.” See Cao (1998,
203-207) for a survey of the views of the other founders of QFT.
4Wightman’s accounts of the origin of the axiomatic approach often emphasise the need to go
beyond the limitations of the perturbative approach: “The motivation for the creation of an
axiomatic field theory was simple enough: it was frustration. Perturbative renormalisation
theory is exceedingly complicated and was even more so in the early 1950’s. Everyone agreed
that it should be generalized to be non-perturbative. However a simple-minded person asking:
what is the problem and what is to be regarded as an acceptable solution of it? could get no
answer from the available account of quantum field theory” (Wightman, 1979, 1000).
5The standard reference for the Wightman axioms is Streater and Wightman (1964). Haag and
Kastler (1964) contains the original statement of the Haag-Kastler axioms. Haag (1992) and
Halvorson (2006) are reviews of the algebraic approach to QFT.
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While some important general results, such as the spin statistics theorem, can
be derived from these axiomatisations of QFT the major rub with this approach
has been the difficulty of demonstrating the existence of concrete models of the
axioms. Some toy models have been constructed in a reduced number of space-
time dimensions, but showing that QED and other realistic theories employed
in high energy physics admit formulations which satisfy the Wightman or Haag-
Kastler axioms is presently a rather distant aspiration—I will have more to say
about this problem in §1.2.
Meanwhile, in mainstream physics, a different response to the limitations of the
perturbative approach emerged in the form of the renormalisation group frame-
work.6 Drawing on ideas from condensed matter and statistical physics, Kenneth
Wilson and others developed a non-perturbative framework for studying the be-
haviour of QFT systems at different energy scales, the key idea being that it is
possible to remove high momentum degrees of freedom from a system and encode
their effect in the dynamics of a low energy ‘effective’ theory. This approach not
only shed new light on the perturbative renormalisation procedure but also led to
the formation of new QFT models and ultimately the rise of the standard model
of particle physics, which still reigns supreme today. Perhaps most importantly,
the renormalisation group framework played a crucial role in accommodating
strong nuclear interactions into the QFT programme. The renormalisation group
analysis of quantum chromodynamics (QCD) revealed that the theory’s coupling
becomes weaker as the energy scale increases—a property known as asymptotic
freedom—meaning that perturbative methods could in fact be successfully applied
at sufficiently high energies. Furthermore, the methodological shift precipitated
by the renormalisation group approach was instrumental in the development of
lattice formulations of QFT which are nowadays employed in numerical simula-
tions of the strong coupling region of QCD.
Much of the rest of this thesis will be concerned with the teasing out the relation-
ship between the perturbative, axiomatic and renormalisation group approaches
to QFT just described. It is worth emphasising before we move on however that
this brief sketch of the QFT programme really only skims its surface. A variety
of other theoretical frameworks can be found in the physics literature, some of
which have yet to receive much attention from philosophers. QFT has been devel-
oped on non-relativistic (Bain 2011) and curved space-time backgrounds (Wald,
1994). Another important development has been the fruitful exchange of ideas
between QFT and statistical physics, which has led to the application of QFT
models in condensed matter physics and the QFT at finite temperatures formal-
6The history of the renormalisation group is a complex subject in its own right. Still, it is clear
from Wilson’s discussion in his Nobel lecture (Wilson, 1983) that concerns about the limitations
of perturbative QFT were one important motivation for his work on the renormalisation group.
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ism (Zinn-Justin, 2002). The approaches introduced in this section are already
sufficient to pose significant challenges for the philosopher of physics, as we shall
soon see. First though, I will switch from a historical to a formal mode and say
something more precise about the problems associated with the construction of
QFT models.
1.2.2 Cutoff and Continuum Models
How does one go about writing down a QFT model? As in quantum mechanics
the starting point is invariably a classical system—in this case a classical field
theory. There are, of course, many kinds of classical field theory which we might
try to quantise. The theories which seem to do a good job of describing our world,
like QED and QCD, are gauge theories: their Lagrangians consist of fermionic
fields coupled to vector fields in such a way that local internal symmetry groups
are preserved. While these theories will be central to the narrative of this thesis
the technical and conceptual issues raised by gauge and fermion fields are largely
tangential to the thrust of my discussion. Most of the features of QFT models
which will be important for our purposes already arise in the case of bosonic
scalar fields and it will often be expedient to discuss the technical issues in this
more straightforward context. In particular, I will often refer to the simplest
interacting field theory we can write down involving a real scalar field φ(x) over
Minkowski space-time; the aptly named φ4 theory. The Lagrangian density7 of
this theory is given by:8
L = (∂µφ(x))2 −m2φ(x)2 − λφ(x)4. (1.1)
The first two terms describe a free scalar field with mass m, and the final term is a
quartic self interaction, whose strength is parameterised by the coupling λ.
This theory makes perfectly good sense as a classical field theory: the question is
how to obtain a quantum version. Aping the canonical approach to quantisation
familiar from ordinary quantum mechanics, an obvious strategy is to elevate φ(x),
and its conjugate momentum density pi(x) = ∂L/∂(∂0φ(x)), to Hilbert space
7The Lagrangian density is related to the standard Lagrangian familiar from classical mechanics
via L =
∫
d3xL, so the action of a classical field theory can be written S = ∫ d4xL. From here
on I will simply refer to the Lagrangian density as the Lagrangian, as per the standard sloppy
terminology of mainstream physics.
8I use the short hand (∂µφ(x))
2 = ∂µφ(x)∂
µφ(x), where ∂µ = ∂/∂x
µ = ∂/∂t − ∇ is the four-
derivative, and adopt the signature (+,−,−,−) for the Minkowski metric. Note that in later
chapters I will often drop the explicit dependence on the spacial coordinate and simply write
φ for the scalar field.
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operators and impose the commutation relations:9
[φ(x), φ(y)] = [pi(x), pi(y)] = 0, (1.2)
[φ(x), pi(y)] = iδ(x− y)I, (1.3)
where I denotes the identity operator.
An alternative method often employed in both the mainstream high energy physics
and mathematical physics literature is known as functional, or path integral,
quantisation.10 The key quantity in this approach is the partition function, Z,
which is identified with the functional integral:
Z =
∫
Dφe−
∫
d4xL. (1.4)
Informally, Dφ indicates that a sum is being taken over all possible configurations
of the field. The significance of the partition function is that all of the system cor-
relation functions can be derived from it. Correlation functions are the vacuum
state expectation values of the fields at disparate space-time points of the form
〈Ω|φ(x1)φ(x2)...φ(xn) |Ω〉 (where |Ω〉 is the vacuum state) and are arguably the
most fundamental properties of a QFT system. For one thing, they are closely re-
lated to the S-matrix and scattering observables, to be discussed more in chapter
3, but crucially for our current purposes we can actually construct QFT models
from a complete set of correlation functions. This means, in effect, that sup-
plying a well defined functional integral expression for the partition function is
tantamount to supplying a well defined QFT model.11
This all sounds promising enough in the abstract but complications arise when
we try to apply these strategies to particular classical field theories. In the case
of free field theories the quantisation process goes through fairly smoothly. Some
subtleties arise in the canonical quantisation of free field theories but, with a bit
of care, a well defined quantum system can be obtained via this method (it turns
out that free fields on Minkowski space-time cannot be simply be converted to
operators, as I suggested above, and instead become operator valued distributions
9These are the commutation relations in the Schrodinger representation; in the Heisenberg
representation they become the, perhaps more familiar, equal time commutation relations.
Note that I have already set ~ = c = 1 here—see the discussion of dimensional analysis in
QFT below.
10Peskin and Schroeder (1995) chapter 9 is a standard introduction to the way that function
methods are employed in mainstream physics. Glimm and Jaffe (1981) develops the construc-
tive field theory programme from a function integral perspective.
11Correlation functions go by different names in different traditions, and exactly how they are
defined depends on the formalism in which you are working—in the Wightman axiomatisation
of QFT, for instance, they are often called Wightman functions. For a discussion of the
construction of QFT models from a complete set of correlation functions in the Wightman
framework see Streater and Wightman (1964).
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in the more sophisticated treatment).12 It is also possible to give precise meaning
to the sum over field configurations needed to define the partition function of
a free quantum field theory in the functional integral approach. Furthermore,
the quantum systems produced by these methods can be shown to satisfy the
Wightman and Haag-Kastler axioms of the axiomatic approach.13
Things get a lot murkier when it comes to interacting theories however. Whether
interacting QFT models exist on Minkowski space-time at all remains one of the
great unanswered questions in theoretical physics. What we do know is that well
defined quantum systems with interacting Lagrangians can be obtained if the
degrees of freedom associated with arbitrarily high and arbitrarily low momen-
tum Fourier modes of the classical field are omitted in the quantum version. I
will refer to the quantum systems which result from this kind of procedure as
cutoff QFT models, and the thresholds imposed on the high and low momen-
tum states as ultraviolet and infrared cutoffs respectively.14 Dimensional analysis
helps clarify what is going on here physically. The standard convention amongst
field theorists is to work in units that set ~ = c = 1 (so-called natural units). This
has the welcome effect of dramatically simplifying dimensional analysis. In this
convention the physical units of any quantity can be expressed as a power of the
energy, often called its mass dimension (since energy, momentum and mass are
dimensionally equivalent in these units). Crucially, the dimension of length is an
inverse power of the energy in this scheme so we can often talk interchangably of
length and energy scales. Removing the high momentum modes of a theory then
amounts to freezing out variations in the fields on arbitrarily short length scales.
Conversely, removing low momentum modes corresponds to modifying the long
range behaviour of the theory; in particular, a sharp cutoff at low momentum is
equivalent to putting the theory in a finite volume box.
The most straightforward way of writing down a cutoff model is to formulate the
theory on a finite volume lattice over continuous space-time, the simplest being
a hypercubic lattice with lattice spacing a and volume V . Field variables φx can
then be associated with each point x on the lattice and derivatives replaced by
discrete difference expressions which converge to ordinary derivatives in the limit
a → 0, the standard choice being ∂µφ(x) → (φx+aµ − φx)/a, where µ is a unit
vector. The effect of the discrete lattice spacing is to eliminate any field modes
with momenta over Λ = 1/a—as expected the discretisation of the theory imple-
ments an ultraviolet cutoff. Obtaining a quantum theory is then straightforward.
We can impose canonical commutation relations in the manner described above
12See Wald (1994, 43-46) for the details.
13For a discussion of free models of the Wightman and Haag-Kastler axioms respectively see
Streater and Wightman (1964, 103-106) and Araki (1999, 216-221).
14I use the term ‘cutoff model’ to refer to a system with both an ultraviolet and infrared cutoff
by default throughout the thesis.
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and it is also possible to give precise meaning to the path integral over field
configurations. In the case of a hypercubic lattice we can simply define:∫
Dφ→
∏
x∈L
∫
dφx (1.5)
where L is the set of points on the lattice.15
These lattice QFTs are nowadays directly employed in high energy physics, espe-
cially in the study of strongly interacting theories like QCD. The most successful
non-perturbative computational method in contemporary particle physics phe-
nomenology is based on running numerical simulations on finite volume lattices.
(More precisely, these simulations are done on lattice QFTs formulated on Eu-
clidean space, the results then being analytically continued back to Minkowski
space-time via the so-called Wick rotation—see Smit (2002) chapter 2.) There
are also other ways of constructing cutoff QFT models however which are some-
times employed in mainstream and mathematical physics.16 In the path integral
approach it is possible to impose a ‘smooth cutoff’ by suppressing the high/low
momentum modes via a quickly decaying function rather than imposing a sharp
threshold on the allowed momenta. Though there are different ways of imple-
menting the cutoffs however it will turn out that many of the important features
of these systems are not sensitive to the details of how the cutoffs are imple-
mented. In what follows I will tend to treat lattice QFTs as the exemplar of a
cutoff model.
While these cutoff QFTs may be well defined quantum systems, they might not
seem to be very satisfying quantisations of classical field theories. Classical fields
take values on a continuous space and have an infinite number of degrees of
freedom: these cutoff systems have neither of these features. Furthermore, cutoff
models invariably violate relativistic properties like Poincare´ covariance which are
often taken to be constitutive of what a quantum field theory is. It goes without
saying that cutoff models do not satisfy the Wightman or Haag-Kastler axioms,
since these systems are based on the assumption that a quantum field should
be defined on arbitrarily small spacial regions and fulfil the demands of special
relativity. A truly relativistic QFT would be directly defined on Minkowski space-
time and therefore take values on arbitrarily large and arbitrarily small length
scales. I will refer to this kind of system as a continuum QFT model.
The quest to construct interacting continuum QFT models has spawned a whole
15Putting gauge and fermion fields on a lattice raises additional technical issues which will not
be discussed here. See Smit (2002) for the details of formulating these theories on a lattice.
16There are also a variety of regularisation methods used in the perturbative approach to QFT.
As I will argue in chapter 3 however, the cutoffs employed in perturbative calculations are
importantly distinct from cutoff QFT models.
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branch of mathematical physics known as constructive field theory. What re-
searchers working on this problem invariably do when attempting to construct
interacting continuum QFTs is start with the a cutoff model and try to take the
continuum limit, in which the ultraviolet cutoff is removed, and the infinite vol-
ume limit, in which the infrared cutoff is removed.17 This turns out to be very
difficult to do in a mathematically controlled way however. For a select class of in-
teracting theories, in a reduced number of space-time dimensions continuum field
theory models have been constructed in this manner. In particular, models of the
Wightman and Haag-Kastler axioms have been shown to exist for φ4 theory on a
two dimensional analogue of ordinary Minkowski space-time.18 But when it comes
to realistic theories like QED and QCD, and even φ4 theory in four dimensional
Minkowski space-time, there are considerable obstacles to taking these limits, and
even reason to think that they do not exist. The renormalisation group analysis
of QED and φ4 theory apparently suggests that an interacting theory cannot be
produced by taking the continuum limit—this issue will be discussed further in
chapter 4. The infinite volume limit, on the other hand, is related to the infrared
behaviour of a theory, which is notoriously poorly understood in the case of QCD.
The construction of a continuum formulation of the quantum Yang-Mills theory,
a close cousin of QCD, is currently among the unsolved millennium problems set
by the Clay institute (Jaffe and Witten, 2006).
In sum then, we know how to write down cutoff versions of realistic theories
like QED and QCD, but the constructive field theory programme, as it stands,
is very much a work in progress, with the few models that have been shown to
exist in the continuum being quite far removed from real physics. I want to
conclude this section with a brief note on the question of mathematical rigour in
the QFT programme. Fraser refers to what I have just dubbed continuum QFT
as the “formal” variant of QFT and consistently emphasises the higher standard
of mathematical rigour found in the axiomatical and constructive approach to
QFT. It is certainly true that mathematical physicists working on QFT are much
more careful with mathematical subtleties than mainstream physicists, though
this is true of any branch of physics. When it comes to cutoff and continuum
QFT systems however rigour is not the relevant distinguishing factor. There is
nothing unrigorous about the cutoff QFT models described above, indeed, as I
pointed out, these structures are often employed in the constructive field theory
17To be precise, this is usually done in Euclidean space. The Osterwalder-Schrader recon-
struction theorem (Osterwalder and Schrader, 1973, 1975) is then appealed to establish the
existence models of the Wightman axioms.
18Glimm and Jaffe’s (1985) famous treatment of the φ4 theory on two dimensional Minkowski
space-time follows this approach. Rivasseau (2014) surveys results in the constructive QFT
programme which have been obtained in this way. In fact, no gauge theories have been
constructed in any number of space-time dimensions—see Douglas (2004) some discussion of
gauge related issues in the constructive field theory programme.
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programme. The motivation for seeking interacting QFT systems defined directly
on Minkowski space-time is not simply about rigour, it is primarily a physical
enterprise. For this reason, continuum QFT is a more apt name for these sought
structures, in my view, than formal QFT. While mathematical rigour is one
parameter which varies greatly among different traditions found within the QFT
programme a theme of my later discussion will be that it is not really the key
issue in the formulation debate.
1.2.3 The Formulation Debate
We have now seen enough to appreciate the force of the methodological challenge
flagged at the outset. A range of sub-programmes and species of physical model
fall under the jurisdiction of the QFT programme. How should philosophers
approach this heterogeneous body of theory?
In the early days of the philosophy of quantum field theory literature this question
simmered away in the background but was rarely explicitly discussed. Philoso-
phers engaged with different approaches to QFT, sometimes drawing conflict-
ing conclusions. Paul Teller’s early work on QFT, for instance, focused on the
methods found in mainstream textbooks and the practice of high energy physics
(Teller, 1995). At the same time another approach to the philosophical study of
QFT emerged based on the axiomatic approach to QFT, and in particular the
algebraic formulation of the theory. Robert Clifton, Hans Halvorson and others
derived a number of foundationally significant results from the Haag-Kastler ax-
iomatisation of QFT.19 These two starting points seemed to lead to very different
perspectives on QFT however. Teller advocates an interpretation of QFT based
on the existence of particle-like quanta, while results in the algebraic approach
seem to show that no particle based interpretation of QFT is possible.20
The debate between Fraser and Wallace has thrown the dilemma facing the philo-
sophical interpreter into sharp relief.21 Each author marshals a complex set of
considerations, often grounded in more general debates in the philosophy of sci-
ence, in support of formulations of QFT which they both take to be theoretically
distinct. Many of these issues will be taken up in later chapters but I will sum-
marise the key points of contention in the debate here to set the scene for what
19Many of Clifton and Halvorson’s seminal papers on algebraic QFT are collected in Clifton
(2004).
20One problem for particle interpretations of QFT raised in this tradition comes from non-
localisability results originating in Malament (1995) and made more precise in the algebraic
QFT context by Halvorson and Clifton (2002). Another challenge, championed by Fraser
(2008), comes from the non-existence of Fock space representations in interacting algebraic
QFTs.
21MacKinnon (2008) and Kuhlmann (2010) are other contributions to the recent debate about
which version of QFT ought to be the basis of philosophical enquiry.
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is to come.
Fraser (2009) distinguishes three formulations of QFT: the “infinitely renor-
malised”, “cutoff” and “formal” variants. The cutoff and formal variants cor-
respond to what I have called cutoff and continuum QFT models above. The
infinitely renormalised variant refers to the characterisation of QFT that seems
to be implicated by the perturbative renormalisation procedure. I will have more
to say about this supposed variant in chapter 3 but, since it is not central to
the core debate, I put it aside for now. Limiting herself to the φ4 theory on two
dimensional Minkowski space-time, which, as I mentioned above, has been shown
to admit a continuum formulation, Fraser claims that the choice between these
three formulations of QFT is underdetermined by empirical evidence. Rather
than drawing an anti-realist moral however, Fraser argues that theoretical con-
siderations break the underdetermination in favour of the continuum formulation.
The key idea here is that the project of unifying quantum and relativistic physics
is integral to QFT, and while continuum models fulfil this commitment, cutoff
models do not.22 For Fraser then it is the axiomatic approach to QFT, and
its constructive field theory offshoot, which philosophers ought to be engaging
with.
Wallace takes a very different view of the situation facing the philosopher of
physics. According to him we ought to be focusing on the approach to QFT
found in mainstream physics which he calls, variously, “Lagrangian” (Wallace,
2006) and “conventional” (Wallace, 2011) QFT and associates with what I called
cutoff QFT models.23 There is something inapt about both of these terms in my
view. The status of the Lagrangian representation of the dynamics is not a crucial
issue here and the suggestion that it is a cutoff formulation of the standard model
that is directly employed in high energy physics is somewhat misleading. Most of
the empirical predictions of the QFT programme do not come directly from cutoff
QFT structures, and those that do are based on simulations on Euclidean lattices,
as briefly described above. What Wallace really wants to say, I think, is that the
empirical and explanatory successes of contemporary high energy physics can be
attributed to cutoff QFT models, a claim which he bases on results gleaned from
the renormalisation group framework. Given these successes, and the relative
failure of the axiomatic/constructive programme to produce empirically viable
models, the claim is that it is cutoff formulations of the standard model, and
other realistic QFTs, which the scientific realist should be focusing on. Crucially
22Fraser (2009) frames this argument in the context of the apparent threat to the consistency
of QFT posed by Haag’s theorem. The axiomatic approach is said to supply a principled
response to this problem, while imposing cutoffs avoids the problem in an ad hoc manner.
23More precisely, Wallace focuses on systems with an ultraviolet cutoff. He has a different
position regarding the status of the infrared cutoff, as will be discussed in more detail in
chapter 6.
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though, Wallace does not take cutoff QFT models to be exact descriptions of
reality. On the contrary, on his account QFT is an “intrinsically approximate”
theory which makes no claims about the way the world is at arbitrarily small
length scales (Wallace, 2006, 46).
There are a number of factors underlying this dispute; I will briefly touch on
four key issues here which will be picked up on, in one way or another, in later
chapters. One of the key points of contention is the significance of renormalisa-
tion group methods. According to Wallace, the renormalisation group approach
has largely solved the problems which the axiomatic QFT project was originally
trying to address. Recall that axiomatic QFT originated, at least in part, in an
attempt to provide a non-perturbative framework which could shore up the inad-
equacies of the perturbative approach. Wallace claims that the renormalisation
group analysis has resolved the mathematical and conceptual puzzles with the
perturbative approach and thus left axiomatic QFT without a tangible motiva-
tion. Fraser expounds a radically different perspective on the renormalisation
group. In her view these methods represent an important breakthrough in artic-
ulating the “empirical content” of QFT—that is, they facilitate the extraction of
empirical predictions—but they do not tell us about the theoretical content of
QFT—they do not help to answer the question of which version of QFT should
be taken to be canonical for the purposes of foundational research.
Another issue over which they disagree is the force of Fraser’s underdetermination
argument, just sketched. Wallace points out that, while Fraser’s underdetermina-
tion scenario might hold in the case of toy models like φ4 theory in two dimensions,
it does not hold for realistic theories QFTs like QED and QCD because they have
no known continuum formulation. Fraser counters this line by stressing that the
continuum field theory project is a work in progress and that the mere possibility
of continuum versions of realistic QFT is sufficient for her arguments in support of
the axiomatic approach to go through (Fraser, 2011). A third issue, which plays
into their diverging assessments of this argument, concerns the status of special
relativity within QFT. As Fraser makes clear in her presentation of her underde-
termination argument, she takes the project of unifying relativity and quantum
theory to be integral to QFT. By contrast, Wallace does not take a commitment
to relativistic space-time structure because on his view QFT makes no claims
about the fundamental nature of space-time at all. He claims that cutoff QFT’s
are approximately Poincare´ covariant and this is all we can reasonably demand
given their status as effective theories.
Finally, besides these issues which are entangled with the details of the QFT
programme, we can also detect broader methodological differences underlying the
dispute. As Fraser makes explicit, she and Wallace have different understandings
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of the whole project of interpreting QFT:
By ‘interpretation’ I mean the activity of giving an answer to the fol-
lowing hypothetical question: ‘If QFT were true, what would reality
be like?’ In contrast, the interpretive question that Wallace focuses
on is ‘Given that QFT is approximately true, what is reality (approx-
imately) like?’ (Fraser 2009, 558).
While Fraser makes clear that approximate notions are not permitted in her
approach to interpretation, the thrust of Wallace claims about QFT is that the
theory furnishes us with partial representations of the world. Yet while both
authors seem to recognise that these background methodological assumption play
an important role in the debate very little is said in support their preferred
construals of the philosophy of QFT project.
In sum, we have two radically different visions of what QFT is, and how the
project of philosophically engaging with it should proceed. On the face of it,
this disagreement over the formulation of QFT needs to be resolved before any
philosophical conclusions which might interest the general philosopher of science
or the metaphysician can be drawn from high energy physics.
1.3 Overview of the Thesis
This thesis develops a response to the challenge posed by the theoretical diversity
of the QFT programme. I suggest that we should move away from the idea that
there is a canonical formulation of QFT that needs to be determined before philo-
sophical engagement can begin. Instead, I put forward a more pluralist method-
ological approach to the QFT programme which allows that different theoretical
frameworks may be the right starting points for tackling different philosophical
issues. The central claim of the thesis is that while the axiomatic formulations of
QFT advocated by Doreen Fraser represent a relevant framework for addressing
important questions about the internal relationship between theoretical princi-
ples, and in particular the issue of whether quantum theory can be unified with
special relativity in a deep sense, cutoff QFT models have the capacity to express
all of the claims about the world we have any right to believe on the basis of the
QFT programme. The perspective advocated here is, therefore, perhaps closer
to Wallace’s side of the debate in its spirit; indeed, much of the discussion can
be understood as clarifying and building upon ideas found in Wallace’s work.
But I will suggest that we can consistently maintain an important role for the
axiomatic and constructive approach to QFT within this framework. My answer
to the question of whether philosophers should be engaging with axiomatic or
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cutoff characterisations of QFT is ultimately ‘both’.
Chapter 2 sets out this methodological stance in the abstract. Picking up on the
aforementioned disagreement between Fraser and Wallace regarding the objec-
tives of the interpretive project, I subject some orthodox ideas about the method-
ology of the philosophy of physics to sustained criticism and put forward a broader
framework in their place. Specifically, I argue that investigations of a particular
physical theory ought to include consideration of a theory’s relationship to the ac-
tual world and not merely its truth conditional semantics. Furthermore, drawing
on comparisons with similar debates in which stalemates arise over the existence
of multiple inequivalent formulations of a theory, I argue that the right response
is to relativise our choice of formalism to a particular line of philosophical en-
quiry. This leads to a more piecemeal approach to the different stands of the
QFT programme. Rather than asking which approach to the theory is ‘correct’
we can simply ask how each bears on particular philosophical issues.
Chapter 3 applies this methodological stance by offering an analysis of the pertur-
bative approach to QFT. Drawing on resources from the philosophical literature
on scientific modelling I put forward an analysis of perturbative QFT according
to which it is in the business of producing approximations rather than explicitly
constructing quantum systems. This leads to a reassessment of the foundational
standing of the perturbative approach. The real problem with QFT perturba-
tion theory, and perturbative renormalisation, on this account is not that it is
mathematically unrigorous or inconsistent, as philosophers have often thought,
but that it leaves us without a physical explanation for its success.
Chapter 4 turns to the renormalisation group approach to QFT. Contra Fraser,
and others who advocate an instrumental reading of the role of the renormali-
sation group in the QFT programme, I argue that this approach has important
philosophical implications. On the one hand, I discuss how the renormalisation
group framework bears on the question of when continuum QFT models exist.
More importantly however, I claim that it has ramifications for the kind of rep-
resentational success which ought to be attributed to QFT models. I sketch how
the renormalisation group framework solves the aforementioned problem with the
perturbative approach by providing a justification for the perturbative renormal-
isation procedure and argue that this story should lead us to take cutoff QFTs to
accurately describe reality on scales far removed from the cutoffs. What emerges
is a view of QFT models as coarse-grained representations of the world.
The later chapters of the thesis are concerned with fleshing out this perspective
on the representational success of QFT models and defending it against possible
objections. One worry about taking cutoff QFT models seriously in this way
is that they violate Poincare´ covariance and therefore appear to be in conflict
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with relativity. Chapter 5 examines this issue in depth. I suggest that all the
evidence is that cutoff QFT models are approximately Poincare´ covariant in a
sense which can be made fairly precise. A more subtle issue about the theoretical
status of relativistic principles in the QFT programme remains however. Apply-
ing the aforementioned pluralist approach to variant formulations of a theory, I
distinguish the question of whether QFTs can be constructed on four dimensional
Minkowski space-time from the question of what we ought to believe about the
world given the success of the standard model. In the later context I claim that
there is no license to demand Poincare´ covariance down to arbitrarily small length
scales.
Another potentially worrying feature of cutoff models is that, if both an ultravi-
olet and infrared cutoff are imposed, the resulting system has a finite number of
degrees of freedom. This rules out the possibility of unitarily inequivalent Hilbert
space representations which some philosophers of physics take to play a role in
high energy physics. In particular, Ruetsche (2003, 2006, 2011) has argued that
these resources afforded by the limit of infinite degrees of freedom are indispens-
ably involved in the explanation of spontaneous symmetry breaking phenomena
in quantum theory and consequently need to be taken physically seriously. I take
this challenge head on by questioning whether the role played by novel properties
of infinite systems in this context really motivates taking them representationally
seriously. I put forward an approach to understanding how standard theoreti-
cal accounts of spontaneous symmetry breaking in statistical mechanics and high
energy physics are successful which avoids the need to reify these properties.
Finally, chapter 7 reconnects with more general issues in the philosophy of sci-
ence and tackles the question of what a realist stance towards QFT amounts
to. Rejecting claims about the pragmatic status of cutoff QFTs, I claim that
scientific realism is actually easier to make sense of in this context. Realists
have long struggled to spell out the sense in which our best physical theories
are ‘approximately true’. I argue that the renormalisation group helps address
this problem by providing a framework for identifying which features of QFT
models latch onto the world in the absence of detailed information about future
physics. I also address Doreen Fraser’s claim that underdetermination between
cutoff and continuum QFT models stands against a realist reading of the latter.
I suggest that the kind of underdetermination we find in the QFT programme
actually strengthens my claims about the partial representational success of QFT
models.
Before we enter into the substance of the discussion I would like to conclude
this chapter by making explicit some of the background assumptions driving the
approach taken in this thesis. First of all, I will be assuming, rather than arguing
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for, a broadly realist view of science and, no doubt, beg the question against
the anti-realist in many places. In general, I have conceived this project in a
constructive spirit—my goal has been to develop a well motivate perspective on
the QFT programme, not to establish that it is the only viable view of it. My
guiding question has not been should we be realists about QFT, but what might
a realist view of QFT look like.
In terms of my general perspective on the philosophy of science, I have tended to
err on the side of caution, taking the more conservative route wherever possible.
This is not to say that QFT cannot form the basis for revisionary ideas regard-
ing the structure and semantics of scientific theories, emergence and reduction,
explanation, and so on—I will flag the possibility of taking a less conventional
route at various junctures. An overriding theme of this thesis however will be
that we do not need to reinvent the philosophy of science in order to make sense
of QFT. We can make progress in analysing the QFT programme using fairly
orthodox philosophical resources. I will tend to speak in the language of the
dominant semantic approach to the structure of scientific theories, though I will
be fairly fast and loose with the terms ‘theory’ and ‘model’—I will, for instance,
speak interchangeably of the φ4 theory and the φ4 model. Both of these terms, of
course, have been taken to mean a great many things by different philosophers,
and are often used in conflicting ways in the scientific literature. For the most
part, subtleties about exactly how these terms should be understood will not
impinge on my discussion and I have opted for sloppiness over pedantry.24
One final point I want to touch on concerns the term ‘effective field theory’, which
has perhaps been conspicuous by its absence in the discussion so far. While the
perspective taken in this thesis is in many respects inspired by the effective field
theory turn in high energy physics since the 1970s, I will make sparse use of
this term. This is more a choice of convenience than of principle. The effective
field theory language has connotations which are not necessarily helpful. In the
physics literature effective field theory is often used to refer to a specific set of
ideas and techniques within the perturbative approach to QFT that I will not
be discussing in detail here, and is typically not applied to lattice QFT, which I
will be discussing. On the other hand, the term can be used in a much broader
sense to refer to any theory which has a limited domain of descriptive adequacy.
On this interpretation however, the meaning seems to me to be, at best, a mi-
nor precisification of what philosophers of science usually mean when they say
that a theory is approximately true (I expand on this connection in chapter 7).
Indeed the thrust of this thesis will be that taking QFTs to be effective field the-
ories in this sense is not a radical departure from previous ideas in physics and
24Though I will have a few words to say about the term ‘model’ in chapter 2.
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the philosophy of science; it is similar to the relationship which, say, Newtonian
gravity bears to the world. Furthermore, in the philosophical literature, the no-
tion of an effective field theory has been associated with controversial ideas about
anti-reductionism (Bain, 2013a) and anti-foundationalist metaphysics (Cao and
Schweber, 1993) which are best avoided in my view. While I will be developing
an effective field theory view of QFT then, I have, for the most part, chosen to
express these ideas in more mundane philosophical terminology.
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Formulation and Interpretation
2.1 In Search of a Methodological Framework
This chapter is concerned with how philosophical engagement with theoretical
physics in general ought to be understood. We have already seen some reasons
for thinking that the methodological framework of the philosophy of physics needs
to be reassessed in light of the challenges posed by the QFT programme. It is
usually assumed that the formalism of a theory must be fixed at the outset of
foundational investigation, but, as I described in the previous chapter, in the case
of QFT philosophical problems already seem to enter at this stage. Furthermore,
one of the factors I identified as underlying Fraser and Wallace’s dispute over
the formulation of QFT in the previous chapter was that they disagree about the
nature of the philosophical project itself. For Fraser interpreting QFT is a matter
of spelling out what the world would be like if the theory were true; for Wallace
the key philosophical issue is what we can say about the actual world given that it
is approximately described by QFT. It seems inevitable then that questions about
the broader goals of the philosophical engagement with the physical sciences will
need to be broached if we are to make progress in resolving the formulation
problem.
I start by examining a common story about the task of the philosopher of physics,
sometimes called the standard account of interpretation, which takes philosophi-
cal engagement with a physical theory to be centrally concerned with the possible
worlds in which it is true. Whatever the merits of this doctrine, I argue that the
full range of philosophical issues that physical theories actually provoke cannot
be expressed in these terms (§2.2). On the one hand, I make the case that our
understanding of a physical theory turns on epistemic judgements about its rep-
resentational success, which are not included in a specification of the possible
worlds it exactly describes. §2.3 sketches a broader framework for regimenting
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philosophical investigations of physical theories which incorporates claims about
how the content of the theory relates to the physics of the actual world. On
the other hand, I claim the standard account does not provide a mechanism for
addressing the existence of variant formulations of a theory. We know that this
is a problem in the case of QFT, but I suggest that this issue also occurs in many
other branches of physics. In §2.4 I argue that the best response to the existence
of inequivalent formalisms is to simply abandon the idea that there is a single
canonical formulation of a physical theory. Instead we should look to justify our
interest in one formulation over another within the context of a particular philo-
sophical project. §2.5 considers the ramifications of these ideas for approaching
the QFT programme and sketches how they will be employed later on in the the-
sis. Throughout I make use of examples drawn from classical physics to illustrate
and motivate my claims.
2.2 The Standard Account and its Deficiencies
The philosophy of physics is often said to be about interpreting physical theories,
but what does this mean exactly? Much of the time nobody worries too much
about this question. Foundational issues raised by particular physical theories
often seem to be adequately stated in purely local terms. On the occasions
that philosophers of physics do address the nature of the interpretive project in
the abstract however, they typically endorse a view which Ruetsche (2011) calls
the standard account. On this view, an interpretation of a physical theory is a
specification of the class of possible worlds in which it is true.1
This notion of interpretation, I suggest, is at base a semantic one. Philosophers
of physics, the advocate of the standard account will say, are concerned with
what physical theories say about the world—that is, what they mean. A popular
view in the philosophy of language is that the semantic content of a proposition is
given by the set of possible worlds in which it is true. Furthermore, this approach
to content fits well with, and is, in fact, incorporated within, many versions of the
dominant semantic view of scientific theories. Within the purview of the stan-
dard account, the process of stating a physical theory can be thought of as a two
step process.2 In the first, structural phase, a mathematical formalism is spec-
ified, which for proponents of the semantic view means a class of mathematical
1Explicit endorsements of the standard account can be found in Belot (1998), Rickles (2008)
van Fraassen (1991), and Ruetsche (2011). Often this view is tacitly assumed: the talk of
classical and relativistic worlds in Earman (1986) being one example among many.
2I follow Ruetsche (2011) here. Van Fraassen often tells a similar story, and endorses a charac-
terisation of the second semantic phase in terms of possible worlds, in his presentations of the
semantic view—see, for instance, van Fraassen (1980, 1991).
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structures. In the case of general relativity, for instance, the relevant structures
are typically taken to be of the form (M, gµν , Tµν), where M is a manifold, and
gµν and Tµν are tensor fields defined on it that satisfy the Einstein equations. At
this stage all we have are mathematical objects. For the theory to make claims
about the physical world, as general relativity surely does, we need to add some
prescription for assigning physical content to these structures. According to the
standard account, this second semantic phase boils down to providing a charac-
terisation of the possible worlds which the theory exactly describes, where these
worlds are taken to be physical, as opposed to merely mathematical, objects.3
The operative question then is the one Fraser endorses in her discussion of QFT:
what would the world be like if the theory were true. Indeed, it seems clear that
the standard account of interpretation guides Fraser’s approach to QFT.
Of course, if an interpretation is an assignment of meaning to a theory’s formal-
ism then it is surely not only of interest to philosophers. Physicists are not doing
pure mathematics, and their theories clearly come equipped with some prescrip-
tions about what the relevant mathematical structures represent—the models of
general relativity are taken to describe space-time and the distribution of matter-
energy over it. If the advocate of the standard account is being careful then, they
ought to say that the job of the philosopher of physics is to make the physical
content of already partially interpreted theories more precise—which for them
just means saying something more precise about the ways the world could be ac-
cording to the theory. The debate surrounding the hole argument, for instance,
is quite naturally cast in these terms: assignments of physical content to gen-
eral relativity which treat diffeomorphic models as representing distinct possible
worlds are shown to be problematic, with the residual puzzle being how best to
characterise the worlds actually described by the theory.
I do not want to reject the standard account outright here. There are interesting
motivations for moving away from a possible world semantics for physical theo-
ries which I am not unsympathetic with.4 I am not convinced that we need to
take this revisionary path to make sense of the QFT programme however; we can
make progress in understanding QFT and high energy physics while accepting
the orthodox conception of physical content embodied in the standard account.
What I do want to object to however is the claim, often loosely implied in presen-
tations of the standard account, that all philosophical issues posed by physical
3How the notion of possible worlds should be understood is, of course, a matter of debate
amongst metaphysicians and philosophers of language, but I take it nothing I have to say here
is sensitive to these issues.
4Frisch (2005) and Curiel (2011) both reject the standard account and a possible world semantics
for physical theories. Mark Wilson’s work on the semantics of scientific theories also seems
to have similar morals (Wilson, 2006). My hope is that the key claims of this thesis will be
recoverable, in one way or another, within revisionary approaches to theory semantics.
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theories boil down to questions about the class of possible worlds in which they
are true.
There are two challenges to viewing the standard account as a comprehensive
methodological framework in this sense that I want to focus on here. The first
arises in the initial structural phase. On the naive picture just sketched, one starts
a philosophical investigation of a theory by writing down mathematical structures
which constitute its formalism, perhaps copying from a nearby textbook. As we
have seen, in the case of QFT matters are not this straightforward; there are a
number of mathematical frameworks that physicists and philosophers take to fall
under the QFT umbrella, and the question of which set of models constitutes the
canonical formulation of QFT is itself a matter of considerable controversy. Really
though matters are not this straightforward for any physical theory: there are
Newtonian, Lagrangian and Hamiltonian formulations of classical mechanics; flat
space and curved space formulations of Newtonian gravitation; Boltzmanian and
Gibbsian formulations of statistical mechanics; and so the list goes on. Before we
can engage with a theory in the way that the standard account prescribes there
is often a philosophically non-trivial question about which formalism we ought to
start with.
There are, of course, well trodden ways of responding to the proliferation of alter-
native formulations of a theory. Many of the apparently distinct formulations of
physical theories we find in scientific practice are commonly thought to be equiv-
alents. Newtonian, Lagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics are often taken to
be equivalent rather than rival formulations of classical mechanics, for instance.5
But while appealing to some notion of theoretical equivalence may abate the
problem of variant formalisms somewhat I will argue in §2.4 that it does not
completely resolve the issue. For many branches of physics there are multiple
prima facie reasonable ways of choosing a collection of mathematical models that
cannot plausibly be viewed as theoretically equivalent—QFT being one, but by
no means the only, such case.
The second, and perhaps more fundamental problem I see with the standard ac-
count as a putatively comprehensive methodological framework is that it is simply
not the case that all philosophical issues raised by physical theories concern their
semantics. The standard account gives us a way of understanding the physical
content of a theory but it does not say anything about how that content relates to
the actual world. This is often presented as a matter to be resolved by very general
epistemic considerations. The scientific realist believes that the theory is true,
5It is difficult to find uncontroversial examples of equivalent formalisms (we shall see some
possible reasons why in §2.4). Many philosophers do not agree that the Newtonian, La-
grangian and Hamiltonian frameworks are theoretically equivalent—see the debate between
North (2009) and Curiel (2014) over which version should be viewed as fundamental.
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and therefore that the actual world is among the class of possible worlds admit-
ted by the theory, while the constructive empiricist remains completely agnostic
about the theory’s truth. It seems to me, however, that presenting the question
as an all or nothing affair, settled entirely in the abstract, does not leave room
for the fine grained claims that philosophers, and scientists themselves, actually
make about the representational success of particular physical theories.
Consider Newtonian gravitation theory for instance (putting aside issues raised
by the existence of variant formulations for now). The standard account asks us
to delimit a class of worlds which are exactly described by the theory. These will
presumably be worlds in which there are absolute (i.e. frame independent) facts
about the temporal duration between events, which, in the wake of relativistic
physics, we do not believe actually obtain. It is not just that we know that our
world is not a Newtonian one then, we also make more selective judgements about
the features of the theory’s interpreted models which misrepresent real physical
systems. Spelling out what Newtonian gravity models get right about the world
also seems to be a thoroughly theory specific enterprise. There is a complex
story to tell about which features of Newtonian gravity models are embedded
within models of general relativity, for instance, which has been explored in detail
in foundational research—see, in particular, Malament (1986). This suggests
that the question of how a physical theory latches onto the world hangs on the
peculiarities of its structure, its relationship to other theories, and the kind of
empirical success it enjoys, and not just on the general epistemic issues discussed
in the traditional scientific realism debate. Furthermore, I think that these local
claims about which aspects of a theory’s models faithfully represent are, in an
important sense, part of our understanding of the theory which is missed if we
limit ourselves to the resources of the standard account. Motivating this view in
the context of the QFT programme will be one of my overarching aims in the
chapters that follow.
The next section develops this critique of the standard account and puts forward
my preferred way of incorporating theory-world relations into debates about par-
ticular physical theories. With this framework in place, I come back to the
problems posed by variant formalisms in §2.4.
2.3 Accommodating Theory-World Relations
I am not the first to think that the absence of any mention of the actual world
in the standard account leads us into trouble. Gorden Belot, for one, raises
this point in his discussion of the Aharonov-Bohm effect (Belot, 1998). The
Aharanov-Bohm effect is often taken to undermine the traditional view of clas-
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sical electrodynamics as a theory about the electromagnetic field. In one way
or another, we seem to need to attribute additional physical significance to the
vector potential to accommodate the relevant physics. As Belot points out, this
is difficult to make sense of on the standard account. Classical electrodynamics
and quantum mechanics presumably describe disjoint sets of possible worlds so
why should a quantum phenomenon tell us anything about the content of elec-
trodynamics? Furthermore, since classical electrodynamics is a false theory, it is
not clear what we learn from this kind of interpretive revision. Aren’t we sim-
ply making claims about possible worlds we know to be distinct from our own
on the standard account? What does this have to do with the physics of the
Aharanov-Bohm effect?
Belot’s solution is to add another layer to the standard account. We are not
only interested in the possible worlds which can be associated with a theory’s
formalism in Belot’s expanded framework, we also need to specify an additional
structure representing “our evaluation of the relative merits of each of the possi-
ble interpretations” (Belot, 1998, 551). Belot takes this to be an ordering relation
on the space of possible worlds encoding our assessment of their closeness to ac-
tuality. With this new apparatus in place he claims we can do a better job of
assimilating the philosophical ramifications of the Aharanov-Bohm effect. What
this quantum phenomenon is telling us, on this account, is that possible worlds
consisting of electric field configurations and assignments of holonomies to closed
curves in space are closer to the actual world than worlds consisting of classical
electromagnetic fields. This is supposed to explain how the revaluation process
triggered by the Aharanov-Bohm effect, and the philosophical investigation of
false theories more generally, can tell us something about our world. In so far
as claims about the closeness of other possible worlds constrain where the ac-
tual world might sit in the space of all possible worlds they are claims about
actuality.
Belot is on the right track here; we do need some way of talking about the
relationship a theory bears to the actual world if we are to do justice to the
full range of philosophical issues raised by theoretical physics. I doubt that a
closeness relation on the space of possible worlds is the right way go however. The
problem I see with Belot’s approach is that the relation of closeness holds between
worlds in toto—saying that one world is close to ours, or is closer than some other
world, does not tell us in what specific respects it resembles actuality. Notice that
the Newtonian gravity case introduced in the previous section displays many of
the features of the Aharanov-Bohm effect case, admittedly in a prima facie less
puzzling form. It is similarly unclear on the standard account why the advent of
general relativity ought to affect our understanding of Newtonian gravity at all,
since again these theories deal with distinct sets of possible worlds. The lesson I
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Figure 2.1: Schematic of the relationship between mathematical structures, phys-
ical models, and concrete systems out in the world.
drew from this case, however, was that we need to be able to accommodate more
selective claims about which parts of an interpreted theory’s content accurately
describe reality. The blanket claim that Newtonian worlds are close to ours does
not capture these more fine-grained judgments about the features of its models
that faithfully represent.
I will now sketch a framework which tries to do a better job of incorporating
the partial nature of theory-world relations. As in Belot’s approach, I suggest
we think of the process of stating a physical theory as dividing into three parts.
The first two are those already covered by the standard account: a class of math-
ematical structures is delimited and some physical content is assigned to these
structures (again, I am suppressing the issues raised by variant formalisms until
the following section). What we have at this stage is a class of physical systems,
associated with non-actual possible worlds on the standard account, whose prop-
erties can be investigated independently of any putative relation they bear to our
world. The final step, which I call the epistemic phase, amounts to providing
some prescriptions about the doxastic attitude we ought to take towards these
physical systems as representations of the actual world. In particular, and in con-
trast to Belot’s proposal, for me this comes down to identifying specific features
of a theory’s interpreted physical systems that should be taken to get things right.
(Figure 2.1 illustrates the relationship between a theory’s formalism, physically
interpreted systems and the world I have in mind here.)6
Exactly how the representation relation between scientific models and concrete
physical systems should be understood is an issue which has provoked much de-
6This framework helps to clarify a common confusion regarding the use of the word ‘model’ in
the philosophy of science. Proponents of the semantic view of theories often use the term in,
roughly, its logical sense, to mean a structure which satisfies a set of axioms. In much of the
literature on scientific modelling however, the term model is used to mean a representation
of another system. The picture I have sketched here supports Thomson-Jones’ (2006) claim
that these two meanings are, in principle, distinct. In the first stage of stating a physical
theory we have a collection of mathematical models, in the logical sense, which via a physical
interpretation become physical models, again in the logical sense. Only in the last phase do
these systems become models of real systems in the representational sense. As outlined in the
chapter 1 however, I will tend to use the term model in a deliberately loose way when these
kind of distinctions are not philosophically important.
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bate in recent years.7 I take it, however, that the fact that scientific models get
some features of their targets right while getting others wrong is something all
sides agree on and are ultimately trying to capture. Rather than taking sides
in this debate then I will sketch how I understand the process of carrying out
the epistemic phase in schematic terms which can presumably be fleshed out and
made more precise in the language of any viable approach to scientific repre-
sentation. When an interpreted mathematical structure is used to represent a
concrete physical system, I suggest, there are three attitudes we can take towards
its properties. We can take a property to be representationally faithful; that is
we can hold that the target system actually has that property. We can take a
property of the model to misrepresent; following the terminology Jones (2005) I
will refer to properties of a model which are not believed to be instantiated by the
target system as idealisations. Finally we can remain agnostic about whether the
target system has or does not have the property in question.8 Carrying out the
epistemic phase of analysing a physical theory, on this simple minded approach,
just means saying something about which properties of its models ought to be
treated as descriptively accurate, idealisations or neither.
With this machinery in hand we can make sense of what is going on in the New-
tonian gravity case (and, I hope, the impact of the Aharanov-Bohm effect on
classical electrodynamics as well, though discussing the subtleties of this case is
a story for another time). What has changed with the rise of general relativity is
that much of the content of Newtonian gravity theory is now thought to misde-
scribe the world. Newtonian gravity models, equipped with a suitable semantics,
make claims, not just about absolute durations, but also about gravitational
effects at long distances and in the presence of very large masses, which con-
temporary physicists believe to be false. As representations of actual gravitating
systems then these properties of Newtonian models are viewed as idealisations, in
the terminology just introduced. Yet other features of Newtonian gravity theory
are preserved in relativistic gravitational theory and can, at least provisionally,
be treated as descriptively accurate. Examining this issue in detail is a task
which calls for sophisticated engagement with the intertheoretic relations that
hold between the two theories. As Malament (1986) and Barrett (2006) describe
7Model-theoretic (French, 2003), similarity (Geire, 2004) and inferential (Saurez, 2004) accounts
of scientific representation have been put forward, to name but a few of the more prominent
approaches.
8A similar tripartite distinction is found in the partial structures approach to scientific repre-
sentation developed in da Costa and French’s (2003). Their approach is certainly one way
that the output of the epistemic phase might be formalised. The Bayesian formalism may also
provide a useful framework here. In this context we could generalise from belief, disbelief and
agnosticism to a continuum of attitudes towards particular aspects of the theory’s content. I
leave the possibility of clarifying the claims of this thesis within these formalisms as a topic
for future investigation.
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in detail, the sense in which Newtonian gravity latches onto the world is most
clearly illuminated in the geometric formulation of the theory, where the embed-
ding of its content within general relativity can be made mathematically precise.
In my view spelling out how a physical theory relates to the world in this way
represents an important contribution of our understanding of the theory and is
certainly a legitimate task for the philosophy of physics.
If we enlarge our methodological framework in this way the question which imme-
diately arises is how we go about making judgements about the representational
success of different features of a physical theory. As with its semantics the kind of
representational success a theory enjoys is not a mere philosophical afterthought.
The development of a theory in scientific practice invariably involves prescrip-
tions about how it describes and distorts the world, either explicitly or tacitly.
Indeed, these assumptions are often crucial in guiding how scientific models are
applied in practice. The philosophers job can, again, be viewed as a matter of
precisification, in this case the project being to pin down the kind of qualified
representational success which can rationally be attributed to a particular theory.
As I have already urged, a variety of local factors are important in carrying out
this task. A theory’s relationship to other, typically more fundamental, theo-
ries often plays an important role in identifying which of its features faithfully
represent and which are idealisations, the relationship between Newtonian and
relativistic gravitation theory we have already discussed being a prime example
of this kind of reasoning. In other contexts direct empirical information about
the target system can play a role in determining the representational status we
assign to a model. As will be discussed further in later chapters, physicists often
employ infinite volume systems, generated by the so-called thermodynamic limit,
to model the properties of concrete systems in statistical mechanics. We don’t
need any overarching theory to tell us that this is an idealisation—the pieces of
iron whose behaviour we are trying to describe clearly have a finite volume.
What about cases in which we do not have access to a more fundamental theory, or
relevant information about the target system, which can inform our assessment
of a theory’s representational success however? After all, this is more or less
the situation we find ourselves in with respect to QFT—extant quantum gravity
theories are arguably too speculative at present to provide any reliable guidance
about which aspects of current QFT models will be preserved in future physics.
There is a general principle which the realist philosopher of science can appeal to
here. Namely, that we ought to believe in those parts of a physical theory which
underwrite its predictive and explanatory successes. This is not a new idea. The
claim that we ought to reserve our optimism for the parts of a theory which
drive its success has become the dominant way of understanding the realists’
epistemic commitments in the face of challenges posed by theory change, classic
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exposition of this sort of doctrine being Kitcher’s (1993) distinction between
idle and working posits and Psillos’s (1999) “divide et impera” strategy. The
motivation for demarcating the belief worthy content of a theory in this way is a
local form of the no miracles intuition, the thought being that we need to take
the aspects of a theory which essentially contribute to it accurate predictions to
latch onto the world in order to explain these successes.9
In order to apply this criterion in practice though we need to say something
relatively precise about what it means for a constituent of a theory to underwrite,
or essentially contribute to, its empirical success (I focus on predictive success
here, but I will have more to say about explanatory success in chapter 6). One
standard approach, found in Psillos (1999) for instance, is to say that something
contributes to a prediction if it plays an indispensable role in its derivation—
that is if there are no alternative ways of deriving the result from the theory
which do not make use of this property. For our purposes, however, a slightly
different modal characterisation of what it means for something to underwrite a
prediction will be useful (though I won’t be defending it as a universally applicable
definition here). The idea is that a property of a model contributes to a particular
prediction if varying it necessarily spoils its empirical accuracy in this respect. To
use terminology which has recently gained currency in the scientific explanation
literature, we might say that it makes a difference to the relevant observable
property.10 Conversely, a property of model does not contribute to an empirical
success, and consequently is not supported by it, if it can be varied without
affecting its predictive accuracy. A simple example may help to illustrate what
I have in mind here. The simple pendulum model, which neglects air resistive
forces correctly predicts that the time period of a pendulum is approximately
proportional to the square root of its length. Adding a small non-zero air resistive
force to the model does not affect this prediction and consequently the assumption
that air resistance is zero does not contribute to this empirical success. I will be
plying this criterion into service in my discussion of the representational success
of QFT models in chapter 4.
9Of course, the anti-realist will balk at this. Van Fraassen holds that the empirical success of
particular theory calls for no explanation while the empirical adequacy of science as a whole
can be accounted for without invoking truth or accurate representation (van Fraassen, 1980,
40). As I set out in chapter 1 however, I will be flagrantly begging the question against the
anti-realist .
10Where Psillos’s deductive characterisation of what it means for something to ‘essentially
contribute’ to a prediction is perhaps allied to deductivist approach to explanation, my char-
acterisation here is closely related to modal accounts of explanation defended in Woodward
(2005) and Strevens (2008). There are subtle issues relating to how the notion of difference
making should be understood which have been glossed over here—exploring the connections
with the broader debate surrounding scientific explanation is an interesting topic for further
discussion. The criterion suggested here is also inspired, in part, by the discussion of idealised
models in Saatsi (2016a).
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I close this section with a few clarificatory remarks about the methodological
system which has emerged from the discussion so far. First, a terminological
note. Should the expanded framework just described be understood as a new
account of what it means to interpret a physical theory, or as an injunction that
interpretive questions do not exhaust the purview of the philosophy of physics?
This is ultimately just a matter of how we choose to use the term interpretation.
There is a case to be made for keeping interpretation as a purely semantic notion
however. For one thing, this maintains the connection with interpretation in the
standard logical sense and avoids potential misunderstandings with advocates of
the standard account. But, perhaps more importantly for my purposes, using
interpretation to refer to the full three stage process as a whole will likely lead to
a blurring of semantic and epistemic issues which should be recognised as separate
in my view. To keep this distinction clear I will continue to use interpretation in its
standard account sense and treat the specification of a theory’s representational
status as an extra-interpretive matter.
I should also make clear that I am not claiming that all philosophical issues
raised by physical theories concern their relationship to the world. As far as
I am concerned, we would do best to avoid general proclamations about what
is, and is not, a legitimate topic for philosophical enquiry and interesting issues
arise at all three levels of analysis just distinguished. Philosophers of physics
certainly sometimes investigate physical theories in a purely internal mode, as it
were, remaining at the semantic level and bracketing any questions about how
the theory relates to the world. We can investigate the status of space-time in
string theory, for instance, while remaining completely agnostic about its claims
about the world—I will have more to say about this kind of enquiry in the next
section. The point here is simply that epistemic issues are raised in the analysis
of particular physical theories and we need resources to deal with them in our
philosophy of physics toolbox. In fact, I suspect that epistemic questions do play
a more important role in extant debates in the philosophy of physics than they
are often given credit for, though supporting this claim in detail would require a
thorough survey of the field. In any case, I will be arguing that they certainly
play an important role in understanding the QFT programme in the chapters
that follow.
Finally, I should stress again that my primary objective here has been to marshal
sufficient resources for the task at hand not to put forward a stand alone account of
the structure, semantics and epistemic status of scientific theories. Accordingly,
the framework I have put forward here should be understood in a provisional
spirit. I have already said, I am open to the possibility of moving away from a
possible world semantics for physical theories, and I am similarly open minded
about the details of how theory-world relations are made precise. My hope is
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that the claims about the QFT programme put forward in later chapters are not
overly sensitive to the way these issues are handled and should be recoverable
within many approaches to theory semantics and scientific representation. To
reiterate once more, the most important point here is that philosophers of physics
need to take seriously both semantic and epistemic issues in their investigations
of physical theories and that this necessarily means going beyond the standard
account. The following section returns to the other problem I identified with
taking the standard account to provide a comprehensive guide to the philosophy
of physics: the existence of variant formalisms.
2.4 Accommodating Variant Formalisms
On both the standard account and the expanded framework put forward in the
previous section the first step of stating a physical theory is to supply a mathe-
matical formalism. As I pointed out however, there are many alternative formu-
lations, not just of QFT, but of almost any physical theory you care to mention.
How should we proceed in the face of this kind of diversity at the formal level?
One reason this is not always perceived as a pressing issue is that many of the
formulations of physical theories found in the scientific literature are assumed to
be equivalent. If Newtonian, Lagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics are sim-
ply different ways of stating the same hypotheses about the world, for instance,
then the dilemma about choosing between them disappears. But while identi-
fying equivalent formulations of a theory in this way is surely part of the story
here, it does not completely resolve the issues raised by the existence of variant
formalisms, as I will now argue.
The most immediate challenge facing any attempt to diffuse the problem of vari-
ant formalisms along these lines is the need for a principled way of identifying
equivalent formulations of a theory: that is, an account of theoretical equivalence.
Unfortunately this has proven to be a contentious philosophical project in its own
right. I will briefly give my take on the extant debate surrounding this issue before
going on to claim that no plausible account of theoretical equivalence identifies all
prima facie reasonable formulations of a physical theory—in many contexts the
question of how to accommodate variant formalisms inevitably remains.
Many accounts of theoretical equivalence take it to be a purely formal relation
which holds between uninterpreted mathematical formalisms. On the syntac-
tic view of theories propagated by the logical positivists, which took physical
theories to be axiomatic systems, it was natural to try to analyse theoretical
equivalence in terms of logical equivalence. It was soon realised however that
logical equivalence is too stringent a condition as it automatically distinguish
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theories formulated in different languages. Various attempts were made to de-
velop more nuanced definitions of theoretical equivalence based on the possibility
of translating between theories expressed in different languages, the account given
in Quine (1975) being a prominent example. Owing in part to the lack of syn-
tactic axiomatisations of interesting physical theories the concrete implications
of these definitions were difficult to assess and no syntactic account of theoretical
equivalence gained widespread acceptance.
Indeed, the difficulty with capturing the identity conditions of scientific theories in
the syntactic framework was one of the original motivations driving the rise of the
semantic view, which takes a theory’s formalism to consist of a class mathemati-
cal structures rather than an axiomatic system.11 In this framework isomorphism
becomes the natural vehicle for an analysis of theoretical equivalence. The defini-
tion which immediately suggests itself is that two theories are equivalent if each
mathematical model of the first is isomorphic to a mathematical model of the
second. Again however, this doesn’t seem to be quite right. Halvorson (2012)
has recently raised technical objections to analysing theoretical equivalence in
terms of isomorphisms between mathematical models alone. Drawing on various
examples from pure mathematics, Halvorson argues that isomorphism on its own
is both too strong, in the sense that it equates theories which ought to be dis-
tinct, and too weak, in the sense that it distinguishes theories which ought to be
equivalent. One potentially counterintuitive consequence of the definition given
above, for instance, is that Lagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics turn out to
not be theoretically equivalent because their models are structurally distinct—
the configuration space of the Lagrangian approach is a tangent bundle while the
phase space of Hamiltonian mechanics is a cotangent bundle.12
Halvorson seems to be optimistic that the failure of previous formal definitions
of theoretical equivalence is due to a lack of mathematical sophistication and
points to category theory as a possible framework for a more promising approach.
While attempts to analyse theoretical equivalence in category theoretic terms are
in their infancy there are general reasons to doubt that this programme will yield
a universally adequate formal definition of theoretical equivalence. Coffey (2014)
has recently argued, to my mind convincingly, that theoretical equivalence is
not a relation which holds between uninterpreted formalisms at all. One simple
minded argument to this effect is that we do not intuitively identify theories
11Suppe often presents the semantic view as superior in part because it does a better job of
capturing the identity criteria of scientific theories. He writes, for instance: “As actually
employed by working scientists, theories admit of a number of alternative linguistic formu-
lations... As such, scientific theories cannot be identified with their linguistic formulations.”
(Suppe, 1989, 82).
12Having said this some authors take the structural distinctness of Hamiltonian and Lagrangian
mechanics to indicate that they are genuinely distinct theories—see North (2008) and Curiel
(2014).
31
CHAPTER 2. FORMULATION AND INTERPRETATION
which employ the same mathematical formalism in radically different scientific
domains. To borrow an example from van Fraassen (2014), though the same field
equation—the diffusion/heat equation—is used to describe both the diffusion of a
gas and spread of heat throughout a system, it seems highly unnatural to suggest
that these models are one and the same. Another point raised by Coffey is that
it is difficult to make sense of the widespread disagreement among philosophers
about which theories are in fact equivalent if it is a purely formal question. Quine
(1975) takes theories in euclidean space and ‘Poincare´ theories’, which mimic
the effects of euclidean geometry by positing compensating universal forces, to
be paradigm cases of equivalent theories, while Psillos (1999), and others, take
them to be obvious inequivalents. It seems clear that the dissagreement here is
not about the formal relations between the two theories but rather springs from
different interpretive judgements about their physical content.
In opposition to previous formal approaches Coffey (2014) advances a view which
takes the relata of the theoretical equivalence relation to be completely interpreted
theories.13 On this account, two theories are equivalent if they share the same
physical content, which on the standard account’s analysis of physical content
simply means that they pick out the same set of possible worlds. In my view this
is the most plausible approach to theoretical equivalence currently on the market
(though my preference for this account will not play a crucial role in the claims of
this section, or the broader argument of this thesis). It captures the key intuition
that two theories are equivalents if they say the same thing about the world, since,
in the framework I have been developing here, a theory’s mathematical formalism
on its own says nothing about the world at all until it has been furnished with a
physical semantics. A potentially disheartening feature of this account however
is that it makes judgements about theoretical equivalence hostage to difficult
questions about the semantic interpretation of particular physical theories.
What is the upshot of this debate for the challenge posed by variant formalisms?
For one thing, it suggests that appealing to the notion of theoretical equivalence
is not going to be a quick fix. On either of the approaches just discussed de-
ciding whether two formulations of a theory are equivalent is a non-trivial task.
For believers in a formal approach careful mathematical work will presumably
be needed to determine whether the formalisms employed in scientific practice
can, in fact, be identified, while on Coffey’s account equivalence claims become
13Note that rejecting formal accounts of theoretical equivalence certainly does not mean that
the mathematical relations between theoretical formalisms are irrelevant to questions of equiv-
alence. The existence of isomorphisms between formulations of a theory, for instance, will
influence how we understand their content. In this way, bringing category theory and other
resources from pure mathematics to bear on physical theories may well inform our judgements
about which particular theories are equivalent, in so far as this programme impacts on our
understanding of their physical content.
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a function of semantic interpretation, meaning that the formal and semantic
phases of specifying a theory will have to be explored in tandem for a number of
variant formalisms. Either way, the result is a more sophisticated picture than
the naive reading of the standard account originally described above, on which
questions about a theory’s formalism are simply decided by consulting a physics
textbook.
More importantly for our purposes however, we are now in a position to see
that none of these approaches to theoretical equivalence, or any plausible fu-
ture account, will identify all of the variant formulations of physical theories
as equivalents. There are genuinely inequivalent formulations of many (perhaps
all) physical theories which are on equal footing as far as the mathematics is
concerned. The QFT programme offers a clear example in which variant formu-
lations of a theory cannot reasonably be identified. Though philosophers disagree
about the nature of theoretical equivalence there are certain general conditions
which everyone agrees equivalent theories must satisfy. One of them is empirical
equivalence—they must be indistinguishable by any possible observation. Cut-
off and continuum formulations of QFT do not seem to pass this test;14 as we
shall see in later chapters, while cutoff theories may be in very close empirical
agreement with continuum models in many contexts they always assign different
values to observable quantities. Furthermore, cutoff and continuum QFT dif-
fer with respect to fundamental theoretical properties: continuum QFTs have
infinite degrees of freedom, while QFT models with an ultraviolet and infrared
cutoff violate Poincare´ covariance and have finite degrees of freedom. On any vi-
able physical interpretation of these structures then, they surely cannot be saying
the same thing about the world.
While QFT is a particularly contentious and complex case in which inequivalent
formulations of a theory arise, it is certainly not the only such case. In fact,
the need to accept the existence of multiple inequivalent formulations of a theory
has been noted in a number of recent debates in the philosophy of physics. As
Vickers (2013) discusses in depth, this is a recurring theme, and frequent source
of miscommunication, in debates about inconsistency in science. To take just
one example, Frisch (2005) notoriously argues that classical electrodynamics is
inconsistent, while Belot (2007) and Muller (2007) contest this. As Vickers (2008,
2013) points out however, these authors make their respective claims about dif-
ferent, and clearly inequivalent formulations of the theory—crucially, Frisch and
his detractors employ different versions of the Lorentz force law. Consequently,
there is a sense in which the participants in this debate are talking past one
another: Frisch, Belot and Muller give different verdicts on the consistency of
14This point is discussed further in §7.4.
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classical electrodynamics, but they also take ‘classical electrodynamics’ to refer
to different things.15
Another context in which this kind of ambiguity arises is the recent debate sur-
rounding determinism in Newtonian mechanics, and in particular the ‘Norton
dome’ model introduced by Norton (2008). This simple indeterministic system
was designed to show that Newtonian mechanics is not, in fact, a deterministic
theory. Some philosophers have responded by arguing that the dome model, as
Norton describes it, is not a legitimate Newtonian system at all. Zinkernagel
(2010), for instance, argues that, on a proper interpretation of Newton’s first law,
the indeterministic solutions appealed to by Norton are ruled out. As Fletcher
(2012) describes in detail, the dome is an example of a system which admits inde-
terministic solutions because the relevant force function violates the property of
Lipschitz continuity. There are various ways of demanding Lipschitz continuity
during the formulation of Newtonian mechanics which would eliminate the inde-
terminism here and there may well be good motivations to construe the theory
in this way—indeed, if Zinkernagel is right, this may be a more accurate formal-
isation of Newton’s historical conception of the theory. Again, the question of
whether Newtonian mechanics is deterministic or not comes down to which ver-
sion of the theory you chose, with different philosophers in the debate adopting
different inequivalent formulations.
Naively applying the standard account to these debates seems to lead to a stale-
mate as each side is talking about inequivalent theories, and therefore different
sets of possible worlds. After a detour via the theoretical equivalence debate
then, we have essentially arrived back at the question we started out with: how
should philosophers negotiate the diverse range of genuinely distinct formulations
of physical theories?
The response advanced by Vickers and Fletcher in the context of their respec-
tive debates, which I would like to endorse as a general methodological stance
here, is that we move away from the idea that we need to identify one partic-
ular formulation of a physical theory as canonical. Instead, we should adopt a
more pluralist perspective according to which theory names like ‘classical elec-
trodynamics’, ‘Newtonian mechanics’, and so on, are not univocal—there are
many inequivalent formalism which legitimately fall under these headings, none
of which has any a priori claim to be the fundamental version of the theory.16 Ac-
15A subtlety in this case is that the question of how inconsistent theories should be characterised
within accounts of the structure of scientific theories is controversial. Frisch (2005) actually
takes the inconsistencies he identifies in classical electrodynamics to be an argument against
the semantic view of theories, while da Costa and French (2003) claim that inconsistent
theories can be accommodated with a model-theoretic framework.
16In fact, Vickers (2014) goes further than this, urging that we should stop using theory names,
and even the general theory concept, entirely, an approach he calls theory eliminativism.
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knowledging the viability of many distinct formalism as objects of philosophical
study leads to a realignment of the traditional methodological picture previously
sketched. Rather than thinking of the mathematical formalism of a theory as
being fixed before philosophical engagement begins we should instead look to
justify our interest in one of a number of possible formulations of a theory in the
context of a particular philosophical project.
In the case of the classical electrodynamic debate, for instance, focusing on the
question of whether ‘the theory’ is inconsistent simply leads to a purely semantic
dispute about how classical electrodynamics should be defined. Theory names
are ultimately just labels however, and which set of assumptions we choose to call
classical electrodynamics has no intrinsic interest. As Vickers urges, the kind of
question we should be focusing on is whether the inconsistent set of assumptions
identified by Frisch tells us anything important about, say, the nature of scientific
theorising, and framing the issue as one about the essence of classical electrody-
namics distracts attention away from these issues. Similarly, the question of how
QFT should be defined lacks substance on its own and ultimately leads us down
dead ends if we attempt to answer it in isolation. The key issue should instead
be how the various approaches to QFT bear on the diverse philosophical issues
raised by the QFT programme.
I won’t try to give a comprehensive characterisation of the many possible lines
of philosophical enquiry that might lead us to focus on one precisification of a
theory’s formalism over another, but there is one distinction I would like to touch
on, as it will become important later on.17 On the one hand, philosophers of
physics often pursue what we might call internal questions. These are queries
about the our theories themselves—their properties, the relations between them,
and so on—that do not hang on the representational relationship they bear to
the real world. Norton’s presentation of the indeterminism debate in classical
mechanics is arguably an example of this kind of project. He is interested in
whether classical mechanics is an deterministic theory, not in the causal structure
of the actual world—as Norton (2008) makes explicit, his dome is not intended to
be an accurate representation of any physically realisable system. In terms of the
methodological framework I have advocated, this kind of internal enquiry takes
While I am sympathetic to the motivations for this methodological proposal I do not follow
this doctrine to the letter in this thesis. I continue to use the terms ‘cutoff QFT’, ‘continuum
QFT’ and ‘the QFT programme’, but I as Vickers says that these names are simply labels
and don’t carry any “conceptual weight” on their own (Vickers, 2014, 120).
17To mention another sort of investigation, you might be interested in the conceptual issues
which impacted on a particular episode in the history of science and therefore want to focus
on the formal structures actually employed by historical scientists. In the context of this kind
of project it could be perfectly legitimate to object to Norton’s dome on the grounds that it
violates the original meaning of Newton’s first law, for instance, as Zinkernagel (2010) seems
to do.
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place in the structure-specifying and semantic phases of analysing a physical
theory. On the other hand, philosophers ask what we might contrastively call
external questions about how a theoretical model latches onto the world, or what
we ought to believe about the world given the successes of a particular theory.
This clearly takes place in the epistemic phase. If we take the pluralist route I
am endorsing there is no particular reason to think that all of the internal and
external questions raised by a branch physics should be directed at the same set
of mathematical structures; indeed, I will be suggesting in the coming chapters
that these issues come apart in the case of QFT.
The take home message of this section then is that instead of trying to eliminate
the formal diversity found in many areas of physics we need to learn to accept it. I
have tried to motivate the thought that this is not really as problematic as it might
initially seem. There is ultimately no good reason to think that there should be
a single fundamental formulation of a physical theory which is the right starting
point for all philosophical enquiries into a particular field of science and giving
up on this idea helps to focus the dialectic on the issues which really matter. Of
course, this shift in thinking gives us a new perspective on the formalism problem
with QFT set out in chapter 1. I close by summarising the implications of the
claims of this chapter for the broader project of the thesis.
2.5 A Look Ahead
To summarise the conclusions of this chapter, I have argued that an adequate
framework for regimenting work in the philosophy of physics needs to go be-
yond the standard account in at least two ways. First, we need to acknowledge
that philosophical debate about particular physical theories concerns not only
the semantic interpretation of the theory but also its epistemic status as a rep-
resentation of the actual world. Specifically, I argued that we must recognise the
partial nature of the representational success of scientific theories and put for-
ward a rough framework for capturing this. Second, we need a more sophisticated
approach to dealing with variant formalisms than a naive reading of the standard
account seems to suggest. Instead of assuming that we can identify a canoni-
cal, universally applicable, formulation of a physical theory we should allow that
there can be many prima facie viable choices of formalism to investigate. The
central question is then which set of structures is the right vehicle for exploring
a particular philosophical issue.
As I mentioned at the outset, philosophers of physics often address the founda-
tional puzzles raised by particular physical theories in a local fashion without
explicitly embedding their discussion within a broader programme. Why worry
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about these general methodological issues then? While I think that the approach
put forward in this chapter may be helpful for clarifying other debates in the
philosophy of physics, my central goal here was to lay the groundwork for ap-
proaching the QFT programme, and the conclusions endorsed here certainly have
important implications for this project. For one thing, we are now better placed
to make sense of Fraser’s and Wallace’s conflicting statements about the proper
goal of the philosophy of QFT. Recall that for Fraser the operative question was
what the world would be like if QFT were true, while Wallace focuses on what
the actual world is like given that QFT is approximately true. In terms of the
framework I have presented here, we can see these are not really rival accounts
of the interpretive project but rather different aspects of the analysis of a phys-
ical theory: Fraser’s question is a semantic one, while Wallace’s is an epistemic
one. This raises the possibility that at least some of what Wallace and Fraser say
about QFT is mutually consistent.
More generally, the pluralist approach to alternative formulations of physical the-
ories set out in the previous section leads to a new perspective on the problem
raised by the many approaches to QFT found in the scientific literature. The
challenge posed by the diversity of the QFT programme should no longer be
viewed as one of picking out the correct formulation of the theory against a back-
drop of distracting impostors. Rather, the task is to tease out how the various
approaches to QFT bear on broader philosophical issues. This suggests a more
piecemeal and constructive approach to the project. Rather than asking, is this
approach to QFT the right framework for philosophical work, we can simply ask
how this approach should be understood, and how it bears on particular philo-
sophical issues raised by the QFT programme, without worrying about whether
it is the ‘correct’ formulation of the theory. I take the analysis of perturbative
QFT put forward in the next chapter to exemplify this approach. This method-
ological shift also opens up the possibility that different theoretical approaches
to QFT are the appropriate frameworks for answering different kinds of philo-
sophical questions. In fact, I will be endorsing this kind of claim in what follows.
In brief, a key claim of the thesis will be that the axiomatic approach to QFT
is a suitable starting point for various internal questions raised by the QFT pro-
gramme, in the sense discussed in the previous section, while cutoff QFT models
are appropriate objects of study for addressing the external issue of what we
ought to believe about the world on the basis of the empirical successes of high
energy physics.
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Chapter 3
The Real Problem with Perturbative
Quantum Field Theory
3.1 Three Worries about the Perturbative Approach to
Quantum Field Theory
This chapter initiates our study of the QFT programme by examining the per-
turbative approach to QFT. There are good motivations for starting here. As
I described in the introduction, the perturbative approach played a crucial role
in the development of the QFT programme. Both the axiomatic and renormal-
isation group approaches to QFT developed, at least in part, as a response to
perceived limitation with the perturbative formalism. It seems plausible, there-
fore, that a better understanding of the perturbative approach will also help us
to understand the significance of these later developments. There is also a more
simple minded reason for philosophers to be interested in perturbative QFT: it re-
mains the main source of empirical predictions within the QFT programme. The
famously accurate prediction of the anomalous magnetic moment of the electron
is just one among many perturbative results which form the backbone of particle
physics phenomenology. Consequently, when it comes to the question of repre-
sentational success, and the kind of ontological claims which are warranted by
the QFT programme, perturbation theory will surely have to be addressed in one
way or another.
Philosophers have often shied away from perturbative methods in their discus-
sions of QFT however.1 To some extent this reticence is understandable. The
1There are, of course, exceptions. Teller (1989, 1995) and Huggett and Weingard (1995) examine
perturbative renormalisation from a philosophical perspective. There has also been discussion
of virtual particles (Weingard, 1988; Redhead 1988) and Feynman diagrams (Meynel 2008;
Wu¨thrich 2012) in the philosophical literature, which necessarily engages with perturbative
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renormalisation method at the heart of the perturbative approach has long been
viewed with suspicion by physicists and philosophers alike. We can distinguish
three main problems sometimes raised in the literature that seem to present a
barrier to philosophical engagement.
i) The rigour problem. One concern about the perturbative approach to QFT
is that it lacks mathematical rigour. Amongst philosophers this kind of cri-
tique is typically rooted in the assumption that a certain standard of math-
ematical rigour is necessary (or at least strongly desired) before interpretive
work can get off the ground. I suspect this attitude towards perturbative
methods is behind Halvorson’s comments about the lack of a “mathemati-
cally intelligible description of QFT” underlying the practice of mainstream
high energy physics (Halvorson, 2006, 731). Fraser (2009) raises this kind of
objection more explicitly in her discussion of what she calls the “infinitely
renormalised” variant of QFT, which she associated with the practice of
taking a momentum cutoff to infinity in the course of perturbative calcu-
lations. Fraser argues that this procedure is ill defined and complains that
“the standard criticism levelled against unrigorous theories—that they are
difficult to analyse and interpret—certainly applies in this case” (Fraser,
2009, 543). One putative obstacle to engaging with perturbative QFT then
is that it is on too flimsy ground mathematically for foundational issues to
be properly addressed.
ii) The consistency problem. A prima facie more severe charge sometimes
brought against perturbative QFT is that it runs foul of inconsistency. A
notorious theorem due to Haag, Hall and Wightman (henceforth Haag’s
theorem) seems to show that standard perturbative calculations rest on an
inconsistent set of assumptions. While Earman and Fraser (2006, 306) want
to allay worries about the consistency of interacting QFTs in general in light
of Haag’s theorem, they claim that the result does “pose problems for some
of the techniques used in textbook physics for extracting physical prediction
from the theory”, and perturbation theory in particular. Fraser even sug-
gests that physicists may be tacitly employing inferential restrictions which
prevent contradictions from being derived when they perform perturbative
calculations (Fraser, 2009, 551). The threat of inconsistency might provide
further reason to be wary of taking perturbative QFT seriously from a foun-
dational perspective, and especially of drawing ontological conclusions from
the perturbative formalism.
iii) The justification problem. Even putting these concerns about the internal
coherence of perturbative QFT aside however, a further puzzle seems to re-
QFT.
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main. In physics textbooks perturbative renormalisation is often presented
as a mathematical trick for removing divergent terms in the naive pertur-
bation series. But why are these infinities there in the first place, and what
justifies the procedure used to remove them? The renormalisation procedure
has often been seen as lacking in physical motivation. Wallace is pointing
to this sort of worry when he suggests that (at least when it was first de-
veloped) perturbative renormalisation made little “physical sense” (Wallace
2011, 117). Similar complaints about the lack of a physical picture under-
lying the renormalisation procedure can be founded dotted throughout the
literature.2 A final reason for trepidation about engaging with the pertur-
bative approach to QFT then is that it appears to be problematically ad
hoc.
In light of these problems one might conclude that philosophers should simply
remain silent about the use of perturbative methods in QFT, at least until physi-
cists and mathematicians have developed a coherent picture of what is going on.
This chapter puts forward a different response. Drawing on Norton’s (2012) dis-
cussion of the distinction between idealisation and approximations I argue that
perturbative calculations should be understood as producing functions which ap-
proximate physical quantities, rather than mathematical structures semantically
interpreted as physical systems. Taking perturbative QFT to be in the business of
producing approximations, in Norton’s sense, leads to a reassessment of all three
of the worries just identified. The rigour and inconsistency problems, in particu-
lar, lose much of their bite. Perturbative renormalisation does not furnish a class
of continuum QFT models on this view not because of mathematical imprecision
but because this is not the objective of the procedure. In fact, I suggest that there
is nothing problematically unrigorous about the perturbative expansions found
in QFT textbooks. Furthermore, this understanding of QFT perturbative ex-
pansions provides resources for an effective response to Haag’s theorem. In brief,
the result does not undermine standard perturbative calculations because they
do not posit the existence of a model satisfying the relevant set of inconsistent
assumptions.
What this analysis does not do however is resolve the justification problem. What
ends up being the really salient puzzle about QFT perturbation theory is why it
is so successful—why, that is, the approximations produced by the perturbative
approach are in fact good ones. I will suggest, however, that this is a issue
which philosophers can contribute to rather than a reason to eschew perturbative
2A typical example of this kind of attitude is found in McMullin (1985). After arguing that
scientists are generally dissatisfied with modifications to a model which lack physical justifica-
tion he comments: “The renormalisation techniques required in quantum field theory because
of the assumption introduced by the original idealization of the electron as a point particle
would be a case in point” (McMullin, 1985, 261).
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methods, and later chapters take up this challenge. The plan for this chapter is
as follows. §3.2 sketches the basic features of perturbative QFT. §3.3 sets out the
distinction between idealised models and approximations in general terms. §3.4
and §3.5 make the case for understanding QFT perturbation theory as a method
for producing approximations and discusses the ramifications of this view for the
three putative problems just outlined.
3.2 The Perturbative Framework
Perturbative QFT is a huge subject in its own right. I focus here on the general
aspects of the approach which are most relevant to assessing the aforementioned
worries about its foundational respectability.3 I first describe how perturbative
expansions of QFT observables are set up, stressing the role of the interaction
picture and the challenge posed by Haag’s theorem. I then discuss the divergences
which appear in naive implementations of the expansion and the renormalisation
procedure which is used to tame them.
3.2.1 Expanding the S-matrix
I claimed in §1.2.2 that the really fundamental quantities of a QFT model are
its partition function and the correlation functions it generates. The key object
we are trying to get at in the perturbative approach to QFT however, at least in
the first instance, is the so-called S-matrix. In scattering theory scattering events
are represented as transitions from localised initial and final states at asymptotic
times. The S-matrix is the operator which maps incoming states |α〉in at t→ −∞
onto outgoing states |β〉out at t→∞:
Sβα = out〈β|S|α〉in. (3.1)
The S-matrix is of paramount importance to particle physics phenomenology
because S-matrix elements associated with particular classes of in and out states
are closely related to scattering cross sections, the quantities measured in collider
experiments. But the S-matrix also plays an indispensable role in perturbative
evaluations of other quantities of theoretical interest. In particular, once we have
the perturbative expansion of the S-matrix in hand it can be used to evaluate
correlations functions as well.4
3Peskin and Schroeder (1995) is a classic text which focuses on the perturbative approach to
QFT. Useful discussions are also found in Duncan (2012) and Lancaster and Blundell (2014).
4This means that perturbative QFT is rooted in scattering theory in a way in which other
computational approaches are not. Monte Carlo simulations in lattice QFT, for instance, can
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There are two major obstacles to getting at the S-matrices of the realistic QFTs
studied in high energy physics. On the one hand, there is the issue of giving
concrete meaning to the S-matrix in the first place. To substantiate the above
definition a precise characterisation of the in and out states, and the space in
which they live, is needed. As we have seen however, identifying mathematical
structures which are constitutive of interacting QFTs in four dimensions is a task
plagued by technical and conceptual hurdles—this is, after all, what the formula-
tion debate is all about. Besides this question however, interacting field theories
inevitably engender more practical concerns about computational tractability. In-
teraction terms lead to non-linear equations of motion, and finding exact solutions
to empirically successful QFTs are typically out of the question. However they are
characterised structurally then, there is going to be a difficulty with computing
the S-matrix elements of theories like QED and QCD in practice.
In the face of these problems the perturbative strategy is to use what we al-
ready know about free QFTs to generate expressions for the S-matrix elements
of weakly interacting theories. The construction of free QFT models is much
better understood than their interacting counterparts—we know how to write
down continuum models in this case. Furthermore, the resulting models can be
exactly solved; we can determine the system’s spectrum, get explicit Fock space
representations of the field operators and obtain the S-matrix analytically (un-
surprisingly, the S-matrix of a free field theory is trivial). The idea then is to split
the Hamiltonian of an interacting theory into a free part, H0, and an interaction
potential, V , parameterised by a ‘coupling’ g (it will be convenient to use the
Hamiltonian representation of the dynamics here):
H = H0 + gV. (3.2)
We then construct power series in g for the theories S-matrix elements whose co-
efficients can be computed using the explicit representations of the fields afforded
by the exact solution of the free model associated with H0. If g is sufficiently
small the hope is that the first few terms of this series yield accurate predictions
of experimentally observed scattering cross sections.
In order to get these expansions up and running though we need to invoke the so-
called interaction picture. As is familiar from quantum mechanics there are multi-
ple ways to represent the time evolution of a quantum system. In the Schro¨dinger
picture the state evolves in time while the operators remain constant; in the
Heisenberg picture the operators take on the time dependence and the states are
constant. The idea behind the interaction picture is to use this freedom to isolate
the free representations of the fields. If AS and ψS(t) are operators and states
be used to evaluate correlation functions directly without referring to the S-matrix at all.
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in the Schro¨dinger picture the corresponding operators and states in the interac-
tion picture are given by AI(t) = e
iH0,StASe
−iH0,St and |ψI(t)〉 = eiH0,St |ψS(t)〉.
This means that the field operators are governed by H0 while the remaining time
dependence due to the interaction potential is shifted into the states.
The time evolution operator in the interaction picture, |ψI(t)〉 = UI(t, t0) |ψI(t0)〉,
is then used to set up perturbation series for particular S-matrix elements. We
can expand UI(t, t0) in a power series in g of the form:
UI(t, t0) =
∞∑
n=0
(−ig)n
n!
∫ t
t0
dt1...
∫ t
to
dtnT [VI(t1)...VI(tn)], (3.3)
where T denotes the time order product, which rearranges operators in descending
order with respect to their time arguments. This expansion can then be plugged
into the definition of the S-matrix:
Sβα = lim
ti→−∞
lim
tf→∞
〈β|UI(tf , ti)|α〉. (3.4)
Taking the in and out states to be eigenstates of H0, on the grounds that the
system is effectively isolated before and after the scattering event, we end up with
a string of terms made up of Fock space operators acting on the free field vacuum
state—expressions that we know how to compute, at least in principle.
What we typically need to do to work out the coefficients of the series at each order
in g is evaluate a set of integrals over momentum space. Feynman diagrams bring
some order to the proceedings, but the number and complexity of these integrals
grows rapidly as the series proceeds and the best we can hope to do in practice is
calculate the first few terms. As is now well known however, the integrals which
result from naively following the prescription just described typically diverge.
The next section describes the renormalisation procedure that is needed to deal
with these divergences.
Before we move on to discuss the renormalisation procedure however there is
another issue with the expansion technique as we have described it thus far:
the apparent clash with Haag’s theorem. What Haag’s theorem shows is that,
given certain assumptions common to all of the main axiomatic formulations of
QFT, the interaction picture does not exist.5 The root of the problem is that
the continuum QFT model associated with H0 and the continuum QFT model
associated with the full interacting Hamiltonian, H, cannot be formulated on
the same Hilbert space. As will be discussed in detail in chapter 6, systems
5The original result can be found in Haag (1956). It is Hall and Wightman’s (1957) generali-
sation however which is nowadays commonly referred to as Haag’s theorem. The assumptions
needed to prove it are discussed in detail in Earman and Fraser (2006) and Miller (2015).
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with infinite many degrees of freedom admit unitarily inequivalent Hilbert space
representations, and the Haag result flows from the fact that the ground state of
the free and interacting theories live in unitarily inequivalent Hilbert spaces. This
means that there cannot be a global unitary transformation connecting the states
and field operators of a free and interacting theory, which the interaction picture is
clearly predicated on. Given the role that the interaction picture plays in setting
up the power series expansion of the S-matrix, Haag’s theorem has seemed to
some to point to a fundamental inconsistency in the perturbative method—this
is, of course, the root of the consistency problem flagged in §3.1.
3.2.2 Perturbative Renormalisation
To make things concrete let’s consider applying the method just described to the
φ4 theory introduced in §1.2.2. The Lagrangian of this theory was:
L = (∂µφ)2 −m2φ2 − λφ4. (3.5)
In the absence of exact solutions the hope is that expanding the S-matrix of the
theory in powers of λ will at least allow us to probe the region of the parameter
space in which λ is small and the interaction is weak. When we follow the
prescriptions set out in the previous section however troublesome terms like the
following start to appear at second order in λ:6
λ2
∫
d4k
(2pi)4
1
(k2 −m2 + i)((p− k)2 −m2 + i) (3.6)
This integral diverges, leaving the expansion ill defined and predictively useless.
The same kind of divergent integrals arise when the perturbative method is ap-
plied to realistic gauge theories like QED and QCD.
This apparently disastrous behaviour can be seen as resulting from a poor choice
of expansion parameter however. The renormalisation procedure used to obtain
a sensible power series divides into three steps. The first is to ‘regularise’ the
offending integrals, that is render them convergent. In the case of the integral
above this can be done by taking the upper limit of integration to be some finite
constant Λ, known as an ultraviolet perturbative cutoff. It can then be explicitly
evaluated as a function of Λ which goes to infinity as Λ → ∞; in our example
there turns out to be an explicit dependence on ln Λ. Terms of this kind are said
to be ultraviolet divergent. The perturbative expansions of theories with mass-
6k here is an the internal ‘loop momentum’ which is being integrated over, p is an external mo-
mentum factor associated with the in and out scattering states and the standard i prescription
has been used to deal with the poles on the real axis.
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less particles, like QED photons, also contain infrared divergent integrals that
blow up as momentum variables are integrated down to zero. In this case the
integral can be regularised by taking the lower limit of integration to be some
small but non-zero constant—an infrared perturbative cutoff. While imposing
cutoffs on the momentum in this manner often plays a privileged conceptual role
in discussions of renormalisation, a variety of other regularisation techniques are
used in perturbative calculations in high energy physics. One method which is
often more convenient in the treatment of gauge theories like QED and QCD,
and has also sometimes been attributed special foundational significance in the
philosophical literature,7 is dimensional regularisation. In this approach the inte-
gration measure is modified so as to range over a fractional number of dimensions,
4− . For ultraviolet divergent integrals this leads to finite results for  > 0, with
divergences manifesting as poles at  = 0, and infrared divergences can also be
regularised in this way.8
Once the coefficients of the perturbation series can be manipulated as finite ex-
pressions the next step is to redefine the coupling in which we are expanding so
as to remove the singular dependence on the cutoff—it is to this process that the
term renormalisation properly refers. In the case of φ4 theory we can do this by
reparameterising the Lagrangian as follows:
L = (1 + δZ)(∂µφr)2 − (mr + δm)2φ2r − (λr + δλ)φ4r. (3.7)
Where φr = (1 + δZ)
−1/2φ is the renormalised field, mr and λr are the renor-
malised mass and charge, and δZ, δm, δλ parameterise so-called counterterms.
Note that nothing mathematically or physically dubious is going on here. The
Lagrangian has simply been rewritten in terms of different variables. The value of
the counterterm parameters make no difference to the dynamics described by the
Lagrangian. It does make a difference to the terms of the perturbation series at
each order however: both the renormalised expansion parameter and coefficients
of the series depend on the choice of counterterms. It turns out to be possible to
choose these factors in such a way that the part of the series coefficient at second
order which diverges as Λ→∞ is completely removed. In fact, this can be done
at each order in perturbation theory.
Theories whose ultraviolet divergences can be systematically eliminated at all or-
7Bain (2013b) makes a distinction between what he calls Wilsonian effective field theories, which
employ an explicit cutoff, and continuum effective field theories, which employ dimensional
regularisation. One upshot of this approach to perturbative QFT set out in this chapter is that
claims Bain makes about the significance of this distinction end up being somewhat misleading.
I discuss this point in more detail in §5.1.
8A number of technical issues with the dimensional regularisation approach, which are not
germane to the thrust of my discussion, have been glossed over here. Collins (1984) provides
a thorough treatment of this regularisation method.
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ders of perturbation theory via a redefinition of a finite number of parameters in
the Lagrangian in the manner just sketched are said to be renormalisable (show-
ing that infrared divergences can also be removed from the perturbation series
is another matter which will not be discussed in detail here). There turns out
to be a simple dimensional criterion for determining whether a theory has this
property: a theory is renormalisable if all of the coupling parameters associated
with terms in the Lagrangian have zero or positive mass dimension.9 The mass
dimension of the φ4 coupling, λ, for instance is zero (in four space-time dimen-
sions) so this interaction term satisfies the requirement. The standard model
Lagrangian also satisfies this criterion, and consequently the ultraviolet diver-
gences in the perturbation series of QED and QCD can be completely removed
at each order. In fact, the renormalisability of these theories is not a coincidence.
Traditionally renormalisability was viewed as a necessary condition for a viable
perturbative analysis of a theory and was often treated as a theory selection prin-
ciple in the formulation of the standard model.10 There is something puzzling
about demanding renormalisability a priori in this way however. What licenses
us to assume that the world is amenable to perturbative analysis? As we shall
see in the following chapter, the renormalisation group leads to a new perspective
on the renormalisability of empirically successful QFTs.
Even assuming renormalisability however, there might seem to be something odd
about the redefinition prescription just described. How can a change of variables,
which by construction leaves the underlying physics unchanged, transform the
physical respectability and predictive power of the expansion? While there is
a puzzle to be addressed here, that renormalising the coupling in this way can
radically alter the properties of the series should not be surprising in itself. In
general, the quality of a power series approximation can be very sensitive to
the choice of expansion parameter. Suppose we are want to expand ln(1 + x)
as a power series, for instance. Expanding in x gives rise to a series which
converges for |x| < 1, while making a change of variables and expanding in
x′ = x/(x+ 2) produces a series which converges for any positive value of x, and
typically converges much more rapidly. Moreover, the practice of renormalising
the coupling parameter is often employed in the perturbative treatment of models
in ordinary quantum mechanics which have no problems with divergences. In
9The term mass dimension, and dimensional analysis in natural units, was introduced in §1.2.2.
10In fact non-renormalisable theories can also be treated with the perturbative framework.
What happens in this case is that new non-renormalisable interactions need to be added at
each order in perturbative theory in order to absorb the ultraviolet divergences. This means
that in principle an infinite number of parameters would need to be fixed by experiment in
order to give meaning to the expansion at all orders. As long as we stick to a finite order of
perturbative theory however, the renormalisation procedure can essentially be carried out as
described here for non-renormalisable theories. For the purposes of this chapter I focus on
the renormalisable case.
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the case of the quantum anharmonic oscillator for instance, the most obvious
choice of coupling leads to a divergent series, but by redefining the coupling, in
essentially the same manner just sketched for interacting QFTs, a convergent
series can be obtained.11 The need to carefully define an appropriate coupling
is not intrinsically problematic then. What is puzzling about this redefinition
procedure just described however is that it seems to be entirely ad hoc. No reason
has been given for thinking that removing the divergent part of the perturbative
coefficients should lead to accurate predictions.
The final step of standard perturbative calculations is to take the cutoffs to infin-
ity, or, more generally, remove the regulator. If the redefinition of the coupling has
done its job this limit is well-defined and we obtain finite expressions from trun-
cations of the series at each order. This is sometimes presented as returning us to
the realms of continuum field theory after a detour through strange regulated the-
ories with cutoffs on the momentum or in a fractional number of dimensions. As
I will shortly be arguing, this way of speaking is quite misleading—removing the
regulator on integrals in the perturbation series does not amount to constructing
a continuum QFT model. It is worth bearing in mind however that there are also
good practical motivations for taking the cutoff to infinity in perturbative calcula-
tions. The most convenient way of performing the rescaling process in practice is
to stipulate the value of a small number of S-matrix elements (containing so-called
‘primitive divergences’) at a particular energy in the limit Λ→∞. It is this step
which allows us to use multiple regularisation methods, often crucial to practical
computations, and be guaranteed to get equivalent results. Furthermore, it is
generally much easier to deal with integrals over all of momentum space than
cutoff expressions. Again, however, the physical justification for removing the
regulator remains unclear.
After all of these steps have been completed truncations of the resulting series
can be in extremely good agreement with experimental data. As has already
been stressed, particle physics phenomenology is largely based on computations
of this kind. There is a final, potentially unnerving, feature of renormalised QFT
perturbation series however which is worth mentioning here: they are thought
not to converge. That is, even after each term has been rendered finite by the
renormalisation procedure the sum of the series at all orders is not. Dyson (1952)
was the first to give heuristic arguments to the effect that QED perturbation series
have zero radius of convergence and this conclusion has since been borne out by
studies of the large order behaviour of the perturbation series of realistic QFTs.
In the case of the interacting QFTs which have been constructed as models of
the Wightman axioms on lower dimensional space-times the divergences of the
11Delamotte (2004) and Neumaier (2011) give useful discussions of renormalisation in this more
general context. The ln(1 + x) example is borrowed from Neumaier (2011).
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perturbation series can, in fact, be rigorously demonstrated.12 Of course, the
apparent convergence of QED perturbation theory in the first few orders, and
their excellent agreement with experiment, assure us that the series is, at least, an
asymptotic expansion. But the fact that it divergences prevents us from directly
identifying its sum with the S-matrix elements of the theory. This perhaps is
one of the features of QFT perturbative expansions which contribute to their
reputation for a lack of mathematical rigour.
In sum then, our survey of the perturbative QFT has identified prima facie moti-
vations for the rigour, consistency and justification problems identified in §3.1.13
In order to assess the substance of these worries however a more careful analysis of
what is going on in the perturbative method is needed. The next section lays the
groundwork for such an analysis by introducing some notions drawn from philo-
sophical work on scientific modelling which illuminates the perturbative method,
namely the distinction between an approximation and an idealised model.
3.3 Approximation and Idealisation Distinguished
The best way to present the distinction between approximations and idealisation
I want to make use of here is with reference to examples. Take a familiar classical
system: a unit mass falling in a uniform gravitational field while acted upon by a
linear air resistive force.14 The equation of motion of this system can be written
in terms of the velocity:
dv/dt = g − kv, (3.8)
12See Strocchi (2013, 35-39) for results pertaining to perturbation series of φ4 theory on two
and three dimensional space-times.
13There are also other puzzles raised by perturbative formalism which have not been discussed
here. One issue is the apparent ambiguity of perturbative calculations owing to the depen-
dence of truncations of the series on the so-called renormalisation scheme. As I explained,
it is the fact that the terms in the perturbation series depend on the counterterms invoked
in the renormalisation process which allows us to remove the divergent dependence on the
regulator. By the same token however, we can also add finite contributions to the perturba-
tive coefficients. This means that there are multiple ways of removing the divergences in the
coefficients, known as renormalisation schemes, which give different results when the series
is truncated. What happens in practice is that a small number of conventional schemes are
used, but the justification for choosing these schemes over possible alternatives is a matter
of contention in the physics literature—see James Fraser (2012) for a review of this debate.
How we can make sense of the success of the perturbative method in light of this apparent
ambiguity is another issue which philosophers of science have yet to tackle.
14This example is taken from Norton (2012). A clarificatory note here: Norton uses the term
idealisation in a different way from my preferred definition set out in the previous chapter.
For Norton an idealisation is a system which is used to represent a distinct target system—i.e.
he uses the term in the way that many authors, myself included, use model. I use the term
idealisation in a more fine grained way to refer to features of a model which misrepresents
the target system. This is simply a matter of terminology and does not make a difference to
the substance of the distinction I am after here.
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where g is the gravitational acceleration and k parameterises the frictional force.
Assuming the body is initially at rest the solution of this equation is:
v(t) = g/k(1− ekt). (3.9)
Suppose however that air resistance is not very important for the aspects of the
system’s behaviour we are interested in describing. Perhaps k is small relative to
g and we are only interested in the system’s evolution over comparatively short
time periods.
There are two paths one might take in this situation. On the one hand, we could
consider a new classical system, with a simplified equation of motion dv/dt =
g, and treat it as a representation of our original system. This model clearly
misrepresents its target in some respects; in the terminology of the previous
chapter it contains idealisations. It falsely represents k as being zero and has
quite different asymptotic behaviour as t→∞, since it lacks a terminal velocity.
But it does get some of the features of the target system right—the velocity
function of the idealised model will stay within some error bound of the target
system’s velocity over some finite time period. There is another way to proceed
however. Suppose that instead of moving to a new simplified system we take the
limit k → 0 of the velocity function of the original system:
lim
k→0
v(t) = gt (3.10)
This produces a new function which is, again, within some error bound of the
target system’s velocity over sufficiently short periods of time. It can therefore
be viewed as an inexact description of this property of the system. Following
Norton (2012), I will call the production of such a function, without referring to
a new physical system, an approximation.
This distinction between representing a system with an idealised model and pro-
viding an inexact description of one of its properties directly has long been recog-
nised in the literature on scientific modelling. Its significance is less agreed upon
however. Redhead (1980) claims that the two approaches are always interchange-
able, in the sense that, for any function which approximates a quantity of a target
system we can construct a system to which it is an exact solution. This certainly
does seem to be the case in the above example, since the approximation obtained
by taking k → 0 in the velocity function is identical to the velocity of the corre-
sponding idealised model. Following examples like these, philosophers of science
have tended to see models as the fundamental unit of analysis and approximations
as ultimately derived from them, a doctrine which probably also owes something
to the dominance of the semantic view of theories.
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Norton (2012) has recently put forward a different view of the distinction which I
want to endorse here, namely that approximation and idealised representation are
not, in general, interchangeable, and that distinguishing between them can play
an important role in resolving some puzzles in the philosophy of physics. Norton
presents a number of counterexamples to the idea that every approximation piggy
backs on a corresponding idealised model. Take, for instance, an ellipsoid with
semi-major axis of length a. The ratio of the surface area and volume of this
geometric object can be expressed as a function of a. If we take the limit a→∞
of this function it converges to 3pi/4; this might be an appropriate approximation
if a is very large. If we take the semi-major axis of the ellipsoid itself to infinity
however we get an infinite cylinder whose surface area to volume ratio is 2 (see
figure 3.1). In this case applying an operation to a function defined on a model
and applying the analogous operation to the model itself gives different results
and we clearly cannot say that the former is underwritten by the latter.
A second class of examples which speak against Redhead’s equivalence claim are
cases in which no model exists corresponding to an operation used to implement
an approximation. Norton discusses the example of a sphere of radius r. The
ratio of surface area to volume of a sphere is 3/r, which clearly has a finite
limit as r → ∞. But, at least on standard definitions of a sphere in Euclidean
geometry, there is no such thing as a sphere with infinite radius. While it may
be appropriate to treat the area to volume ratio of a large sphere as vanishing,
there is no geometric object which actually has this property. A case of this kind
closer to our area of interest is the use of the thermodynamic limit in statistical
mechanics. A common modelling strategy in statistical mechanics is to take the
limit in which the volume and number of degrees of freedom, N , go to infinity
(this is closely related to the infinite volume limit of a cutoff QFT model discussed
in §1.2.2). Once again, there is some ambiguity about how this practice should be
understood. One could take this limit of a particular thermodynamic function,
or actually construct an infinitely extended system by taking the boundary of a
finite system to spatial infinity in a controlled way. The latter task turns out to
be difficult to do in practice: the limit system typically has to be established on
Figure 3.1: Taking the semi-major axis of an ellipsoid to infinity. Taken from
Norton (2012).
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a case by case basis and is known not to exist for gravitating systems.15 Again, it
might be that theN →∞ limit is well-defined for some thermodynamic quantities
though there is no infinite volume limit system.
Apart from counterexamples of this kind, another motivation for taking approxi-
mations and models to be distinct kinds of theoretical output is that it often leads
to a more natural interpretation of scientific practice. As the previous examples
attest to, it is typically more difficult to establish the existence of a physical sys-
tem than a single function. As Norton points out, we often find that physicists
do not do this extra work; he argues, for instance, that in many applications the
N →∞ limit is taken of particular thermodynamic functions without addressing
the question of whether an infinite system can be generated in this way. Those
who hold that approximations are underwritten by the presence of a correspond-
ing model will be forced to reproach physicists for their sloppiness in such cases.
But if we give up this idea, as Norton’s examples suggest we should anyway, a
more sympathetic reading becomes available. On this view, producing a func-
tion which approximates some property of the target system, and producing a
model which resembles it in certain respects are simply different things—the for-
mer does not rest on the latter. Consequently, there is nothing wrong with using
approximate expressions for physical quantities without embedding them within
idealised models.
It is this capacity of a robust notion of approximation to illuminate scientific
practice which I want to draw on here. In the context of the QFT programme,
the existence of QFT models is a delicate issue and consequently the construction
of approximations and models naturally come apart. This, I think, is the key to
understanding what is going on in perturbative QFT.
3.4 Perturbative Theory Produces Approximations, Not
Models
The key claim of this chapter is that perturbative QFT ought to be understood as
a method for producing approximations in the sense just elaborated, rather than
picking out QFT models. The truncated power series obtained by following the
prescriptions set out in §3.2 can approximate physical quantities like scattering
cross sections, but the various steps involved in getting to these expressions should
not be interpreted as an attempt to provide a structural characterisation of an
interacting QFT. The central motivation for this view is that it makes sense
15Ruelle (1969) is a classic reference for rigorous results about the existence of the thermody-
namic limit of particular systems. Callender (2011) gives a discussion of the non-existence of
the thermodynamic limit in the case of gravitating systems.
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of what physicists actually do, or perhaps more importantly do not do, when
they treat QFTs perturbatively. As was discussed in chapter 1, constructing
interacting QFT models in four dimensions is a project fraught with technical
difficulties. Looking for a solution to this problem in the standard perturbative
approach leaves us disappointed. At each juncture in the perturbative method
we find that the work needed to construct a physical model is missing.
Consider, for instance, the regularisation of the momentum space integrals mak-
ing up the perturbative coefficients. Imposing a high momentum cutoff on such
an integral is sometimes described, in both the physics and philosophy literature,
as taking us to a cutoff theory. In light of the distinction drawn in the previ-
ous section however, we can see that putting a cutoff on a single integral and
constructing a quantum system which lacks high momentum degrees of freedom
is not the same thing. In fact, early applications of renormalised perturbation
theory made no attempt to verify the existence of such systems, or explore their
properties. The details of how to formulate QFTs on a lattice have since been
worked out, and other ways of implementing a ‘non-perturbative’ cutoff have been
developed in the constructive field theory programme (as I described in §1.2.2).
But this came decades after the original perturbative treatment of QED. The lack
of any attempt to construct a quantum system corresponding to a regularised in-
tegral is even more evident in the case of dimensional regularisation. Recall that
this method works by continuing the integration measure to a non-integer number
of dimensions. Again, one sometimes finds talk of quantum theories with a frac-
tional number of dimensions in this context. Yet (to my knowledge) no attempt
has been made to actually construct QFT models of this kind, and dimensional
regularisation techniques do not play any role in extant work in the constructive
field theory programme.16
Another place where the perturbative approach is apt to disappoint those looking
for a class of mathematical structures to identify with realistic QFTs is the re-
moval of the regulator. I have already suggested that it is misleading to talk about
taking a continuum limit here, and we can now see why. All that is happening
when an ultraviolet cutoff is taken to infinity in a typical perturbative calculation
is that a limit is being taken of a particular truncated power series expression.
That a great deal more is needed to verify the existence of a continuum QFT
model is evident when we look at the work that goes into constructing models
of the Wightman or Haag-Kastler axioms. As I described in §1.2.2, what mathe-
matical physicists working on this problem typically do is start with a cutoff QFT
model, with non-perturbative cutoffs at high and low momentum, and attempt
to take the continuum and infinite volume limits of this structure. The difficul-
16Rivasseau (2014, 7) comments that dimensional regularisation “cannot be used up to now in
a constructive non-perturbative program”.
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ties associated with taking these limits in a controlled way outstrip, and are in
fact largely independent of, the problem of ridding perturbative expansions of
divergences. As will be discussed further in the following chapter, the continuum
limit is best understood within the context of the renormalisation group frame-
work. For now it is enough to say that the existence of the continuum limit is
commonly taken to depend on the existence of a so-called ultraviolet fixed point,
and this property is independent of the property of perturbative renormalisabil-
ity. Moreover, the treatment of infrared divergences in the perturbation series of
gauge theories like QCD does not solve the problems associated with bringing its
infrared behaviour under mathematical control in the non-perturbative context.
In sum then, removing the cutoffs on perturbative approximants has very little
to do with the project of constructing continuum QFT models.
A final blow for those searching for explicit constructions of QFT models in
perturbative framework is the divergence of the expansion. If renormalised per-
turbation series converged we could use their sums to define S-matrix elements
and correlations functions and construct QFT models from there. Alas, all indi-
cations are that they do not. This may not rule out the possibility of extracting
a structural characterisation of interacting QFTs from renormalised perturbation
series entirely—there are, after all, a number of ways of defining sums for diver-
gent series.17 It does, at least, show that it is a non-trivial undertaking. And
again, is not a project which we find physicists working with perturbative meth-
ods engaging in. In most practical calculations particle physics phenomenologists
simply truncate the perturbation series after the first few terms and do not con-
cern themselves with the fate of the sum to all orders. Once again, no attention
is being given to the existence of QFT models.
This all makes sense if we take the intended output of the perturbative approach
to be approximations rather than physical systems. On this reading the strategy
underlying the perturbative treatment of interacting QFTs is to dodge rather
than solve the problem of how to characterise the theory in terms of mathemat-
ical structures. While philosophers of a realist persuasion in particular will find
this troubling—a point I will come back to shortly—there is nothing manifestly
incoherent about it if we accept the conclusions of the previous section. As I
argued there, it is a mistake to think that approximations must be embedded
within a model in order to be meaningful. We should not berate particle physics
17It turns out that the perturbation series of interacting theories which have been constructed as
models of the Wightman axioms in a reduced number of space-time dimensions have a unique
Borel sum which is identical to the exact values of the corresponding S-matrix elements—see
Magnen and Seneor (1977) and Riviseau (2014). There are good reasons to think that this
behaviour does not generalise to the case of realistic QFTs however, for a discussion of this
problem see Duncan (2012) chapter 11. Thanks to Michael Miller for discussions about this
issue.
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phenomenologists then for failing to tell us what an interacting QFT is. Obtain-
ing approximate expressions for scattering cross sections and constructing QFT
models are different objectives; in principle the former can be pursued without
addressing the latter.
A great advantage of this reading is that it opens the way for more constructive
philosophical engagement with perturbative QFT. The analysis I have developed
here sheds new light on the three putative problems with the perturbative ap-
proach I distinguished in §3.1 and ultimately leads to a less pessimistic assessment
of the conceptual respectability of the perturbative framework.
One of the complaints about perturbative QFT, which I called the rigour problem,
was that its lack of mathematical rigour makes it impossible to engage with from
a foundational perspective. This worry is not usually stated in very explicit
terms—we rarely find philosophers pointing to specific aspects of the perturbative
method which they find problematically unrigorous. But I suspect that what is
often driving this sort of objection is the absence of an explicit specification of
a class of mathematical structures underlying the approach. As I discussed in
the previous section, philosophers of science have often viewed approximations
as derived from, and consequently underwritten by, physical models. Given what
has been said already about perturbative QFT it is easy to see how a zealous
follower of this doctrine might perceive it as hopelessly sloppy, and attribute
this to an unrigorous treatment of the relevant mathematics. As I mentioned in
§1.2.3, in addition to cutoff and continuum models, Fraser identifies an “infinitely
renormalised” variant of QFT which is associated with the process of imposing
and removing a cutoff in the perturbative renormalisation procedure. According
to her this amounts to adding infinite counterterms to the Lagrangian and leads
to a mathematically ill defined system.
Rather than reading the perturbative approach as a botched attempt at con-
structing QFT models however, I have been arguing that it is much more natural
to interpret it as never taking up this project in the first place. Understood as
a method for producing approximations, the perturbative approach is more dif-
ficult to dismiss as mathematically unsound. This is not to say that standard
perturbative computations are paragons of mathematical precision. The treat-
ment of the convergence of momentum space integrals in the physics literature,
for instance, often falls short of the standards of rigour upheld by mathemati-
cians. But this is the kind of everyday imprecision that is ubiquitous in applied
mathematics—if we reject the perturbative approach on these grounds we will
also be jettisoning much of physical science. The perturbative approach has been
seen as mathematically problematic in a more radical sense, I think, because of
the lack of attention payed to the existence of QFT models. On the view I have
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been developing here however this has nothing to do with mathematical rigour
and instead reflects the more modest objective of the perturbative methodology.
Whether “infinitely renormalised” QFTs make sense as constructive mathemati-
cal objects or not they are not deployed in any way in conventional perturbative
calculations.
The apparent inconsistency problem posed by Haag theorem also turns out to
be less threatening than it initially appeared. The crucial point here is that
Haag’s result pertains to the properties of QFT models. Roughly speaking, it
tells us that the time evolution of models of the Wightman and Haag-Kastler
axioms cannot be carved up in the manner prescribed by the interaction picture.
Why doesn’t this undermine perturbative evaluations of scattering cross sections?
The short answer is that since the perturbative method is not in the business of
providing a structural characterisation of QFT there cannot possibly be a conflict
here. Perturbative evaluations of S-matrix elements do not posit the existence of
models satisfying the assumptions shown to be inconsistent by Haag’s theorem
because they do not pick out any physical models at all.
In fact, the perspective on perturbation theory advocated here fits well with a re-
cent response to Haag’s theorem due to Miller (2015), which helps to clarify how
perturbative calculations avoid inconsistency. As Miller points out, the methods
used to regularise ultraviolet and infrared divergences in the perturbative ex-
pansion invariably cut against the assumptions needed to prove Haag’s theorem.
Consider, in particular, the imposition of high and low momentum cutoffs on the
relevant integrals. As I argued above this is not the same thing as constructing
a cutoff model, but we now know how to write down such systems. If we put a
QFT on a finite volume lattice, for instance, the resulting model is not touched
by Haag’s theorem because it violates the assumption needed to prove it. In fact,
since the number of degrees of freedom is finite, such as system does not admit
unitarily inequivalent Hilbert space representations at all. This means that the
interaction picture exists and the steps involved with setting up the perturbative
expansion of the S-matrix can be concretely implemented on such a structure.
Crucially, when we remove the cutoffs at the end of the calculation this should be
understood as taking a limit of a particular function. Just as taking the radius to
infinity of particular quantities defined on a sphere does not require one to posit
the existence of an infinite sphere, in Norton’s example, removing the cutoffs does
not rest on the assumption that the interaction picture can be implemented in the
continuum limit. The perturbative method simply does not assert an inconsistent
set of claims about QFT models.18
18This is not to say that Haag’s theorem has no foundational significance at all, merely that it
does not directly undermine standard perturbative QFT.
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The rigour and inconsistency problem turn out to be red herrings on the reading
of the perturbative approach I have developed then. Worries about the internal
coherence of the QFT perturbation theory have largely sprung from a misunder-
standing of its aims in my view. Still, there clearly is something puzzling about
the perturbative approach, as I have described it. It is the justification prob-
lem, I think, which ends up being the really fundamental conceptual issue with
perturbative QFT.
3.5 The Real Problem
The method described in §3.2 may provide a sound method for generating well
defined functions but there remains a mystery about why the results provide
such good approximations of their experimentally measured values. The renor-
malisation procedure, in particular, seems to be entirely ad hoc. The process of
regularising integrals, redefining the coupling and removing the regulator in the
standard renormalisation procedure all seem to proceed in the absence of any
physical argument underlying each step.
While my analysis of the perturbative approach does not solve this problem it
does help to provide a diagnosis of the root cause. The success of the perturba-
tive approach is mysterious, I suggest, precisely because it dodges the question
of what an interacting QFT is. Many of the seemingly peculiar features of QFT
perturbation series are actually found in many applications of perturbative meth-
ods elsewhere in physics. As I mentioned in §3.2.2, the process of redefining the
expansion parameter in the renormalisation procedure is often employed in per-
turbative calculations in classical and quantum theory even when there is no
problem with divergences. Furthermore, divergent perturbative expansions are
commonplace in many branches of physics. In most of these cases however, we
typically know what the physical systems whose properties we are trying to ap-
proximate looks like. Although we cannot solve the standard quantum mechanical
models of the Helium atom, for instance, we know how to write down its Hamil-
tonian and Hilbert space. What sets the original perturbative treatment of QED
apart from these cases is the absence of any non-perturbative characterisation of
the system of interest. While I have argued that this does not render perturba-
tive QFT incoherent it undercuts the possibility of telling a physical story which
could explain its success.
This appears to be bad news for the scientific realist, who wants to say that scien-
tific predictions succeed because they are derived from theories which accurately
represent the way the world is. But this situation also seems to be problematic
for the best developed forms of anti-realism. Semantically interpreted models are
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still the basic unit of analysis for the constructive empiricist; they define their
epistemic commitments and notion of empirical adequacy with respect to these
structures. If I am right then the perturbative approach to QFT cannot be read
in these terms either: it does not provide us with physical models at all, empir-
ically adequate or not. If an anti-realist reading of the perturbative approach
as it stands can be maintained then, it must be a fairly radical instrumentalist
position, according to which the perturbative method is, as Buchholz suggests,
merely “an efficient algorithm for the theoretical treatment of certain specific
problems in high-energy physics” (Buchholz, 2000, 1-2). Whether we can make
sense of this stance is a question for another time, but familiar worries about
instrumentalism are likely to rear their head again in this context.19
Besides these connections with broader debates in the philosophy of science how-
ever, the ad hoc character of perturbative renormalisation can also be viewed as
an local problem for the QFT programme. Indeed, as I gestured at in §1.2.1, it
was perceived as such by physicists in the wake of the success of the initial success
of the perturbative approach. The emergence of the axiomatic and renormalisa-
tion group approaches to QFT in the second half of the 20th century can both be
understood as responding to inadequacies with the perturbative formalism, the
search for a physical justification for the renormalisation procedure being at least
one of motivation for these developments. We should not move too quickly to
dismiss the perturbative approach to QFT as conceptually unsound on the basis
of the justification problem then. The analysis put forward here suggests that the
perturbative formalism lacks the resources to answer this challenge on its own,
but in the modern context we have non-perturbative approaches to QFT on the
table which may yet provide a solution to this puzzle. The following chapter takes
up this possibility by examining the impact of renormalisation group methods on
this issue.
19My analysis of perturbative QFT can thus be understood as posing a challenge to the idea
that theories and models are the key objects for understanding the structure of science. Inci-
dentally, Kaiser (2009) endorses a similar conclusion in his study of the historical development
of Feynman diagram methods in high energy physics. There is scope for a more radical de-
parture from the traditional picture of the philosophy of science here then. In keeping with
the conservative stance set out in the introduction however, I will be exploring the possibility
that we can, in fact, make sense of what is going on here within a fairly conventional realist
framework.
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Lessons From the Renormalisation Group:
Structures and Representations
4.1 The Contested Status of the Renormalisation Group
The application of renormalisation group methods to QFT was undoubtedly a
major breakthrough in 20th century physics; as I described in chapter 1, the
renormalisation group approach paved the way for the development of QCD and
ultimately the standard model. Its philosophical significance is more controversial
however. The status of the renormalisation group is a central point of contention
in Fraser and Wallace’s dispute over the theoretical identity of QFT. Wallace takes
renormalisation group methods to have important ramifications for the philosophy
of QFT and appeals to them frequently in his arguments in support of cutoff
formulations of the theory. By contrast, Fraser advocates a more instrumentalist
reading:
[Renormalisation group (RG)] methods illuminate the empirical struc-
ture of QFT. That is, they furnish a more perspicuous procedure for
deriving empirical predictions... However, RG methods do not shed
light on the theoretical content of QFT. For this reason, appeal to
RG methods does not decide the question of which set of theoretical
principles are appropriate for QFT. (Fraser, 2011, 131)
For Fraser it seems the advent of the renormalisation group approach to QFT
represents progress of a pragmatic kind but does not amount to a substantial
improvement in our understanding of the foundations of QFT.
This chapter aims to clarify the relevance of the renormalisation group to the
philosophy of QFT. I argue that the renormalisation group approach does in
fact impact on a number of philosophical issues raised by the QFT programme.
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After describing the basics of the renormalisation group framework (§4.2), with
particular emphasis on the non-perturbative momentum space approach, I argue
that this formalism impacts on the project of constructing continuum QFTs, an
issue which Fraser herself clearly takes to be of considerable foundational im-
portance (§4.3). My real focus here, however, is on how the renormalisation
group approach informs judgements about the kind of representational success
which can reasonably be attributed to QFT models. Picking up where we left
off in the previous chapter, I claim that the renormalisation group furnishes a
non-perturbative explanation of the success of perturbative QFT (§4.4). A key
element of this story is that the renormalisation group approach reveals the in-
sensitivity of physical quantities at relatively low energies to the details of the
dynamics at high energies, and in particular to the value of an ultraviolet cutoff.
This leads me to argue that cutoff QFT models ought to be viewed as successful
representations of coarse-grained features of the actual world, a claim which I
spend most of the rest of the thesis clarifying and defending (§4.5). I conclude by
returning to the question of how the foundational status of the renormalisation
group ought to be understood (§4.6). The best way to view the renormalisation
group, I suggest, is as a powerful tool for obtaining information about the prop-
erties of QFT models—contra Fraser however, I do not think its reach is limited
to their empirical properties.1
4.2 The Renormalisation Group in Quantum Field Theory
The term ‘renormalisation group’ might give the impression that we are deal-
ing with a single, monolithic, mathematical formalism. In reality a plethora of
distinct methods, which differ in potentially conceptually significant respects,
fall under this rubric.2 Disentangling the various strands of the renormalisation
group concept, and their application across different branches of physics, is not
my project here (though this is certainly an issue which calls for further inves-
tigation by historians and philosophers of science). This section focuses on the
incarnation of the renormalisation group which I take to be most important for
1My discussion in this chapter owes a great deal to previous work on the renormalisation group
approach to QFT in the philosophical literature, and especially to Wallace (2006, 2011) and
Hancox-Li (2015a, 2015b).
2There are at least three distinct renormalisation group traditions, which historically arose
more or less independently. First, there was the early work of Stueckelberg and Petermann
(1951), Gell-Mann and Low (1954) and others which introduced some of the key ideas of the
renormalisation group in the context of perturbative QFT. Second, there is the real space
or blocking approach originating in the work of Kadanoff (1966) in the context of condensed
matter physics (touched on briefly below). Third there is the momentum space approach
developed by Kenneth Wilson, which I focus on in this chapter. Even within these traditions
however, there is a great deal of variation in the methods which are employed.
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Figure 4.1: A ‘majority rule’ blocking procedure on a two valued spin system.
the philosophy of QFT; namely the non-perturbative momentum space approach
developed by Kenneth Wilson and others in the 1970s.3
The core idea underlying the modern conception of the renormalisation group, in
all of its guises, is the study of coarse-graining transformations. That is, opera-
tions which take us from an initial system of interest to a new one which lacks
some of the degrees of freedom associated with variations at small length scales
but agrees with its large scale properties. One reason that renormalisation group
methods are so diverse is that there are many ways of implementing a transforma-
tion of this kind. One approach employed in the study of lattice spin systems in
statistical physics, for instance, is to replace groups of neighbouring spins with a
single ‘block spin’ degree of freedom and tune the dynamics of the new system so
as to reproduce the same (or, in practice, similar) macroscopic behaviour (figure
4.1). In some cases it may be possible to invert the transformation, forming a
group structure—hence the name. But this is not always possible; blocking trans-
formations of the kind just described are typically not invertible. In any case,
group theory seldom plays an important role in renormalisation group methods,
so the terminology is always misleading in one way or another. The real signifi-
cance of these transformations is that they can be understood as inducing a ‘flow’
in a space of possible models. Studying this flow gives us information about the
way that systems behave at different length/energy scales.
Rather than working in real space, as in the blocking approach, Wilson pioneered
the idea of setting up a coarse-graining transformation in momentum space. In the
QFT context this is most naturally carried out within the path integral approach
to the theory. The key quantity here is the partition function, Z, introduced in
§1.2.2. For a single scalar field, this quantity is associated with the path integral
expression:
Z =
∫
Dφe−
∫
d4xL. (4.1)
3Wilson and Kogut (1974) is a classic review of this approach. Binney et al (1992) provides
a useful account of the Wilsonian renormalisation group in the context of condensed matter
physics. Duncan (2012) describes its application to QFT.
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As we saw, there are grave difficulties associated with precisely defining this inte-
gral on continuum space-times—we will see in the next section that the Wilsonian
renormalisation group turns out to be relevant to this project. It is possible to
give concrete meaning to the path integral however if cutoffs are introduced. The
Wilsonian renormalisation group is based on setting up a coarse-graining trans-
formation on these cutoff QFT models.
The key idea is that, rather than evaluating the whole path integral at once, we
can isolate the contribution due to high momentum field configurations, whose
Fourier transforms have support above some value µ. This part of the path
integral can then be computed separately and absorbed into a shift in the initial
Lagrangian. In symbols:∫
|p|≤µ
Dφ
∫
µ≤|p|≤Λ
Dφe−
∫
d4xL =
∫
|p|≤µ
Dφe−
∫
d4x(L+δL) (4.2)
This defines a transformation which takes us from an initial cutoff QFT model
to a new one, which has a lower ultraviolet cutoff and a modified dynamics but
behaves like the original.4
This transformation will not only alter the values of coupling parameters in the
initial Lagrangian but also give rise to new interaction terms. In general we
need to consider all possible terms which are not ruled out by initially demanded
symmetries and constraints, including non-renormalisable interactions (which,
you will recall, are interaction terms with couplings that have zero or positive
mass dimension). For scalar fields this means going beyond the φ4 theory to a
broader class of Lagrangians of the form:5
L = (∂µφ)2 −m2φ2 −
∞∑
n=2
λ2nφ
2n. (4.3)
The renormalisation group transformation can then be seen as inducing a flow in
a space of possible Lagrangians, spanned by the couplings (m, λ4, λ6, ...). The way
that these parameters change as µ is lowered, and more and more high momentum
degrees of freedom are ‘integrated out’, is conveniently described by the so-called
beta functions:
βi = µ
∂
∂µ
λi. (4.4)
4There are some subtleties here when it comes to precisely defining this kind of coarse-graining
transformation. In particular, there is a difficulty with controlling the contributions of configu-
rations in which the magnitude of the field diverges in a space-time region—known as the large
field problem (Rivasseau, 2014). See Hancox-Li (2015a) for a discussion of the work that has
been done to make the Wilsonian renormalisation group more rigorous in the mathematical
physics literature.
5Assuming a φ→ −φ symmetry to ensure that the energy is bounded from below.
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The most important points in this space for understanding the behaviour of the
renormalisation group flow are those at which all of the beta functions van-
ish, known as fixed points. We will have more to say about their significance
shortly.
One important point to note about the presentation of the renormalisation group
approach so far is that perturbation theory has not been mentioned at any point.
In practice, the path integral over large momentum configurations cannot be
evaluated exactly for physically interesting models and some kind of approxima-
tion method is needed to make computations tractable. Perturbative methods
are often employed in this context, but other kinds of approximation are also
invoked.6 As I argued in the previous chapter however, the problem with per-
turbative QFT is not the use of perturbative approximations itself but the lack
of a non-perturbative characterisation of the underlying physics which explains
their success. I will argue in §4.4 that the renormalisation group approach fills
this lacuna, and provides a way of justifying perturbative renormalisation.
Another significant property of this kind of momentum space renormalisation
group transformation is that it can be inverted—so we really are talking about
a group here. This means that we can explore what happens when we take the
renormalisation group flow in the other direction, as it were, and increase the
value of µ beyond the initial value of the cutoff. As I describe in the next section,
it is this feature of the Wilsonian approach which makes it relevant to the project
of constructing continuum QFT models.
4.3 Ultraviolet Fixed Points and the Continuum Limit
As we have discussed already, what mathematical physicists working in the con-
structive field theory programme invariably do when they attempt to establish
the existence of interacting QFTs on continuum space-times is start with a cutoff
QFT model and take the continuum and infinite volume limits of this structure.
The renormalisation group provides a natural framework for attacking the for-
mer, ultraviolet, part of this problem, as I will now explain. Hancox-Li (2015b)
has recently argued that this speaks against Fraser’s view, quoted in §4.1, that
the renormalisation group merely facilitates the extraction of empirical predic-
tions within the QFT programme. I reiterate this case here, paying particular
attention to Fraser’s discussion of this issue.
For simplicity’s sake, let’s consider a single interaction term in the Lagrangian
6This is another reason why renormalisation group methods are so diverse; even when we have
settled on a coarse-graining transformation to study a range of different approximations can
be employed to gain information about the resulting renormalisation group flow.
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Figure 4.2: Sketch of the beta function in the case of a) asymptotic freedom, b)
asymptotic safety and c) no fixed point.
of a cutoff model, parameterised by a coupling g. As we saw in the last section,
the momentum space renormalisation group transformation can be inverted and
µ can be taken beyond the initial value of the cutoff. Essentially what we are
doing here is adding more degrees of freedom associated with variations at smaller
length scales and modifying the dynamics to compensate. Suppose we start with
g at some non-zero value and take µ→∞: what happens to g? One possibility
is that the corresponding beta function goes to zero and the renormalisation
group terminates at a so-called stable ultraviolet fixed point (henceforth simply
ultraviolet fixed point). An important special case is asymptotic freedom in which
g → 0 as µ→∞. All of the evidence from perturbative calculations suggests that
this is what happens in the case of QCD. The coupling can also converge to non-
zero value, a scenario sometimes known as asymptotic safety. The possibility that
QFTs obtained from a naive quantisation of the Einstein equations have this kind
of ultraviolet behaviour is currently a subject of intense research in the quantum
gravity programme.7 The other possibility is that there is no fixed point and the
coupling does not converge to a finite value as µ→∞. All the indications are that
this is how the interaction couplings of QED and the φ4 theory in four space-time
dimensions behave. (See figure 4.2 for an illustration of these scenarios.)
The relevance of the renormalisation group to the constructive field theory project
should now be clear. We need the Lagrangian to converge as the cutoff goes
to infinity if we are to obtain an interacting theory in this way—we need an
ultraviolet fixed point. Theories which have no ultraviolet fixed point are often
said to be trivial because the only way to obtain a well defined continuum system
in this case is to take g → 0, i.e. completely ‘turn off’ interactions, as the cutoff
is removed. Whether realistic theories like QED and QCD admit continuum
7Niedermaier and Reuter (2006) is a review of this programme. Note that this substantiates
my claim from §3.3 that perturbative renormalisability is not a necessary condition for the
existence of a well-defined continuum QFT. In fact, rigorous results about the continuum
limit of the non-renormalisable Gross-Neveu model in three dimensions have been obtained
(Rivasseau, 2014).
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formulations is clearly a question which many philosophers of physics, and not
least Doreen Fraser herself, take to be of paramount importance. I will have more
to say about my take on the philosophical significance of this issue later on in
this chapter. For now though, the key point is that we have identified one way in
which the renormalisation group apparatus impacts on an issue of foundational
import.
This clearly cuts against the view that these methods only illuminates the em-
pirical content of QFT. Perhaps unsurprisingly then, Fraser takes a deflationary
view of the relationship between the renormalisation group treatment of the ul-
traviolet behaviour of a theory and the existence of continuum QFT models. She
writes:
...[T]he fact that QED is not asymptotically free does not entail that
there are no non-trivial models because the formulation of QED us-
ing the RG formalism relies on particular approximation techniques;
different approximation techniques could be compatible with the ex-
istence of non-trivial rigorous models.8 (Fraser, 2011, 131)
While these comments point to some important provisos about what can be
legitimately inferred from the renormalisation group analysis of realistic QFTs as
it currently stands, they do not undermine the relevance of the general approach
for the project of constructing continuum QFT models, as I will now argue.
What does Fraser mean exactly by “approximation techniques” in this passage?
If we take approximation to mean an inexact description of the properties of a tar-
get system, as in the previous chapter, we can certainly find many approximations
being employed in the renormalisation group approach to high energy physics.
As has already been mentioned, the Wilsonian renormalisation group transfor-
mation rests on path integral expressions which cannot be evaluated analytically
for physically interesting models. Approximations of one kind or another need
to be employed, which give us only partial and imperfect information about the
renormalisation group flow. Perturbative approximations of the beta function,
in particular, are intrinsically limited by the fact that they can only be expected
to be accurate in the region in which the coupling is small. It is possible that
perturbative calculations indicate that a model is trivial in the continuum limit
when in fact an ultraviolet fixed point exists at large g in a region of the space
which cannot be accessed via perturbative theory. This is one sense in which
the use of approximations within the renormalisation group approach could give
8Two quick comments on this passage: Fraser refers to asymptotic freedom here but we can
safely substitute the more general notion of having an ultraviolet fixed point sketched above.
Furthermore, by a ‘rigorous’ model I think Fraser really means a continuum model—as I said
in §1.2.2, the question of mathematical rigour is not the most salient issue in the distinction
between cutoff and continuum models.
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rise to misleading impressions about the non-existence of the continuum mod-
els. In the case of QED and φ4 theory a number of different perturbative and
non-perturbative approximation methods all point to the non-existence of an ul-
traviolet fixed point, but we still lack a rigorous proof of this result.9
This clearly does not mean that the renormalisation group has no bearing on
the constructive field theory project however; it merely serves to remind us that
more work is needed to decisively determine whether particular QFT models
have ultraviolet fixed points.10 In fact, this has been one of the main focuses of
the constructive field theory programme in recent years. As Hancox-Li (2015b)
describes in some depth, mathematicians working in this field have attempted
to probe the renormalisation group flow of QFT models using non-perturbative
approximations with well controlled error bounds, the hope being that rigorous
results about the existence or non-existence of ultraviolet fixed points can be
established.
I suspect, therefore, that Fraser is getting at something else here. It is the at-
tempt to construct continuum QFT models by means of the continuum limit of a
cutoff theory itself which Fraser is referring to as an “approximation technique”.11
While I have been, somewhat sloppily, speaking about taking the continuum limit
there are really number of ways of implementing this sort of constructive strategy:
in part because there are many ways to write down cutoff models, but also because
questions of convergence depend on the topological properties of the background
space, which can be handled in different ways. The fact that a standard construal
of the continuum limit does not converge does not necessarily mean that a con-
tinuum QFT model cannot be obtained by some other means. This is especially
true if we are working with an open ended conception of what a continuum QFT
is—that is if we are willing to weaken the Wightman axioms in the face of new
developments as Fraser attests to.
While this suggests that it will be a difficult task indeed to prove that a particular
QFT model does not exist on continuum space-time I do not think that this
should push us towards the instrumentalist reading of the renormalisation group
9For a non-perturbative treatment of the renormalisation group flow of QED see Gies, H.
and Jaeckel, J. (2004). Lu¨scher and Weisz (1987) is a standard reference for evidence of the
triviality of φ4 theory.
10Note that this point applies just as forcefully to cases in which the ultraviolet behaviour of
the theory seems to be well behaved, such as QCD. The asymptotic freedom of QCD has not
been rigorously demonstrated, and this would surely be needed if a continuum version of the
theory were to be concretely constructed.
11On this interpretation ‘approximation’ is being used to refer to a limiting process used to
define a mathematical structure. This is clearly a different meaning from my use of the
term in the previous chapter. In her discussion of this issue Fraser (2011) cites a passage in
Wightman (1984) which refers to the construction of a continuum model by means of a series
of lattice models as a “lattice approximation”, which corroborates this reading.
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which Fraser advocates. Speaking of the apparent lack of an ultraviolet fixed
point in the renormalisation group flow of the φ4 theory Rivasseau (2014, 271)
remarks:
Mathematicians often cure this defect by reformulating the flow equa-
tions in another space... It is perhaps in this direction that one might
reach in the future some positive results concerning [φ4 theory], al-
though for the moment we have no geometrical insight on how to
change the ordinary space on which the parameters such as the cou-
pling constant live.
Rivasseau is clearly optimistic about the existence of a continuum φ4 model on
Minkowski space-time here, but he is not dismissing the relevance of previous
work on the renormalisation group analysis of its ultraviolet behaviour. What
he is proposing is that it may be possible to modify the space in which the
renormalisation group analysis is being conducted so as to obtain a convergent
continuum limit. This seems to me to be the appropriate response to these
results; the challenge theories like φ4 theory and QED pose for the constructive
field theory project calls for more engagement with the renormalisation group
framework, not less.
One moral of the foregoing discussion then is that very little can be said with cer-
tainty about the existence or non-existence of continuum QFT models on the basis
of extant work within the renormalisation group approach. Claims that QED has
been shown to admit no continuum formulation, not uncommonly found in the
physics literature, are premature. Nevertheless gaining control over the ultraviolet
behaviour of four dimensional QFTs is a crucial challenge facing the constructive
field theory project and despite these qualifications the renormalisation group
framework clearly remains relevant to this problem. This is one respect in which
renormalisation group methods amount to more than a “procedure for deriving
empirical predictions” within the QFT programme.
The next section returns to the unsolved puzzle about the perturbative approach
to QFT discussed in the previous chapter. In this context too, the renormalisation
group has important ramifications which are difficult to make sense of on an
instrumentalist reading.
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4.4 Explaining the Success of Perturbative Quantum Field
Theory
The renormalisation group approach is often said to have put perturbative QFT,
and the perturbative renormalisation procedure in particular, on a firmer con-
ceptual footing.12 This section offers a diagnosis of why this is in fact the case.
The crucial point is that the renormalisation group approach largely solves the
key problem with the QFT perturbation theory which I identified in the previous
chapter: the lack of explanation for its success.
Where the previous section looked at what happens when we take the renormal-
isation group transformations in the ultraviolet direction, the crucial issue here
is how the renormalisation group flow behaves as we decrease the value of the
cutoff. As was discussed in §4.2, this kind of coarse-graining operation inevitably
gives rise to non-renormalisable, as well as renormalisable, interaction terms in
the new Lagrangian and the full renormalisation group flow lives in an infinite
dimensional space of couplings. In the perturbative context the distinction be-
tween renormalisable and non-renormalisable interactions was based on whether
ultraviolet divergences in the expansion could be absorbed into a finite number of
parameters in the Lagrangian—this turned out not possible for terms whose cou-
pling had negative mass dimension. The mass dimension of the coupling in the
Lagrangian also has important implications for how it behaves under renormalisa-
tion group transformations. Though the equations governing the renormalisation
group flow are highly non-linear and intractable, we can say something surpris-
ingly general about how the renormalisation group flow behaves in the low energy
regime: as µ decreases it is attracted to a finite dimensional surface spanned by
the parameters associated with renormalisable terms in the Lagrangian.13 In the
case of scalar field theory, for instance, non-renormalisable interaction terms, like
λ6φ
6, λ8φ
8, and so on, have very weak effects at low energies—at sufficiently large
length scales almost any scalar QFT will look like the familiar φ4 model (see
figure 4.3 for an illustration).
Some indication of this behaviour is provided by naive dimensional analysis. As-
12See Lepage (2005). Similar discussions can be found in many modern QFT textbooks.
Huggett and Weingard (1995), Butterfield and Bouatta (2014) and Hancox-Li (2015b), chap-
ter 4, all advocate the significance of the renormalisation group for understanding perturbative
renormalisation.
13The distinction between renormalisable and non-renormalisable couplings directly corre-
sponds to the distinction between relevant, irrelevant and marginal couplings in condensed
matter physics. As this terminology suggests, couplings with negative mass dimension are
dubbed irrelevant because they have very weak affects on the critical behaviour of condensed
matter systems. For more on the connections between the application of the renormalisation
group in QFT and condensed matter theory, see Binney et al (1992), chapter 14.
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Figure 4.3: The renormalisation group flow of scalar field theories to a surface
spanned by renormalisable parameters.
suming that the only dimensional quantity at play is the ultraviolet cutoff, we can
rewrite the couplings of non-renormalisable interactions in terms of a dimension-
less factor multiplied by an inverse power of Λ. In the case of scalar field theory
for instance, we can define, λ2n = c2nΛ
4−2n, where {c2n} is a new set of dimension-
less parameters. The contribution of a particular interaction term to observables
at some energy scale E can thus be estimated to be of the order c2n(E/Λ)
4−2n. If
E  Λ then we can expect the affect of non-renormalisation terms (with n > 2)
to be heavily suppressed. This is not a foolproof argument however because the
new couplings c2n, though dimensionless, can still depend implicitly on the energy
scale, and could, in principle compensate for the inverse powers of Λ. A more
rigorous, and genuinely non-perturbative demonstration of this behaviour, origi-
nally due to Polchinski (1984), is based on linearising the renormalisation group
equations by treating the relevant couplings as infinitesimals. If we do this it is
possible to show that the non-renormalisable couplings at an initial cutoff scale Λ
are almost completely absorbed into variations in renormalisable couplings as we
coarse-grain to a much lower cutoff scale µ Λ, up to powers of (µ/Λ)|d|, where
d is the mass dimension of the non-renormalisable coupling.14 This analysis only
tells us about the renormalisation group flow for small values of the coupling (a
limitation I will return to in the following section) but since perturbation theory
rests on this assumption it will be sufficient for present purposes.
One upshot of this result is that it allows us to understand why it is that the
14See Duncan (2012), chapter 17, for an especially clear presentation of this result.
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standard model, and its component theories, are renormalisable. As I mentioned
in the previous chapter, renormalisability was traditionally treated as a theory
selection principle, but there was always something mysterious about this way
of thinking. Why should the world be structured in such a way as to facilitate
perturbation approximations? Without the renormalisation group results just de-
scribed the fact that the Lagrangians of empirically successful theories like QED
and the standard model are renormalisable would seem to be a lucky coincidence.
We can now see, however, that limiting one’s attention to renormalisable inter-
action terms is a very reasonable thing to do. Suppose we take Λ to be at a
very high energy scale at which new fields, or effects beyond the scope of QFT
entirely, come into play—in the most extreme case this could be the Planck scale
at which quantum gravity effects are expected to become important. On the ba-
sis of the above argument, we should then expect physics at currently accessible
energies to be very well described by a renormalisable Lagrangian, as the effects
of non-renormalisable interaction terms will be heavily suppressed by the large
ultraviolet cutoff.
While this new perspective on renormalisability has been emphasised in the
nascent philosophical literature on renormalisation theory,15 this does not get
to the heart of how the renormalisation group illuminates the QFT perturba-
tion theory in my view. After all, the fundamental puzzle about perturbative
renormalisation identified in the previous chapter was why it works at all, even
granting the renormalisability of the interactions under consideration. I argued
there that the perturbative approach is incapable of answering this question on
its own because it lacks a non-perturbative characterisation of the underlying
physics. The renormalisation group framework allows us to respond to this chal-
lenge however. In fact, all of the machinery needed to explain the success of the
standard perturbative renormalisation procedure in physical terms has already
been introduced.
You will recall that the perturbative renormalisation procedure can be divided
into three steps. In the first, regularisation phase, divergent momentum space
integrals are replaced by convergent expressions. There are many ways to do this
but the basic approach in the case of ultraviolet divergences is to put a finite
upper bound on the integral (I’ll come back to infrared divergences shortly). The
renormalisation group framework provides a physical interpretation of what is
going on here which was lacking in the original perturbative method. We have
seen that it is possible to simulate the effects of high momentum degrees of
freedom not included in a cutoff model by tuning the system’s dynamics. We can
thus legitimise the perturbative cutoff on momentum space integrals in the same
15Butterfield and Bouatta (2014) and Hancox-Li (2015a) both stress how the renormalisation
group impacts on the concept of renormalisability.
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terms, on the understanding that the effects of physics beyond the cutoff can
be absorbed into the Lagrangian. Of course, if we are viewing the perturbative
cutoff in this way then we should be taking non-renormalisable interactions into
account, which is not done in the standard perturbative method—this will become
important shortly.
The second step of the renormalisation procedure is to redefine the expansion
parameter so as to remove the diverging dependence on the cutoff in the pertur-
bative coefficients. But what licenses us to do this? The best answer we can give
within the perturbative method itself is that it is required if the expansion is to
be mathematically well behaved, and yield sensible predictions, as the cutoff is
removed. But this is a purely instrumental rationale. The fact that this prescrip-
tion produces finite results does not give us any reason to think that they ought
to be good approximations to physical quantities like scattering cross sections. It
is this manoeuvre, more than anything else, which gives perturbative renormali-
sation its ad hoc flavour. The renormalisation group analysis of the low energy
regime provides a physical justification for removing the hypersensitivity to the
cutoff however. It turns out that physical quantities like scattering cross sections
actually are very weakly dependent on the cutoff at low energies. Choosing the
expansion parameter so as to minimise the dependence on the cutoff can simply
be understood as a matter of ensuring that truncations of the series mimic the
behaviour of the physical quantity that it is supposed to approximate.
We have seen that the low energy behaviour of a cutoff theory can be almost en-
tirely parameterised by the renormalisable couplings. All that varying the value
of the cutoff at high energies can do to the renormalisation group flow then is
move us around on the surface of renormalisable couplings. This means that fix-
ing the values of the renormalisable couplings at low energies by measuring the
values of a finite number of scattering cross sections absorbs almost all of the
cutoff dependence of physical quantities. The upshot of the Polchinski (1984)
argument outlined above is that the correlation functions of a cutoff model only
depend on the cutoff through powers of E/Λ, for scattering process taking place
at kinetic energy E.16 This amounts to a non-perturbative demonstration that
16These renormalisation group results are often described as indicated a general insensativity of
low energy behaviour to physics at much higher energy, also associated with the decoupling
theorem (Appelquist and Carazzone, 1975), and I will sometimes slip into this way of talking
in what follows. As Williams (2015) stresses however, we need to be somewhat careful here.
While the renormalisation group indicates that the cutoff dependence can be absorbed into
the low energy renormalisable couplings if there are parameters in the theories Lagrangian
with a positive mass dimension—corresponding to so-called relevant operators—this masks
an implicit hyper-sensitivity to the value of the cutoff. This is the root of the naturalness
problem with the Higgs sector of the standard model. I won’t have anything more to say
about this here though it will ultimately be an important issue for investigating the status of
particular QFT models.
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the logarithms and powers of Λ that appear in naive perturbative expansion are
artefacts of an inappropriate choice of expansion parameter. Once the expansion
parameter has been renormalised in the manner described in the previous chap-
ter the only dependence on the cutoff that remains in perturbative approximants
takes the correct form of powers of E/Λ. The perturbative renormalisation pro-
cedure then is fundamentally about ensuring that our approximations have the
right scaling behaviour on the view I am advocating here, not about ensuring
that they are mathematically well behaved as the cutoff is removed.
We can also provide a natural justification for the removal of the cutoff in the final
stage of the perturbative renormalisation procedure within this framework. As-
suming that the cutoff scale is much higher than the energy scale we are trying to
describe, the E/Λ cutoff dependence of renormalised perturbative approximants,
and the actual physical quantities they are supposed to approximate, will be very
small. In many contexts, they will be much smaller than expected experimental
error and can consequently be justifiably neglected. What we are doing when
we take the cutoff to infinity in perturbative calculations is setting E/Λ → 0,
and completely eliminating the dependence on the cutoff. As I mentioned in the
previous chapter, removing the cutoff has significant computational benefits, and
since the renormalisation group gives us a handle on the kind of errors that result
from doing so it is pragmatically justified.
This reinforces the claim I made in the previous chapter that taking the cutoff
to infinity in perturbative calculations and taking the continuum limit of a cutoff
QFT model are very different things. As we saw in §4.3, when it comes to
the continuum limit it is the behaviour of the renormalisation group flow in
the ultraviolet direction which is of interest. In contrast, the justification for
removing the cutoff on perturbative approximations I have just described is based
entirely on the behaviour of the renormalisation group flow at low energies, and
the fact that physical quantities are almost entirely independent of the cutoff in
this regime. In fact, nothing we have said in this section hangs on the existence or
non-existence of a continuum limit at all. This explains why the worries about the
continuum limit of QED raised by its apparent lack of an ultraviolet fixed point
do not lead to doubt about the reliability of QED perturbation theory.
What about the infrared divergences that appear in the perturbation series of
theories with massless particles? In this case the renormalisation group does
not help us and other theoretical resources are needed to understand what is
going on. But while the details of the treatment of infrared divergences are
different, and will not be discussed in detail here, there is reason to believe that
the basic explanatory story here is essentially the same. As in the ultraviolet
case, there is strong evidence that infrared divergences are unphysical artefacts
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of the perturbative approximation scheme. For one thing, there are rigorous
results, admittedly still within the context of perturbative QFT itself, which tell
us that the infrared divergences in QED and QCD perturbation series ultimately
cancel when in and out states are treated appropriately and do not manifest in
physical observables.17 Furthermore, we have strong non-perturbative evidence
that correlation functions over relatively short length scales are very insensitive
to the details of a long distance cutoff. In the context of lattice QCD the impact
of finite size effects on correlation functions can be estimated quite precisely,
using methods like chiral perturbation theory.18 In general, the result is that
correlation functions at energy scales E depend on the infrared cutoff through
powers of exp(−EL), where L is the length of the finite volume lattice. As in the
ultraviolet case then, the singular dependence on the infrared cutoff is unphysical
and systematically removing infrared divergences can again be understood as a
matter of ensuring that our perturbative expressions share the relevant behaviour
of the quantities they are supposed to approximate.
While I certainly would not claim that all of the conceptual puzzles with the per-
turbative approach have been solved in the preceding discussion, we have certainly
improved the situation as we left it in the previous chapter.19 The perturbative
renormalisation procedure, in particular, has been shown to have a sound physical
motivation and grounding in a non-perturbative characterisation of QFT models.
This paves the way for further philosophical engagement with perturbative QFT
since the final outstanding problem—the justification problem—has been at least
partially addressed. It also represents another context in which renormalisation
group methods have genuine philosophical import. As I argue in the next sec-
tion, the explanation of the success of perturbative renormalisation which has
just been sketched also leads a more general shift in our understanding of QFT;
it motivates a realist view of cutoff QFT models.
17The Bloch–Nordsieck theorem is the classic result for the cancellation of infrared divergences
in QED, see Duncan (2012) for an exposition. New subtleties arise in the context of QCD
however. Though general cancellation results can be obtained isolating the infrared safe part
of perturbative approximants is often non-trivial. See Muta (2010) for an in-depth discussion
of infrared divergences in QCD perturbation theory.
18See Golterman (2011) for a discussion of the estimation of finite size effects in lattice QCD.
19One issue which I have not addressed here, for instance, is the scheme dependence problem
mentioned in chapter 3. There is also a great deal more to be said about how renormalisation
group methods are employed in the context of contemporary perturbative QFT, and the way
that non-renormalisable theories are dealt with perturbatively in the modern effective field
theory methodology. I take my discussion here to be a first step in the broader project of
philosophically engaging with perturbative QFT.
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4.5 Quantum Field Theories as Coarse-Grained
Representations
As I stressed in chapter 3, one of the key features of perturbative QFT, in its origi-
nal incarnation, that made it problematically different from perturbative methods
employed elsewhere in physics was the lack of a physical characterisation of the
system whose properties are being approximated. The previous section detailed
non-perturbative results which, I claimed, help to rationalise the standard per-
turbative method. It may not be obvious from the discussion so far however
what the physical picture underlying this account is supposed to be. This section
addresses this issue explicitly and argues that the explanatory story developed in
the previous section is, in fact, of the sort that should satisfy the scientific realist.
Properly understood, the renormalisation group analysis just described furnishes
an explanation of the empirical successes of the QFT programme in terms of the
way the world is. Spelling this out will lead to a broader thesis about how QFT
models relate to reality. The key claim is that cutoff QFT models ought to be
taken seriously as faithful representations of the physics of our world at length
scales far removed from the ultraviolet and infrared cutoffs, though, as we’ll see,
this view of QFT systems as coarse-grained models will also apply to continuum
formulations of realistic QFTs, if they exist.
Recall that in the methodological framework set out in chapter 2 the process of
stating a physical theory was divided into three parts. In the first structural phase
mathematical structures which make up the theory’s formalism are supplied. In
the second semantic phase some physical content is assigned to these structures—
this is what is usually meant by providing an interpretation of the theory, and the
so-called standard account, which I was happy to provisionally accept, took this
step to involve a specification of a set of possible worlds in which the theory is true.
In the final epistemic phase, which I argued also needs to be taken into account
if we are to make sense of the full range of conceptual issues raised by physical
theories, something is said about how these interpreted structures ought to be
understood as representations of the actual world. Specifically, on the minimal
framework I put forward, we need to identify which properties of a theory’s models
we should take to faithfully represent, which we should take to misrepresent, and
which we should simply remain agnostic about. My approach here will be to
examine how each of these steps play out in the case of cutoff QFTs in light of
renormalisation group results just outlined (I’ll return to continuum models at
the close of the section). What will end up emerging from the discussion is an
explanation of the extant empirical successes of the QFT programme in terms of
the representational success of these theories.
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When it comes to the first phase of writing down mathematical structures, we saw
in §1.2.2 that ultraviolet and infrared cutoffs can be implemented in a number
of different ways, leading to a diverse collection of mathematical models which I
have been referring to collectively as cutoff QFTs. For the moment though keep
in mind the canonical case of a finite volume hypercubic lattice QFT—we will
see that focusing on these systems is not as ad hoc as it might initially seem
shortly. As I discussed in chapter 1, lattice QFT models are very well understood
mathematically and can be quantised using both the canonical and functional
integral approaches. The resulting structure is a quantum system with a finite
number of degrees of freedom that is highly analogous to the lattice systems used
in condensed matter physics to describe a quantum crystal.
How should we go about assigning physical content to these structures? On the
one hand, QFT models (cutoff and continuum) will inherit puzzles from ordinary
quantum mechanics here. Owing in large part to the enduring controversy sur-
rounding the measurement problem, there is very little agreement about what
any quantum theory says about the world. In particular, there has been much
debate in recent years about the ontological status of quantum states and these
issues will inevitably spill over into QFT, though so far they have been much less
discussed in this context.20 Additional semantic issues have also been raised in
the philosophy of QFT literature. A key focus of philosophical work on QFT has
been the status of particles and fields in QFT systems, and specifically whether
they can be counted as part of the fundamental furniture of possible worlds that
are exactly described by QFT models. Furthermore, in the case of continuum
QFT models the existence of unitarily inequivalent representations poses puzzles
for understanding what these theories say about the world (as will be discussed
further in chapter 6).
I don’t have anything new to say about these issues here. What I do want to stress
however is that the imposition of ultraviolet and infrared cutoffs does not lead to
any new problems at the semantic level. In fact, since systems with finite degrees
of freedom do not admit unitarily inequivalent representations cutoff systems
are easier to make sense of than continuum QFTs (again, this feature of cutoff
models will be discussed further in chapter 6). The issues which remain here are
essentially those that plague quantum physics in general. Since this point is not
uncontroversial I will pause to defend it.
It is sometimes suggested that cutoff QFTs are incapable of completely describing
a possible world at all. This would mean that the standard account cannot be
applied in this context and there is a serious puzzle with making sense of their
20Recent papers discussing the fundamental ontology of ordinary quantum mechanics are col-
lected in Ney and Albert (2013). Wallace and Timpson (2010) and Arntzenius (2014) chapter
3 extend these discussions to the context of QFT systems.
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content. Wallace (2006) describes cutoff QFT as “intrinsically approximate”, for
instance, and the claim that QFTs which incorporate an ultraviolet cutoff ‘break
down’ at high energies is not uncommonly found in the scientific and philosophical
literature on effective field theories.21 In my view this is another area where we
need to be careful to distinguish perturbative and non-perturbative issues. It is
true that if a finite ultraviolet cutoff is maintained in the perturbative framework,
for instance when non-renormalisable theories like the Fermi model of weak in-
teractions are treated perturbatively, the resulting approximations become badly
behaved at energies that exceed the cutoff—in particular, unitarity is violated. In
the non-perturbative context however there is no sense in which a lattice theory
‘breaks down’ at high energies—the system simply does not admit states with
momenta in excess of the ultraviolet cutoff. As far as I can tell it makes perfectly
good sense to talk about the possible worlds in which a lattice QFT model is
true: these will presumably be worlds in which space-time actually has a lattice
structure at the fundamental level.22
The really interesting issues with cutoff QFTs, I think, arise in the final epis-
temic phase when the question of representational success is broached. How do
these systems relate to the physics of the actual world? Before the rise of the
renormalisation group approach the default answer was probably not at all. As
we have now discussed in some detail, cutoff models have long been employed in
the constructive field theory programme as an intermediary step towards obtain-
ing continuum formulations of realistic QFTs, and in this context can simply be
viewed as an instrument in the search for continuum models. A similarly dismis-
sive attitude towards the physical significance of the cutoff can be found in the
high energy physics literature prior to the influential work of Wilson. The suc-
cess of the renormalisation group approach has transformed physicists’ attitudes
towards the cutoff however. Nowadays lattice QFT models, and perturbative
calculations which maintain a finite cutoff, are taken seriously as descriptions of
actual physics.
This transformation should, I think, be understood as taking place at the epis-
temic rather than semantic level. The shift in late 20th century high energy
physics towards thinking of QFTs as so-called effective field theories was not a
revolution in how QFT systems are formulated but was rather a reassessment
of their representational status. How did this come about? The first step is to
21See McKenzie (2012) chapter 6 and Williams (2016) for discussion of the break down of
effective field theories in perturbation theory at the ultraviolet cutoff scale.
22This is not, of course, to say that the violations of unitarity found in perturbation theory
have no significance whatsoever. In many contexts the appearance of these effects can be
used to estimate the scale of a physically significant cutoff at which new physics kicks in—in
the case of the fermi model of weak interactions, for instance, the natural physical cutoff is
the mass of the electroweak W bosons.
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recognise that the results discussed in the previous section show that cutoff QFT
models are empirically successful in their own right. We have seen that the values
of observable quantities associated with a cutoff model at energies much lower
than the ultraviolet cutoff, for instance, are thought to differ from standard per-
turbative approximations via powers of E/Λ, which, if Λ is taken to be sufficiently
large, can obviously be ensured to be much smaller than the experimental error
associated with the measurement of the quantities in question. This means, in
effect, that the myriad predictive successes of QFT perturbation theory accrue
to cutoff versions of realistic QFT models.
Furthermore, in the wake of the success of the renormalisation group approach,
more evidence of the predictive capacities of cutoff models has come to light, with
the success of non-perturbative approximations generated by numerical simula-
tions of lattice QFT systems. These numerical methods have proven to be our
most predictively powerful probe of the low energy behaviour of QCD, where
interactions are strong and perturbative approximations are no longer useful.
I mentioned in the previous section that the Polchinski (1984) renormalisation
group analysis of the low energy regime is based on the assumption that the cou-
pling is small and consequently cannot be trusted to give us accurate estimates
of the cutoff dependence when the coupling is large. In the low energy region of
QCD we expect the appearance of so-called intrinsically non-perturbative contri-
butions to correlation functions proportional to factors like exp (−1/g) (where g
is the QCD coupling) that are ‘invisible’ to perturbation theory. It turns out to
be possible to estimate the dependence on the lattice spacing a in this context
however—the basic result being that it vanishes like powers of a as a → 0.23
Again, this means the dependence on the ultraviolet cutoff takes the form of
inverse powers of Λ = 1/a. As I briefly mentioned in the previous section, fi-
nite size effects in lattice QFT simulations are also exponentially suppressed.
Thus the basic rationalisation of the success of lattice QFT simulations is es-
sentially the same as that of perturbative approximants: this method produces
good approximations because the observable quantities we are trying to predict
are very insensitive to the values of the lattice spacing/ultraviolet cutoff and the
volume/infrared cutoff.
Should we take the empirical success of cutoff formulations of realistic QFTs to
confirm their claims about the physical world? I argued in chapter 2 that we
would do best to move away from the idea that the content of any physical the-
ory should be accepted en bloc. The kind of representational success which can
reasonably be attributed to a theory invariably involves taking some parts to be
veridical and others to misrepresent. As I discussed there, there are numerous
23See Duncan (2012), chapter 9, for a discussion of intrinsically non-perturbative effects and
Weisz (2011) for a detailed discussion of the estimation of lattice defects in lattice QCD.
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factors which can influence these epistemic judgements. But I also put forward
a master criterion for identifying the belief worthy content of a theory based on
the familiar realist idea that we ought to reserve our optimism for the parts of
the theory that are really responsible for its predictive achievements. I offered
a counterfactual characterisation of what this means according to which a prop-
erty of a model contributes to a prediction, and therefore is supported by it, if
varying it spoils the relevant empirical success. Conversely, if a model’s empiri-
cal adequacy is robust under variations in one of its properties then it does not
essentially contribute to its success and should not be taken representationally
seriously.
Coupling this approach with what we have already learned about the scaling
behaviour of cutoff QFTs leads to a general thesis about the representational
status of these models. The renormalisation group analysis of cutoff QFTs tells
us that, once the quantities of a model have been reparameterised in terms of
couplings fixed by low energy measurements, its large scale behaviour is very
insensitive to the value of the ultraviolet cutoff and the details of the dynamics
at the cutoff scale. Less systematic, but still compelling, evidence suggests that
the empirical consequences of cutoff QFT models are also robust under variations
in the value of the infrared cutoff and the degrees of freedom at arbitrarily large
distances. What this means is that the very small and very large scale properties
of these models can be varied without undermining its empirical adequacy, which
is exactly the criterion I put forward for identifying features of a model that do
not contribute to its success. The upshot then is that we should not trust these
features of cutoff models to accurately represent anything in reality.
While there are speculative motivations coming from quantum gravity and cos-
mology for thinking that the world actually has some kind of short distance cutoff
at the fundamental level, and really is finite in volume, these are, as far as I know,
unanswered questions. As far as the empirical success of the QFT programme
goes then, I suggest we ought to remain agnostic about these issues. On the other
hand, we have good reason to believe that any particular implementation of the
cutoffs misrepresents the way the world is. For one thing, the fact that there
are many ways of writing down a cutoff version of a realistic QFT which make
no difference to its relevant observable consequences suggests that none of these
cutoff schemes has a reasonable chance of describing reality as it is. But there are
also compelling reasons external to the QFT programme for viewing the claims
that our current QFT models make about the small and large scale structures of
the world to be false—due to the clash with general relativity we expect radically
new physics to come into play at both of these scales. The model’s claims about
the world at the cutoff scales then should be viewed as idealisations.
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If the details at the cutoff scale are not responsible for its predictive accuracy
though, what is? The answer which emerges from the discussion of this chapter
is that it is the system’s correlation functions over length scales much longer
than the ultraviolet cutoff and much shorter than the infrared cutoff which really
underwrite its success. These are the fundamental properties of QFT models that
remain almost entirely invariant under variations in the cutoffs. They are also
modally connected to directly observable quantities like scattering cross sections,
in the sense that QFT models with different correlation functions at the energy
scales we are currently probing in collider experiments will necessarily lead to
discernibly different predictions. Following through on the idea that the realist
commits themselves to the aspects of scientific theories that fuel its success then,
we should take these quantities to faithfully represent coarse-grained aspects of
reality. This is, of course, closely allied to the stance towards cutoff QFTs set out
in Wallace (2006, 2011). Unlike Wallace however, I have advocated a very similar
attitude towards both the ultraviolet and infrared cutoff (more on this point in
chapter 6); we will see another difference between Wallace’s approach and mine
shortly.
Some clarificatory remarks are in order. First of all, it may be helpful to point
out that the idea that a model captures coarse-grained features of its target while
misrepresenting it at other scales is far from a novel one in the broader landscape
of scientific modelling. We are very familiar with the use of continuum models
to describe the properties of systems ultimately composed of a finite number
of particles in fluid mechanics and condensed matter physics, for instance. In
statistical mechanics so-called lattice gas models, which discretise the states of a
system of particles so that they can only take positions on the sites of a spacial
lattice, are used to describe fluid to solid phase transitions. Models like this clearly
idealise the short scale structure of the concrete systems they aim to describe but
nevertheless accurately capture many of their large scale properties. We can
also find more mundane instances of this kind of coarse-grained representational
success in non-scientific contexts. Consider a digital photograph, for instance.
The discrete changes in colour at the scale of individual pixels clearly do not
reflect real variations in the target but, again, digital images accurately represent
some features of their subjects on length scales much larger than the pixel length.
The kind of representational success I am attributing to realistic cutoff QFTs can
be thought of as broadly analogous to these more tangible cases.
I should also stress here that my claim that cutoff models get coarse-grained fea-
tures of the world right is not to be confused with the claim that they merely
capture observables, in the philosopher’s sense. In particular, the view I am
putting forward here is not to be assimilated to the constructive empiricist claim
that these models are merely empirically adequate. For the empiricists an entity
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or property posited by a theory is said to be observable if it is a possible object of
unmediated human perception. In the QFT context, scattering cross sections are
perhaps the obvious candidate for quantities that might satisfy this definition.
But the correlation functions I am taking to be the locus of our epistemic com-
mitments here are not, in general, observable in this sense—they are, of course,
supported by empirical evidence but they are not directly measured in scattering
experiments. It is worth pointing out that when I say coarse-grained here I mean
coarse-grained relative to a suitable ultraviolet cutoff, which in the case of the
standard model and its sub-theories will be very small distance scales indeed. In
the case of QCD, for instance, I am suggesting that correlation function on scales
much smaller than the diameter of the proton should be taken representation-
ally seriously; these properties will clearly not be observable by the empiricist’s
lights.24
A final issue which needs to be addressed is the plethora of distinct cutoff for-
mulations of any realistic QFT. At first blush, the fact there are many different
ways of freezing out the degrees of freedom associated with arbitrarily high and
low momenta might seem to stand against taking these systems seriously from a
foundational perspective. We can now see that this is not as problematic as it
initially appears however. The existence of many cutoff versions of QED, that
are all essentially indistinguishable at sufficiently low energies, might be a prob-
lem if we took them to be rival hypotheses about the fundamental nature of the
world. But, as I have argued, cutoff QFTs should not be viewed in this way.
Lattice QFTs and systems which employ a smooth ultraviolet cutoff (as briefly
as described in §1.2.2) disagree on their short scale structure, but we should not
take these claims representationally seriously in any case on the view I have de-
veloped here. In contrast, these systems agree about everything we have any
right to believe, namely the correlation functions or scales intermediate between
the ultraviolet and infrared cutoffs. There is no conflict in the claims about the
world that are warranted by the success of these theories then.25 We can, I think,
24There is a potential concern here about how the representational content of these correlation
functions should be understood however, given the controversy surrounding the semantics of
quantum theory in general. Correlation functions are expectation values of products of field
operators and consequently how we interpret quantum operators and states will determine
how their physical significance is spelled out. Consequently, the precise characterisation of
the coarse-grained features captured by cutoff QFT models will depend, to some extent, on
one’s broader view of quantum theory. This should not be too surprising however; familiar
interpretive issues with quantum mechanics are bound to reoccur in the QFT context, as I
have already mentioned. This need not mean that the philosophy of QFT is held hostage
to the measurement problem. We can arguably deal with a certain amount of semantic
ambiguity here; as long as we maintain a broadly ontological view of quantum states, steer
clear of epistemic and pragmatic views, such as that of Healey (2012), correlation functions
will end being robust physical quantities.
25I develop this point further in §7.4 in the context of concerns about underdetermination
among QFT models.
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understand the ambiguity associated with the imposition of the cutoffs in a simi-
lar way to idealisations elsewhere in physics. In the case of the simple pendulum
model, briefly invoked in §2.3, what justifies sending the air resistive force to zero
is that its precise value makes no difference to the time period (to the required
level of accuracy). Similarly, since the very small/large scale properties of QFT
models make no difference to their relevant empirical predictions are free to deal
with them in whatever way we find convenient. This explains why it is legitimate
to focus on lattice QFTs, despite the existence of other ways of imposing the
cutoffs.
Now we have dealt with the cutoff case in some detail, I will close this section with
some comments about continuum QFTs, as promised. What does all this mean
for the continuum theories sought in the constructive field theory programme? If
we had continuum formulations of realistic QFTs the basic morals of the analysis
of cutoff systems just detailed would also apply to them. Suppose that there is
a breakthrough in mathematical physics and continuum versions of a theory like
QED or QCD are constructed. As I mentioned above continuum systems raise
new semantic puzzles, but putting these issues aside, what impact would this
have on the epistemic question of what we ought to believe about the world on
the basis of the QFT programme? In my view, essentially none at all (though I
will add a caveat to this claim in §6.5). Though these continuum theories would
purport to describe the world on arbitrarily large and small length scales these are
not claims which we are licensed to believe for the same reasons that we have just
run through in the case of cutoff systems. We have seen that physics at the energy
scales we currently have access to in collider experiments, is effectively isolated
from what goes on in these domains and consequently is not supported by the
empirical success of QED and QCD. Furthermore, we know that these theories
do not describe the world in these domains for external theoretical reasons, the
need for a consistent theory of quantum gravity being the most immediate (I
will have more to say on this point in the next chapter). Does this mean that
the axiomatic and constructive approaches to QFT are philosophically barren? I
think not. In the chapters that follow I will be developing the idea that studying
continuum QFT systems can still be philosophically rewarding without furnishing
new claims about the way the world is.
In contrast to Wallace’s presentation of the dialectic, for me the lack of continuum
formulations of realistic QFTs is not a key motivation for focusing on cutoff
QFTs. What comes out of the discussion of this section is a general picture
about how QFT models relate to the world; they capture coarse-grained features
of the world. This is, I think, a precisification of the familiar claim in the physics
literature that the standard model is an effective field theory. Constructing a
continuum formulation of this theory will do nothing to change this and the
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cutoff formulation we have already has all that we need to articulate the claims
about the world that it warrants. Furthermore, I have suggested that the coarse-
grained representational success of QFT models furnishes a physical explanation
of the empirical successes of the QFT programme. Indeed, I think that the view
which emerges from the discussion of this section is a genuinely realist one—a
claim which I defend in detail in chapter 7.
4.6 Understanding the Significance of the Renormalisation
Group
I want to conclude this chapter by returning to the debate over the significance of
the renormalisation group approach to the philosophy of QFT we started out with
in §4.1. I have argued that the renormalisation group approach does indeed have
important implications for philosophical engagement with the QFT programme.
In terms of the framework set out in chapter 2, we can see the renormalisation
group results as coming into play in both the structure-specification and epistemic
phases of analysing QFT. In the former case, I have argued that this framework
is relevant to the question of whether interesting continuum QFT models exist;
in the latter, I claimed that it informs epistemic judgements about which aspects
of QFT models ought to be taken to get things right about the world.
There is room for clarification about how the conceptual significance of renormali-
sation group methods ought to be understood however. Indeed, there might seem
to be a puzzle about how they can illuminate the foundations of physics at all.
To caricature somewhat, there sometimes seems to be an assumption amongst
philosophers of physics that all that really matters about a physical theory, for
the purposes of foundational and interpretive study, is its fundamental structure
and the theoretical principles it invokes. The way that results are derived from
this base in scientific practice is a pragmatic concern which does not impact on
the philosophical analysis of the theory. The renormalisation group does not
furnish us with a novel theoretical characterisation of QFT models however; it
is essentially a method for studying behaviour of physical systems at different
scales. I suspect that this way of thinking about the interpretive project is a key
factor behind Fraser’s characterisation of the renormalisation group as an essen-
tially pragmatic device with limited bearing on the foundational issues addressed
in the philosophy of QFT.
This austere methodological stance does not seem to do justice to the kind of ar-
guments we actually find in the cut and thrust of debate about particular physical
theories however. Decoherence theory, for instance, does not invoke new physi-
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cal principles or offer a novel reformulation of ordinary quantum mechanics—it
provides a framework for studying the dynamical behaviour of quantum systems
coupled to an external environment. Still, decoherence theory is often taken to
have important implications for the philosophy of quantum mechanics. The dy-
namical behaviour of quantum systems it helps to capture, which is certainly not
obvious from a causal inspection of standard axiomatic presentations of the the-
ory, is invoked in various approaches to the measurement problem. Despite not
making an intervention at the level of fundamental theoretical principles then,
decoherence theory gives us information about properties of quantum systems
that is at least putatively relevant to foundational questions about quantum the-
ory.26
The philosophical import of the renormalisation group should be understood in
similar terms. The renormalisation group framework is not primarily concerned
with the fundamental structure of physical theories, but this does not mean it only
deals with their empirical content. In fact, the renormalisation group framework
as I have described it does not invoke the observable/unobservable distinction in
any way. What it gives us is a way of studying how any property of a model,
observable or not, varies with scale. Indeed, the quantities at the heart of the
renormalisation group approach to QFT are correlations functions which, as I
have stressed, are not directly observable. The real significance of the renormali-
sation group framework for the QFT programme, I think, is that it gives us a way
of probing the modal, rather than empirical, properties of QFT models; it tells us
how the properties of QFT models depend, and do not depend, on its small scale
structure. This is crucial for gaining mathematical control over the continuum
limit. But more importantly, counterfactual information of this kind is precisely
what should be informing our judgements about which parts of a physical theory
faithfully represent. I have argued that the renormalisation group, in conjunction
with other theoretical resources, motivates a general epistemic attitude towards
successful QFT models.
Much of the rest of this thesis will be concerned with developing and defending
this epistemic stance. The following two chapters deal with objections coming
from within the QFT programme, as it were. Chapter 5 addresses the fact that
imposing a cutoff on the momentum violates key relativistic properties, most
importantly Poincare´ covariance. Given the central role that special relativity has
played in the QFT programme this immediately raises worries about cutoff QFT
models as objects of foundational study. Chapter 6 addresses another concern
26Of course, one might end up concluding that decoherence theory has no decisive impact on
the debate surrounding the measurement problem. My point here is that it is not a priori
obvious that it does not simply because it is not concerned with the fundamental structure
of the theory.
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about cutoff systems, namely that they are explanatorily inadequate. As we have
seen, a system with both an ultraviolet and infrared cutoff has a finite number
of degrees of freedom and consequently does not admit unitarily inequivalent
Hilbert space representations. But unitarily inequivalent representations have
been thought to play an essential role in explaining crucial physical phenomena
like spontaneous symmetry breaking. Chapter 7 considers objections coming from
the general philosophy of science and defends my claim that the view of QFT put
forward in this chapter is a realist one.
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Emergent Relativity
5.1 An Apparent Clash with Relativity
The key claim of the last chapter was that cutoff QFT models provide accurate,
if partial, representations of the actual world. One feature of these systems which
urgently needs to be addressed is their non-relativistic properties. Cutoff models
invariably violate the requisites of special relativity. This is particularly trans-
parent in the case of lattice QFT models. Any lattice we can put on Minkowski
space-time will not be invariant under rotations, translations or Lorentz boosts—
at best it will respect a finite subgroup of these transformations. Furthermore,
the dynamics of a lattice model will clearly not be local: influences propagate
instantaneously over the cutoff length scale manifesting as non-zero commutators
between field operators at space-like separated points.1 And though there are
other ways of constructing cutoff models, and perhaps further approaches which
have not yet been discovered, there are, at least, heuristic reasons for thinking
that relativity will always be compromised in one way or another; any way of sup-
pressing high momentum modes is going to introduce a privileged length scale
that will not be a relativistic invariant. While there are approaches to quantum
gravity which attempt to discretise space-time in a fully relativistic way, such as
loop quantum gravity and causal set theory, this inevitably involves substantial
deviations from the QFT programme as we know it.2
Why should this raise concerns about the representational capacities of these
models? On the one hand, there might seem to be a straightforward empirical
1I won’t have much to say about non-locality in this chapter but my hope is that any worries
the non-local nature of lattice systems generate can be addressed in an analogous way to my
discussion of Poincare´ symmetry.
2The possibility of a ‘fundamental length’ and the relationship of this idea to Poincare´ covari-
ance is a topic of much debate in the quantum gravity literature. Hagar (2009) is a recent
philosophical discussion of this issue.
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worry here. Special relativity is very well confirmed experimentally.3 This, one
might think, gives us good reason to believe that it is true, and therefore that
any theory which is inconsistent with it is false. Shouldn’t this be enough to
rule out any kind of realism about cutoff QFTs? There is also a more subtle
theoretical worry about the non-relativistic properties of cutoff models. Bringing
together relativistic and quantum theory has long been a key motivation driving
the QFT programme. In both axiomatic formulations of QFT and the more
informal discussions of physics textbooks, relativistic properties like Poincare´
covariance are often presented as constitutive of what a QFT is. Consequently,
the violations of relativity engendered by a momentum cutoff might be thought
to undermine the theoretical assumptions underlying the QFT programme in an
unacceptable way.
This second line of objection comes to the fore in Fraser and Wallace’s debate
about the formulation of QFT. While both authors agree that there is no empir-
ical problem with cutoff QFT models, they take very different views about the
theoretical status of relativity principles in QFT. Fraser consistently stresses the
centrality of special relativity to her understanding of QFT:
Quantum field theory is by definition the theory that best unifies
quantum theory (QT) and the special theory of relativity (SR). . .
Since QFT = QT + SR, the project of formulating quantum field
theory cannot be considered successful until either a consistent theory
that incorporates both relativistic and quantum principles has been
obtained or a convincing argument has been made that such a theory
is not possible. (Fraser 2009, 550, her italics).
As passages like this one make clear, Fraser takes QFT to incorporate a commit-
ment to Minkowski space-time structure and Poincare´ covariance. In fact, this
forms the basis for her central argument for rejecting cutoff QFTs in favour of the
axiomatic approach. The Wightman and Haag-Kastler axioms, which incorporate
Poincare´ covariance explicitly, amount to a principled unification of relativistic
and quantum principles according to Fraser, while cutoff QFTs compromise this
project in an ad hoc way.
By contrast, Wallace is unfazed by the non-covariance of cutoff QFT models:
It is true that those cut-off schemes we can actually concretely im-
plement violate Poincare´ covariance. . . But provided that the real
cut-off is actually imposed by some Poincare´ covariant theory, this
will just be an artefact of the particular cut-off schemes we are using
at the moment. . . Having said this, if Poincare´ covariance turns out
3See Mattingly (2005) for a survey of phenomenological tests of relativistic space-time symme-
tries.
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to be only phenomenological, so what? (Wallace 2011, 123).
Notice that while Wallace advocates the primacy of cutoff formulations of QFT
he is clearly not wanting to assert that the world really is non-relativistic. Rather,
his stance seems to be that QFT, as an approximate description of reality, does
not make any claims about the fundamental nature of space-time at all. He does
maintain, however, that cutoff models are approximately covariant in a sense
which is sufficient to accommodate impressive empirical support for relativistic
space-time symmetries (Wallace, 2006, 50-52).
This chapter takes up these issues raised by the apparent clash between relativity
and cutoff QFTs. §5.2 examines the sense in which cutoff models can be said
to be approximately Poincare´ covariant, something Wallace says relatively little
about. I sketch an approach to making the notion of an approximate space-
time symmetry more precise and argue that there is reason to believe that, at
energies far below the cutoff, cutoff formulations of realistic models like QED
and QCD are approximately Poincare´ covariant in a sense which is sufficient to
placate worries about their empirical adequacy. §5.3 takes on the question of
the theoretical status of relativity in QFT. At first blush, it is difficult to see
how to negotiate Fraser and Wallace’s dispute over this question. We seem to
be faced with different conceptions of what QFT is: Fraser takes a commitment
to Minkowksi space-time structure to be integral to QFT while Wallace does
not. Returning to themes introduced in chapter 2, I argue that we should move
away from the idea that certain theoretical claims about space-time structure
are constitutive of QFT and instead question in what philosophical contexts we
ought to entertain these assumptions. I distinguish between the internal question
of whether, and to what extent, quantum theory and relativity can be consistently
combined from the external question of what we ought to believe about the world
given the successes of high energy physics. In the latter context, I claim, we have
good reason to remain agnostic about fundamental space-time structure.
Before launching into these issues I want to briefly comment on a recent inter-
vention in the debate surrounding relativity in QFT due to Bain (2013b). In the
context of his discussion of the effective field theory approach to QFT Bain sug-
gests that there is in fact a way of implementing a high energy cutoff which does
not compromise relativity. He points out that much of the renormalisation group
apparatus described in the previous chapter can be implemented in the context
of perturbation theory without explicitly freezing out large momentum degrees
of freedom. Dimensional regularisation methods, briefly described in §3.1.2, can
be employed and the decoupling of high and low energy degrees of freedom can
be inserted by hand using so-called matching conditions. According to Bain this
approach, which following Georgii (1993) he calls “continuum effective field the-
87
CHAPTER 5. EMERGENT RELATIVITY
ory”, amounts to an alternative cutoff variant of QFT, not considered by Fraser
and Wallace, that does not violate Poincare´ symmetry.
This claim is misguided however. I argued in chapter 3 that we ought to distin-
guish between the regularisation of divergent integrals in perturbation theory and
the construction of cutoff models. It is true that the dimensional regularisation
method ensures that no explicit Poincare´ violations occur in any step of a per-
turbative calculation, indeed this is one of the main practical advantages of this
approach. This has nothing to do with the non-perturbative project of construct-
ing continuum QFT models on Minkowski space-time however—as I pointed out,
dimensional regularisation has so far found no application in this context. What
Bain calls continuum effective field theory is a purely perturbative approach to
QFT and does not contribute to the issue Fraser and Wallace are arguing over:
which non-perturbative mathematical structures should be identified as the cor-
rect formulation of QFT. I assume in what follows that anything worthy of the
name cutoff QFT violates Poincare´ covariance and continue to treat lattice QFTs
as the exemplar of such a system.4
5.2 Approximate Space-Time Symmetries
Wallace defends cutoff QFTs against concerns about their non-relativistic prop-
erties by claiming that they are, nevertheless, approximately covariant. It is
not immediately obvious what this means however, and one might even worry
about whether it makes sense at all. Part of the problem here is that the notion
of approximate symmetry itself stands in need of clarification. The burgeon-
ing philosophical literature on symmetries in physics has almost exclusively fo-
cused on exact symmetries. Yet there are clearly many contexts in which inexact
symmetries play an important role in physical science. In high energy physics,
isospin, and the more general flavour symmetries which have been found to hold
approximately in QCD, are prominent examples. What will turn out to be a
more instructive case for our discussion here is the emergence of approximate
rotational symmetry in condensed matter systems. Crystals are not rotationally
invariant but their large scale behaviour, such as the propagation of sound waves,
can be effectively isotropic and approximate continuum symmetries of this kind
are often invoked in model building in condensed matter physics. While the ex-
istence of approximate symmetries is sometimes mentioned in the philosophical
literature however there has been very little discussion about how they ought to
4Thanks to Michael Miller for helpful discussion about the notion of effective Poincare´ symmetry
in QFT and quantum gravity.
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be understood.5
A comprehensive analysis of approximate symmetry in physics is beyond the scope
of this thesis. Still, we need to say something about this issue if we are to assess
the severity of the problem raised by the non-covariance of cutoff QFTs. In what
follows I set out a simple-minded approach to understanding how a symmetry can
hold approximately that goes some way towards clarifying the status of relativistic
space-time symmetries in cutoff models. Whether these ideas have more general
application is a question for another time.6
Start with the familiar characterisation of exact symmetries. An exact symme-
try of a geometric figure, function, physical theory, or other object, is a trans-
formation that leaves its properties (or some specified subset of its properties)
invariant. The complete set of these transformations forms a group structure.
The Poincare´ group, for instance, is the set of transformations which preserve
intervals on Minkowski space-time, consisting of spacial rotations, Lorentz boosts
and translations. An important class of physical symmetries are transformations
which leave the dynamics of a physical theory or model invariant. Much of the
philosophical debate about exact symmetries in recent years has focused on how
to understand these dynamical symmetries, and how they bear on the semantic
content of a theory.7 Formally at least, what we mean when we say that a QFT
model has a symmetry is that its partition function is invariant under the trans-
formation in question.8 It is worth mentioning that we can also talk about the
symmetries of particular states of a physical theory in the same terms—these will,
again, be transformations that map the state in question to itself. Symmetries
(and asymmetries) of states will become important in the discussion of sponta-
neously broken symmetry in the following chapter, but for our current purposes
it is symmetries of theories which will be our primary concern.
If an exact symmetry is a transformation that gives you back what you started
with an obvious suggestion about what it would mean for a symmetry to be
approximate is that the transformation in question gives you back something
similar. An object which has an inexact but approximate symmetry, on this line
5Kosso (2000) and Castellani (2003) contain discussions of approximate symmetry in physics.
6I do not claim that the approach taken here is the only way of discussing approximate symme-
tries. Castellani (2003) defines an approximate symmetry as one which is “valid under certain
conditions”. This suggests a different understanding of approximate symmetry akin to the
notion of a ceteris paribus law, or non-universal generalisation. While I don’t explore this
possibility here, it may be that the literature on ceteris paribus laws can help to clarify the
status of approximate symmetries in some contexts.
7See Belot (2013), Dasgupta (2015) and Caulton (2016) for recent work on these issues.
8We also often talk about symmetries of the Lagrangian in the QFT context, however sym-
metries of the classical Lagrangian can be broken by so-called anomalies (briefly described in
Castellani, 2003). The partition function, therefore provides a more general characterisation
of the symmetries of a QFT system.
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Figure 5.1: Function with approximate reflection symmetry.
of thought, will not be invariant under the corresponding transformation group;
instead the action of the group will generate a set of objects which are ‘close’
to each other. To make this precise we need to spell out the intended sense of
closeness. At the very least this will mean specifying a topology on the space
of relevant object, but if we want to talk about the amount that a symmetry
is broken in quantitative terms we will also need a metric. At this point things
might seem to get worryingly messy. We are interested in the symmetries of many
different kinds of objects, and there will likely be multiple ways of defining an
appropriate topology in each case. It is unlikely then that this route will lead to
a neat general definition of approximate symmetry.
This is not a conceptual disaster however. The existence of many possible topolo-
gies simply reflects the fact that there are many ways that two objects can be
similar to each other; approximate notions are always infected with this kind of
ambiguity. Furthermore, in many important contexts there are standard ways of
defining a metric which will do the job for us here. If we are talking about the ap-
proximate symmetries of real functions, for instance, the natural measure to use
is simply the absolute value of the difference between pre- and post-transformed
functions. Take a double well potential function which has a x → −x reflection
symmetry and add a small Gaussian perturbation at positive x (depicted in figure
5.1). This new function, f(x), will no longer have an exact reflection symmetry,
but the difference between the initial and reflected function, |f(x)− f(−x)|, will
be small, especially for values of x far away from the asymmetric perturbation. In
this way we can pin down the sense in which the function has an approximate re-
flection symmetry and even quantify the amount of symmetry breaking incurred
by the perturbation. One lesson to be drawn from this example is that, while
exact symmetries are necessarily exact everywhere, an inexact symmetry can be
broken to different extents in different places. Just as one function can provide a
good approximation to another in some regions of its domain but not in others,
it is possible that a symmetry can hold to a good degree of approximation in one
region but not in another. This local nature of the quality of an approximate
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symmetry will be important shortly.
We now have the resources in hand to clarify the sense in which cutoff QFT models
may be said to be approximately covariant. Note, first of all, how continuum
space-time symmetries are employed in the model building process in high energy
physics. Typically Poincare´ symmetry is invoked at the level of classical field
theory when it comes to writing down a Lagrangian for the relevant interactions
the theory is supposed to describe. Possible interaction terms which explicitly
violate Poincare´ covariance are discarded a priori. The Poincare´ violations of
cutoff QFT models obtained via these classical Lagrangians then entirely originate
in the imposition of the cutoffs in the course of writing down a corresponding
quantum system. Asking how a quantity defined on a cutoff QFT model behaves
under Poincare´ transformations then is tantamount to asking how it depends on
the cutoffs.
As we saw in the previous chapter however, we have good reason to believe that
many of the properties of cutoff QFT models are highly insensitive to the exact
value of both the ultraviolet and infrared cutoff. To gloss over some subtleties dis-
cussed there, the basic picture to emerge from the renormalisation group analysis
of QFT models was that, after quantities like correlation functions and S-matrix
elements have been reparameterised in terms of renormalised couplings fixed via
measurements at low energies, the residual dependence on the ultraviolet cut-
off takes the form of powers of E/Λ, which are heavily suppressed at energies
E  Λ. The imposition of an infrared cutoff will also give rise to violations of
Poincare´ symmetry, but again, there is strong evidence that correlation functions
over length scales which are short relative to the infrared cutoff depend only very
weakly on its precise value. In the context of lattice QFT models the contribution
of finite size effects is expected to fall off at least as fast as exp(−EL), where L
is the length of the lattice. As we saw, this means that correlation functions on
scales intermediate between the ultraviolet and infrared cutoffs are very nearly
independent of the details of how they are imposed.
Cutoff QFTs are not invariant under Poincare´ transformations then—applying
the Poincare´ group to a lattice QFT generates a set of cutoff systems which differ
with respect to their partition functions. But the above argument suggests that
the correlation functions of this collection of systems at energy scales suitably
far away from the cutoffs will be very similar indeed. The difference between
correlation functions pre- and post-transformation due to the ultraviolet cutoff
will be of the order E/Λ, for instance, and therefore vanishingly small at low
energies. Using this difference to quantify how ‘close’ Poincare´ transformed cutoff
models are we can give a precise meaning to the claim that Poincare´ symmetry
holds approximately at low energies in these systems. Just as the quality of
91
CHAPTER 5. EMERGENT RELATIVITY
the reflection symmetry in the double well example depends on the value of x,
the amount of Poincare´ breaking incurred by the cutoffs depends on the energy
scale at which we are probing the system. At the cutoff scale itself Poincare´
transformations give rise to large changes in physical properties of the model,
while at coarse-grained scales the system’s behaviour will be essentially invariant
under these transformations.9
What this means, in effect, is that special relativity will have the status of an
effective, low energy, theory in a possible world exactly described by realistic cut-
off QFTs.10 We might say that Poincare´ symmetry is ‘emergent’ in this context,
in an innoculous, reduction compatible, sense of the term.11 Furthermore, we
can make an immediate connection with empirical tests of special relativity on
the approach I have put forward here. The empirical effect of Poincare´ break-
ing in experimentally observed quantities, like scattering cross sections, will also
be supressed by inverse/exponential powers of the cutoffs and can therefore be
expected to fall well within the relevant experimental error if the cutoffs scales
are far away from the scales at which we are measuring these quantities. In this
way, we can allay worries about cutoff models based on the lack of any detectable
violation of Poincare´ symmetry in extant experimental tests.
Formally at least, this is all highly analogous to the way that continuum sym-
metries emerge in condensed matter systems. At the scale of the crystal spacing
rotational symmetry is badly broken in these systems but correlations between
widely separated lattice sites can be approximately invariant under rotations giv-
9There is a different way of cashing out the sense in which a cutoff system has approximate
continuum space-time symmetries at low energies which is often invoked in the lattice QFT
literature. The so-called operator product expansion is used to express non-local combinations
of lattice operators as series of local continuum operators. The standard lattice kinetic term
on a Euclidean lattice, for instance, is expanded like:∑
µ
[φx+aµˆ − φx
a
]2
= (∂µφ(x))
2 + C1φ(x)∂
4
µφ(x) + ...
Eliminating terms in the expansion which do not respect the discrete symmetries of a hy-
percubic lattice, it turns out that the terms beyond the familiar continuum kinetic term are
non-renormalisable and consequently can be expected to diminish in importance at low en-
ergies. Consequently, the claim is that the effective Lagrangian governing the low energy
degrees of freedom will exhibit standard continuum symmetries. This argument is discussed in
Moore (2003) and Williams (2016). I take this approach to be complimentary to my discussion
here, though how to spell out the precise sense in which continuum space-time symmetries are
approximate in this context is a topic for further discussion.
10Exactly how one spells this out will, I suspect, depend on one’s broader views about space-
time theory. As a side note, on Brown’s (2005) dynamical view of relativity theory, the story
seems to be quite simple. For Brown Minkowski space-time is just an encoding of a symmetry
of the dynamics, namely Poincare´ symmetry. Consequently, if we can pin down the sense in
which this symmetry is approximate at low energies, and I am suggesting that we can, we have
already done much of the work needed to spell out the sense in which Minkowski space-time
might be said to be emergent.
11As in the sense of emergence put forward in Butterfield (2011).
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ing rise to isotropic bulk behaviour. There is an important difference between
the representational status of the cutoffs in condensed matter and QFT however,
which impacts on how the symmetry violations should be understood in the latter
case. The molecules in a solid really do form a lattice structure, and there really
is a threshold on the allowed momentum modes of the system. In this case then
rotation symmetry breaking effects are physically real and can be detected by
probing the system at sufficiently short length scales. In the case of cutoff QFTs
however I have argued that the cutoff ought to be viewed as an idealisation, and
we should not believe what the model says about the world at the cutoff scales.
My claim that cutoff QFTs capture coarse-grained aspects of reality does not
entail that the world is non-relativistic at the fundamental level then. Rather,
since the Poincare´ breaking effects originate in the imposition of the cutoffs they
too should be viewed as unphysical idealisations, and the belief worthy content
of the theory will respect Poincare´ symmetry to the level of approximation which
it is actually supported by current evidence.
Pressing questions remain about the story just sketched. The possibility of emer-
gent Poincare´ symmetry has recently been the subject of some controversy in
quantum gravity research. In the literature on the causal set theory approach
to quantum gravity, for instance, one often finds claims that a regular discrete
structure to space-time, like a lattice, cannot recover approximate relativistic
symmetries at low energies. This is taken to motivate the need to ‘sprinkle’
discrete space time points in a Lorentz invariant way in a fundamental quan-
tum theory of space-time (Dowker et al, 2004). Renormalisation group studies
of the effects of various kinds of high energy Poincare´ violations on low energy
phenomenology have also motivated various claims that seem to conflict with pic-
ture I have put forward here—see, for instance, Polchinski (2012), and references
therein. Addressing these arguments is clearly an urgent task for defenders of the
representational significance of cutoff QFTs, as prima facie they seem to suggest
that these systems are not empirically adequate after all. There remains a great
deal more to be said about the emergence of continuum space-time symmetries
in discrete systems then.12
Still, I take it that the above discussion has shown that the notion of approximate
Poincare´ symmetry makes sense. We now have a programme at least for recon-
ciling my previous claims about the representation success of cutoff QFTs with
the empirical success of special relativity, as well as its role in model building in
high energy physics. As I have already flagged however, Fraser’s main objection
to the Poincare´ violations incurred by cutoff theories is an extra-empirical one.
12There are also potential connections here with broader debate surrounding the notion of
emergent space-time in quantum gravity theories. See Huggett and Wu¨thrich (2013) for a
recent discussion of these issues.
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The next section turns to these theoretical concerns about the status of relativity
in the QFT programme.
5.3 Relativity and the Quantum Field Theory Programme:
Internal and External Questions
Fraser grants that cutoff QFTs are empirically adequate, indeed the claim that
the choice between cutoff and continuum models is underdetermined by empirical
evidence is central to her presentation of the formulation debate. For Fraser the
violations of relativity engendered by the cutoffs are problematic not for empir-
ical or pragmatic reasons but because they compromises the project of unifying
quantum and relativity theory which is essential to the theoretical identity of
QFT.
It is worth pausing to unpack this claim as unification is a notoriously nebulous
notion whose philosophical significance is controversial.13 After all, if the picture
sketched in the previous section is correct, a cutoff formulation of the standard
model may qualify as a unification of quantum theory and special relativity in a
weak sense of the word. What physicists sometimes seem to mean when they say
that two theories have been unified is simply that they can be recovered, perhaps
in some limit, from a third more fundamental theory. This is the sense in which
some ‘theories of everything’, such as the string theory programme, propose to
unify the standard model and general relativity—these theories are supposed
to emerge as effective theories from a multidimensional fundamental theory. If
cutoff QFT models are approximately Poincare´ covariant in the manner described
above then, as I pointed out, special relativity should be an effective low energy
theory in this sense. Fraser clearly has something stronger than this in mind.
The objective of the unification project she focuses on, it seems, is to consistently
combine quantum and relativistic principles at the fundamental level, and not
merely recovering them as approximations. Haag theorem is presented as a major
obstacle to achieving this and the Wightman and Haag-Kaiser axioms are held
up as exemplars of the kind of theory that is sought. Though Fraser allows that
extant axiomatic frameworks may need to be modified to accommodate realistic
QFTs, the idea seems to be that an adequate formulation of QFT must marry
quantum structures and dynamics with a commitment to fundamental Minkowksi
13Morrison (2007) argues that unification in physics is a diverse phenomenon which cannot
be captured by general definitions. While other authors are less pessimistic than Morrison
about the possibility of saying something general about unification, it is usually admitted
that multiple senses of unification can be distinguished, which have potentially quite different
roles and significances. Indeed, we find many distinct characterisations of unification in the
literature on scientific explanation and the foundations of physics.
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space-time and Poincare´ covariance.14
Note however that the kind of unification we find in the axiomatic approach
to QFT is still of a somewhat shallow kind. What these frameworks aim to
do is put together quantum and relativistic axioms in a consistent way, but as
Maudlin (1996) points out, a great deal more than mere consistency is needed for
a deep physical unification. To use one of Maudlin’s examples, general relativity
enacts a genuinely physical unification of gravitational and inertial mass, which
are only coincidentally connected in Newtonian gravitation theory, by showing
that both arise from a common source, namely the metrical structure of space-
time. Another example of a robustly physical unification is Einstein’s light-quanta
hypothesis which explained the success of Planck’s black body radiation equation,
the photoelectric effect, and various other phenomena, in terms of a single posit.
Putting aside the question of whether they apply to realistic QFTs, the Wightman
axioms do not seem to offer this kind of explanatory unification of quantum and
relativistic physics; they codify rather than account for the fact that the world is
very well described by Minkowski geometry and quantum theory.
I will come back to the significance of unification shortly, but for now the key point
is that Fraser takes QFT to incorporate a commitment to fundamental Minkowski
space-time structure. Wallace clearly does not accept this characterisation of the
theoretical content of QFT however. For Wallace QFT is not in the business
of describing the fundamental structure of space-time; this is the goal of the
quantum gravity programme. QFTs are effective theories which describe the
world at relatively large length scales and consequently the kind of emergent
relativity discussed in the previous section is all that we can reasonably demand.
Again, while Wallace endorses a realist stance towards cutoff QFTs he does not
want to say that the non-relativistic effects engendered by the cutoff are physically
real. Instead, we should simply remain neutral about whether Poincare´ covariance
holds down to arbitrarily small length scales as far as the QFT programme is
concerned.
In sum then, Fraser and Wallace take quite different views of the status of special
relativistic constraints within QFT. This seems to lead to a stalemate situation;
it is not obvious what considerations we could bring to bear to determine which
assumptions about space-time structure should be taken to be part of the theory.
There are close parallels here, I think, with the philosophical debates involving
multiple inequivalent formulations of a theory we discussed in §2.4. One case we
considered there, for instance, was the controversy surrounding the consistency of
classical electrodynamics. Frisch (2005) and his detractors present their dispute
14Fraser (2009, 557) comments that there is “a certain amount of latitude in deciding what
counts as a relativistic principle and what counts as a quantum principle”, but it seems clear
that, for her, core relativistic properties like Poincare´ covariance are non-negotiable.
95
CHAPTER 5. EMERGENT RELATIVITY
as one about whether classical electrodynamics is consistent, but, on closer in-
spection, philosophers on each side of the debate take different sets of theoretical
assumptions to constitute the theory. As in this case, once we recognise that
Fraser and Wallace are delineating the content of the theory in different ways
the debate threatens to degenerate into a purely semantic dispute about which
version is worthy of the name QFT.
I argued in chapter 2 that the right way to respond to this situation is to move the
dialectical emphasis away from the question of what the ‘correct’ version of the
theory is. Theory names are just labels at the end of the day and which collection
of models and theoretical assumptions we decide to call QFT has no philosophical
interest on its own; a particular delimitation of theoretical content only becomes
interesting via its relation to broader foundational issues. Rather than think-
ing of the theoretical structures under consideration as being set in stone before
philosophical engagement begins we should instead look to justify focusing on
one formulation of a theory over another within the context of a particular philo-
sophical project. Making this move in the present debate leads to a different
perspective on the issue regarding the status of relativity in QFT. The question
now is not whether fundamental Poincare´ covariance is part of the definition of
QFT but whether we ought to be demanding this property when addressing the
disparate philosophical issues raised by the QFT programme. This opens up the
possibility that different approaches to QFT, which incorporate contrary com-
mitments about space-time structure, might be the appropriate starting points
for different lines of philosophical enquiry. I will now argue that this is in fact
the case: it is appropriate to assume exact Poincare´ symmetry when addressing
some salient internal questions raised by the QFT programme but there is no
case for demanding it when it comes to the question of what QFT tells us about
the world.
On the one hand, there clearly are contexts in which we do want to demand fun-
damental Poincare´ covariance. A central issue raised by the QFT programme is
whether, and to what extent, quantum theory and special relativity can be con-
sistently combined. As I sketched in §1.2.1, bringing these theories together was
one of the key motivations driving the development of QFT in its early days, and
while I don’t think we should define QFT as a fundamental unification of quan-
tum and relativistic principles, as Fraser does, this project is surely a legitimate
strand of the QFT programme. Furthermore, the relationship between quantum
and relativity theory has long been a topic of scrutiny and debate amongst phi-
losophy of physics, especially in the wake of Bell’s theorem. If we are interested
in the question of how quantum phenomena can be consistent with fundamental
relativity there is an obvious sense in which cutoff formulations of the standard
model are besides the point. Not only are cutoff QFT models not covariant or
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local they don’t tell us anything about whether a theory which actually has these
properties is possible. By contrast, the axiomatic and constructive approaches
to QFT provide a natural starting point for addressing this issue. Axiomatic
formulations of QFT on continuum space-times give us a powerful framework for
exploring questions about quantum theories on Minkowski space-time in the ab-
stract, while the constructive field theory programme’s raison d’eˆtre is to establish
if, and when, interacting QFTs on Minkowski space-time exist.
The question of how quantum and relativity relate to one another is ultimately an
internal one however, in the sense introduced in §2.4—it is a question about the
way our theories are rather than the way the world is. As a point of comparison,
consider the debate between Norton (1995, 2002) and Malament (1995) over the
question of whether Newtonian cosmology is a consistent theory. Norton argues
that it isn’t, while Malament claims that using modern geometric formulations of
Newtonian gravitation we can make sense of it as a consistent cosmological model.
This question is interesting for a number of reasons: it illuminates the structure
of gravitational theory and may be a useful case study for understanding how
scientists can subscribe to an inconsistent set of assumptions without falling foul
of the principle of explosion.15 But answering it does not directly tell us anything
about the world. If it is possible to formulate a consistent Newtonian cosmological
model we will obviously not be in a position to believe any of its content—we
now know that many of the core assumptions of pre-20th century cosmology are
radically false. Similarly, answering the question of whether interacting QFTs
exist on continuum Minkowksi space-time does not, on its own at least, amount
a discovery about the way the world is. How such a theory relates to the actual
world is a separate question, and I have urged in this thesis that it is often a
highly non-trivial one.
As far as I am concerned, investigating the internal relations between quantum
theory and special relativity is interesting and important in its own right. As I
have already stressed, philosophers of physics often remain at the semantic level
in their analyses of physical theories and busy themselves with questions about
their content. This kind of enquiry improves our understanding of the theoretical
landscape of modern physics and can thus be hoped to indirectly contribute
to our knowledge of the world, either by clarifying how a theory’s epistemically
warranted claims should be spelled out, or by paving the way for future theoretical
developments. I take it that work on the philosophy of quantum gravity, for
instance, is typically conducted in this spirit. Philosophical investigations into
string theory, canonical and loop quantum gravity are not predicated on the
assumption that these frameworks accurately describe the world in their current
15See Vickers (2013) chapter 5 for a discussion of why the inconsistencies in Newtonian cosmol-
ogy were not noticed until the end of the 19th century.
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state; the hope is rather that elucidating the conceptual issues raised by these
approaches will ease progress in the quantum gravity project. Clarifying the
relationship between quantum and relativistic principles in an internal mode can
be viewed in a similar light. In my view, much of the philosophical work on
the axiomatic approach to QFT that has been conducted in recent years can be
understood as contributing to this kind of project, a prime example being Clifton
and Halvorson’s (2000, 2001) work on how distinctively quantum phenomena like
entanglement can be made sense of the fully relativistic context of axiomatic
QFT.
There are, in fact, some indications in Fraser’s discussion of the formalism prob-
lem that her vision of the philosophy of QFT is an internal one. For one thing,
she consistently stresses that her focus is the question of what the world would be
like if QFT were true—which for her, of course, means what the world would be
like if it were quantum and perfectly relativistic. This amounts to an endorsement
of the adequacy of the standard account of interpretation for her purposes, but
I argued in chapter 2 that this definition of interpretation is a purely semantic
one and is not equipped to deal with the epistemic question of how a theory’s
content relates to the actual world. She also dismisses quantum gravity research
as irrelevant to her project (Fraser, 2009, 552). This makes perfect sense if we are
addressing internal issues, but when it comes to assessing how QFT models relate
to the world the difficulties associated with bringing gravity into the quantum
fold are surely relevant. (By way of analogy, modern cosmology does not impact
on the question of whether a consistent Newtonian cosmology can be formulated
but is clearly crucial for assessing the epistemic status such a theory would have.)
If Fraser’s claim is that the axiomatic/constructive approach to QFT is the right
starting point for addressing the internal quantum-relativity relationship within
the QFT programme she makes a good case for it.16
This thesis is wholly compatible with the view of the representational success
of cutoff QFT models put forward in the previous chapter however. There is
no tension in advocating the study of continuum QFT systems for insights into
quantum-relativity relations while maintaining that we have no reason to believe
that they exactly describe the world. The external question of how QFT models
relate to the world and what we ought to believe about reality given the empirical
successes of the QFT programme is, in principle at least, a separate issue. Should
we be positing fundamental Poincare´ symmetry as a theoretical constraint in this
context then? The answer, I think, is no.
Why might we think that fundamental Poincare´ covariance is a warranted as-
16Though ‘defining’ QFT as a unification of these theories does not play any role in motivating
this conclusion.
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sumption when we come to the epistemic question of what the QFT programme
tells us about reality? It should be clear by now that the idea that QFTs are
Poincare´ covariant by definition does not count for much here, and we saw in
the previous section that the extant empirical support for relativity theory does
not establish that Poincare´ symmetry is actually exact. While Fraser sometimes
seems to style her philosophical project as an internal issue, we also find an
argument for viewing continuum QFT models and the axiomatic approach as
epistemically superior in her discussion, which goes something like this.17 First
of all, the claim is made that the relationship between cutoff and continuum
formulations of QFT is a case of underdetermination of theory by evidence. Cut-
off and continuum versions of a QFT say different things about the world but
they are equally well supported by empirical evidence.18 Fraser suggests that we
should not draw an anti-realist moral however because we can appeal to a familiar
realist strategy to break the underdetermination. Continuum QFT systems have
extra-empirical theoretical virtues which give us reason to believe their claims
over those of the corresponding cutoff theory. Namely, they are more unified;
they enact a principled unification of quantum and relativity theory while cutoff
models violate fundamental Poincare´ covariance in an ad hoc way.
This argument mitigates against the view of the epistemic status of QFT models
put forward in the previous chapter. I argued there that if we had continuum
formulations of realistic QFTs their claims about the large and small scale struc-
ture of the world would not be belief worthy because they don’t make a difference
to the predictive successes of the QFT programme. The suggestion here, how-
ever, is that there are extra-empirical reasons for believing a continuum QFT is
representationally accurate down to arbitrarily small length scales; it is only by
accepting these commitments that we adequately unify quantum and relativistic
principles at the fundamental level.
How should we evaluate to this claim? Wallace’s reply has been to deny the
premise that there is an underdetermination scenario here in the first place (Wal-
lace, 2011, 121-122). As we have seen, we do not currently have continuum
formulations of realistic QFTs. We aren’t in a position of choosing between the
claims of a cutoff and continuum version of QED then, only the former is on the
table. And we surely cannot believe in a theory we have not yet formulated no
matter how theoretically virtuous it supposed to be! Fraser’s response to this
obvious worry is to emphasise the incompleteness of the constructive field theory
programme. The suggestion seems to be that, though we aren’t in a position
17I say a good deal more about extra-empirical virtues here than we find in Fraser (2009).
My motivation has been to state the argument in what I take to be its most plausible and
persausive form rather than to offer a faithful exegesis of what Fraser actually says.
18It is not obvious that this is the case given that the cutoffs do lead to in principle observable
effects—I will have more to say about this in §7.4.
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to believe in continuum QFT models at the moment, the argument from supe-
rior theoretical virtues still motivates a positive epistemic attitude towards the
constructive field theory programme as a work in progress and we should be op-
timistic that further work on this problem will produce belief worthy theories at
some point in the future.19
Whether you find this way of responding to the unsubstantiated character of
Fraser’s underdetermination scenario compelling or not, there are more basic
problems with this line of thought in my view. As I made clear in the previous
chapter, I am not convinced that the question of whether realistic continuum
models exist is as crucial as Wallace and Fraser’s discussion suggests, and I think
this perspective can also be defended here. In order to separate out the relevant
issues it will be useful to engage in a couple of thought experiments. First of
all, imagine that we had a continuum formulation of an interacting QFT in four
space-time dimensions. Further suppose that this theory is well supported by
the available empirical evidence and there is no reason to think that it was not
a complete description of reality—there are no gravitational interactions that
stubbornly resist quantisation, or any other indications that the theory will break
down in some, as yet unprobed, domain in this fantasy.
Would we be justified in believing the claims this theory makes about the large
and small scale structure of the world over those of an empirically indistinguish-
able cutoff alternative? It seems to me that this is a more subtle issue than Fraser
and Wallace give it credit for. While the idea that extra-empirical virtues can
provide some kind of evidential support is relatively mainstream amongst scien-
tific realists there is very little agreement about how the details of this story are
supposed to play out in the context of confirmation theory.20 Simply saying that
unification is a theoretical virtue will not do here, we have the right to demand a
more detailed story about why the unification enacted by the continuum theory
makes it more worthy of our belief than its cutoff competitor. This challenge is
exacerbated by the fact that, as I mentioned earlier, unification is an ambiguous
notion. A common way of cashing out how extra-empirical virtues play a role
in confirming the claims of a theory is that they contribute to its explanatory
19There is, perhaps, a connection here with the axiological characterisation of scientific realism
favoured by van Fraassen, according to which the core doctrine is that science aims at truth,
rather than that our current theories are truthlike (van Fraassen, 1980, 6-7). A realist stance
towards the constructive field theory programme could be construed along these lines as a
commitment to it being a path to true theories while admitting that, as of yet, it has not
achieved this goal. While I think this makes sense as an epistemic stance it is much less clear
to me that Fraser’s arguments support it. Even if we grant that a continuum version of QED
would be epistemically superior to a cutoff versions this does not, in itself, provide us with
any reason for thinking that the continuum theory actually exists—Wallace (2011, 121-122)
makes the same point.
20Specifically, there is disagreement over how the epistemic relevance of unification should be
understood. For some recent proposals see Myrvold (2003), Sober (2003) and Lange (2004).
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power, so that we can justify believing its claims over its rivals via an inference
to the best explanation. As I mentioned above however, it does not seem that the
kind of unification we find in axiomatic formulations of QFT is of an explanatory
variety. It seems plausible that Einstein’s light-quantum hypothesis is supported
by the fact that it neatly accounts for a number of disparate phenomena in terms
of a single hypothesis, but it is not clear that the same could be said of the Wight-
man axioms even if they were empirically adequate. At the very least then, more
work is needed on the part of Fraser sympathisers to shore up the case that the
extra-empirical virtues of continuum QFTs would support their claims about the
arbitrarily large and small.21
Ultimately though, whatever we end up concluding about this counterfactual sce-
nario, there are more staightfoward reasons why this appeal to extra-empirical
virtues does not go through when we move closer to the epistemic situation we
actually find ourselves in. This time imagine that we had continuum formula-
tions of QED, QCD and the standard model. Would the extra-empirical virtues
of these theories give us grounds to believe what they say about arbitrarily large
and small length scales? Clearly not. In fact, we know with certainty that the
standard model does not furnish us with an accurate description of the world at
all energy scales. For one thing, it does not incorporate gravitational interactions,
but there are also a plethora of other issues which lead many physicists to think
that it will break down long before the Planck scale, the naturalness problem with
the Higgs sector being perhaps the most significant. Furthermore, the quantum
gravity project provides us with compelling reason to think that the QFT pro-
gramme itself is not up to the task of representing the fundamental structure of
reality. On all of the major approaches to quantum gravity Minkowski space-
time ultimately ends up being a sort of idealisation—eventually space-time must
become dynamical and quantum in nature. It is not just that the large and small
scale structures of QFT models are not supported by empirical evidence then,
they are directly undermined by broader theoretical considerations. And these
external factors surely trump any arguments for trusting continuum QFTs at all
length scales based on extra-empirical virtues.
21Another point here is that it is not at all clear that demanding exact Poincare´ symmetry
eliminates the underdetermination problem here at all. As Fraser (2011) points out, and I
will discuss further in §7.4, the renormalisation group framework points to a more general
kind of underdetermination in high energy physics. It suggests that very different high energy
theories can have indistinguishable low energy physics. But this generalised underdetermi-
nation challenge would apply just as strongly to continuum formulations of realistic QFTs if
we had them. It is possible that multiple continuum QFTs, which do an equally good job of
unifying quantum theory and relativity by Fraser’s lights, flow to the same effective theory
under renormalisation group transformations. One can make the case then that the renormal-
isation group undermines any reason to trust our theorys’ claims about energy scales beyond
our experimental reach independently of the considerations discussed in the next paragraph.
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To sum up, I have suggested that there is an ambiguity in Fraser’s advocacy of the
philosophical significance of the axiomatic approach to QFT. If we understand her
project to be an investigation of internal issues raised by the QFT programme,
and specifically into the relationship between quantum theory and relativity, then,
to my mind, her arguments for focusing on the axiomatic/constructive approach
go through. I claimed, however, that this is perfectly compatible with the claims
about the representational status of QFT models put forward in the previous
chapter. When it comes to what we ought to believe about the world given the
empirical successes of QFT programme I have argued that we have no epistemic
warrant to demand fundamental Poincare´ covariance. Exact Poincare´ symmetry
is not established by extant empirical tests and even if we did have grounds to
believe that Poincare´ covariance is fundamental this would not mean that we
should trust what a formulation of the standard model on Minkowski space-time
says about large and small scale structure of the world. The master argument
against appeals to the extra-empirical virtues of an exactly Poincare´ covariant
QFT model is that we know that current QFTs cannot be exact descriptions
of reality at all scales because of their rivalry with general relativity. My claim
that QFT models, both cutoff and continuum, are, at best, coarse-grained repre-
sentations of reality can be defended against objections based on tensions with
relativity theory then.
One upshot of the discussion of this chapter is that we have managed to reconcile
at least some of what Fraser and Wallace say about the QFT programme. I have
argued that we can accept that continuum QFT systems are worthy of philosoph-
ical study while maintaining that cutoff models capture all that we have any right
to believe about the world. I will be developing this idea further in later chap-
ters by expanding on the ways that the investigation of the axiomatic approach
might be justified without taking the axioms themselves to be epistemically jus-
tified.
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Chapter 6
Spontaneous Symmetry Breaking and the
Limits of Infinite Degrees of Freedom
6.1 An Explanatory Challenge
I have been using the term cutoff QFT model, by default, to denote a system
which lacks both arbitrarily high and arbitrarily low momentum modes—i.e. one
which has both an ultraviolet and infrared cutoff. An important feature of this
kind of doubly cutoff QFT system is that it has a finite number of degrees of
freedom. My claim that these systems capture all that is worth believing in
high energy physics is somewhat heterodox as many philosophers of physics have
viewed the presence of infinitely many degrees of freedom as being the distinctive
feature of QFT models which makes them interesting (and challenging) from a
foundational perspective. Quantum systems with infinite degrees of freedom ad-
mit unitarily inequivalent Hilbert space representations and a great deal of work
in recent years has focused on the implications of this fact for the interpretation
of continuum QFT systems.1 Furthermore, we find claims in this literature which
appear to be in direct conflict with the view of cutoff models set out in chapter 4.
Most notably, Laura Ruetsche (2003, 2006, 2011) has argued that the unitarily
inequivalent representations afforded by the limit of infinite degrees of freedom
play an indispensable role in explaining important physical phenomena like phase
transitions and spontaneous symmetry breaking (SSB) in quantum theory, and
consequently need to be taken physically seriously. This suggests a new explana-
tory challenge: one might admit that cutoff QFTs are empirically successful while
maintaining that they lack the explanatory resources needed to really account for
important features of the physical world.
1Fraser (2008) and Baker (2009) both make crucial use of the existence of unitarily inequivalent
representations in their discussions of the ontological status of particles and fields in QFT, for
instance.
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Fraser (2009, 560) pushes this sort of objection in her debate with Wallace:
...[T]he cutoff variant does not have even approximately the same con-
tent as algebraic QFT because the cutoff variant has a finite number of
degrees of freedom and therefore does not admit unitarily inequivalent
representations; in contrast, algebraic QFT has an infinite number of
degrees of freedom and therefore admits unitarily inequivalent rep-
resentations. Spontaneous symmetry breaking is one case in which
these unitarily inequivalent representations are put to use.
The implication being that doubly cutoff QFTs cannot accommodate an appar-
ently crucial phenomenon for high energy physics, namely SSB.2
Wallace has tended to reply to this line of attack by distinguishing between the ul-
traviolet and infrared cutoffs and advocating a different stance to the latter:
Fraser is again assuming that CQFT requires both a short- and a long-
distance cutoff; but as I have noted, I (and I think most quantum field
theorists) are happy to grant that long-distance divergences really
should be tamed by algebraic methods, and that QFTs defined on
spatially infinite manifolds really do have infinitely many degrees of
freedom, and hence unitarily inequivalent representations. (Wallace,
2011, 119)
What Wallace seems to be saying here is that the QFT systems he advocates a
realist reading of are those with an ultraviolet cutoff but no infrared cutoff—e.g.
a QFT defined on an infinite volume lattice. Since these systems do have infinite
degrees of freedom the claim that they lack the relevant representational resources
of continuum QFT models misses its mark.
There are some tensions in this response however. Wallace (2006, 55) dismisses
unitarily inequivalent representations which appear due to the presence of in-
finitely many degrees of freedom on arbitrarily short length scales as unphysical
for two main reasons: i) there are mathematical difficulties associated with defin-
ing QFT models on a continuum, and ii) the renormalisation group tells us that
the properties associated with the very small scale structure of a QFT model do
not affect its large scale physics. Both of these points also seem to apply to the
infrared cutoff however (and I have de-emphasised the significance of the former
issue). Taking the infinite volume limit of QFT models is by no means math-
ematically trivial. We know that there are realistic physical systems for which
the closely related thermodynamic limit does not exist, and proving that it exists
in the case of particular models is often a subtle mathematical problem. In the
case of QCD, in particular, it is the task of bringing the infrared, rather than
2Toader (2016) also explicitly raises this objection against Wallace.
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ultraviolet, physics under mathematical control which is the main source of diffi-
culty from the constructive field theory perspective.3 Furthermore, as I pointed
out in §4.5, while our knowledge here is much less systematic than in the case of
the ultraviolet cutoff, we have good reason to believe that physics at finite length
scales is very weakly affected by the imposition of an infrared cutoff. Prima facie
then, there is a great deal of symmetry between the status of the ultraviolet and
infrared cutoff.
Furthermore, the discussion of the unitarily inequivalent representations afforded
by the infinite volume limit found in Wallace (2006) does not address the kind
of explanationist arguments put forward by Ruetsche. Wallace focuses on the
question of how we can discover which representation we are in, as it were, which
he sees as a challenge to scientific realism. He argues that the representational
ambiguity associated with infrared unitarily inequivalent representations simply
codifies our ignorance of global facts about the universe, such as the total mass
and charge. But Ruetsche’s claim is that we actually need to take multiple uni-
tarily inequivalent representations seriously in order to furnish adequate scientific
explanations of phenomena as mundane as the boiling of a kettle, and this ar-
guably poses a challenge to a realist view of QFT which cuts across Wallace’s
discussion.4
In this chapter I explore a more direct response to the explanatory challenge
posed by the finiteness of doubly cutoff QFTs. I suggest that the case has not in
fact been made that the novel properties afforded by the limit of infinite degrees
of freedom need to be taken to represent features of the world. In effect, I will
simply be doubling down on my previous claim that cutoff QFT models can
represent all of the features of the world which we have any reason to believe in
on the basis of current high energy physics.
I situate my discussion within a broader debate in the recent philosophy of physics
literature about the explanatory and representational role of the limit of infinite
degrees of freedom in both classical and quantum theory, and especially in sta-
tistical physics. In statistical mechanics, phase transitions, such as the boiling of
water, are associated with non-analyticities in the free energy which only occur
in the infinite volume, or in this context thermodynamic, limit. Though this
limit is clearly an idealisation in this case, Batterman (2005) claims that the
3As we saw in §4.3 all indications are that the ultraviolet behaviour of QCD is well behaved. It’s
worth pointing out here that the Clay institute quantum Yang-Mills problem explicitly refers
to the need to demonstrate the existence of a mass gap and confinement (Jaffe and Witten,
2006). These are infrared issues which indicates that the infrared aspects of the problem are
taken to be the most challenging and interesting for mathematical physicists.
4See, in particular, Ruetsche (2011) chapter 15 for a discussion of the connection between her
rejection of ‘pristine’ interpretations of quantum theories with infinite degrees of freedom and
the scientific realism debate.
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non-analyticities that occur in the thermodynamic limit are needed to success-
fully represent and explain phase transitions, a position which is closely allied to
Ruetsche’s claims about the limit of infinite degrees of freedom in quantum theory.
Batterman’s analysis of the thermodynamic limit has been contested by Butter-
field (2011), Norton (2011) and Callender and Menon (2013) however. According
to these authors, the thermodynamic limit is predictively and explanatorily suc-
cessful in phase transition theory because of features infinite systems share with
large finite systems—specifically, the non-analytic functions found in the limit
are said to provide a good approximation to the values of macroscopic quantities
in realistic, finite volume, models. Following this line of thought I suggest that
it is not clear that resources afforded by unitarily inequivalent representations
really are explanatorily indispensable in high energy physics in an ontologically
committing sense.
Showing that the limit of infinite degrees of freedom is not representationally
indispensable in general is a tall order, given the range of uses to which it is
put. I focus on the case of SSB for two reasons: first, SSB raises new challenges
for the kind of deflationary programme set out by Butterfield and others, and
second, because the notion of SSB plays a prominent role in high energy physics
and is the case which Fraser and Ruetsche focuses on in this context.5 I start
in §6.2 by setting out the role that novel properties of infinite systems play in
theoretical accounts of SSB in both classical and quantum physics. §6.3 discusses
the prospects of deflating the physical status of these properties with reference
to the recent debate surrounding phase transitions. In §6.4 I argue that the
deflationary reading of the limit of infinite degrees of freedom can be extended
to the case of SSB. I conclude in §6.5 by sketching some avenues for further
investigation into the epistemic and representational status of the limit of infinite
degrees of freedom in the QFT programme.
6.2 Modelling Spontaneous Symmetry Breaking
What is SSB? A great deal is going to hang on this question so we need to be
somewhat careful here. Before rushing into formal definitions let’s start with a
qualitative description of the kind of worldly phenomena we are trying to account
for. The archetype is ferromagnetism. The interactions between the magnetic
moments associated with electron spins inside a ferromagnet make it energetically
favourable for neighbouring spins to align together. These interactions have a
5In fact, phase transitions are also dealt with in the QFT programme, specifically in the QFT at
finite temperatures formalism and in particle physics cosmology, but this is a story for another
time.
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rotation symmetry and at high temperatures the system behaves in a spherically
symmetric way: spins are uncorrelated and the magnetisation is effectively zero.
If the temperature is lowered to some critical value however, spins suddenly line up
in a particular direction, giving rise to a net magnetisation. Moreover, the spins
remain frozen into this aligned state, unless an external magnetic field is applied
or the temperature is raised above the critical temperature once more.
It will be useful in what follows to distinguish two aspects of the theoretical no-
tion of SSB. On the one hand, there is the ‘symmetry breaking’ part. Informally
speaking, the system displays ‘stable’ states which are non-invariant under some
transformation group. In the case of the ferromagnet, the aligned spin states
which manifest at low temperatures are clearly not rotationally invariant. On
the other, there is the ‘spontaneous’ part. Naively this might be taken to mean
that the system has, in some sense, an equal chance of choosing a number of
asymmetric configurations; the spins inside the ferromagnet can align in any di-
rection at the critical temperature.6 In practice the sense in which the symmetry
is broken spontaneously is often spelled out via a contrast with so-called explicit
symmetry breaking, in which asymmetric behaviour is produced by asymmetries
in the underlying interactions at play.7 Applying an external magnetic field to
the ferromagnet produces aligned states, for instance, but in this case the asym-
metric behaviour arises due to violations of rotation symmetry in the relevant
dynamical equations. Giving a theoretical characterisation of SSB comes down
to spelling out more precisely what the relevant stable asymmetric states are
and in what sense the asymmetric behaviour is produced spontaneously. One
theme of this chapter will be that there is not a single way of doing this. As we
shall see however, the novel properties of infinite systems play an important role
in standard theoretical accounts of SSB in both classical and quantum systems.
I start by discussing how SSB behaviour is typically described in classical the-
ory, before moving on to the quantum case and the status of SSB in the QFT
programme.
6.2.1 Classical Systems
One often finds SSB defined as a situation in which a system (classical or quan-
tum) has multiple ground states which are mapped into each other under the
action of an exact symmetry group of the dynamics. Why? The thought is that
a system should eventually collapse into (or, at least, close to) a ground state,
6This idea becomes problematic in the case of gauge symmetries, but as I touch on below,
many philosophers view the notion of spontaneously broken gauge symmetry as intrinsically
problematic.
7See Castellani (2003) for a discussion of the distinction between spontaneous and explicit
symmetry breaking.
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Figure 6.1: A double well potential.
so these are the appropriate states to identify as the locus of stable symmetry
breaking behaviour. As I mentioned, the sense in which the symmetry is produced
spontaneously is typically cashed out via a contrast with explicit symmetry break-
ing in which there are non-invariant terms in the system’s dynamical equations.
If we assume that there are no such terms, and the symmetry in question is exact,
the only way to have a non-invariant ground state is if it is non-unique—a unique
ground state is necessarily mapped into itself under all of the exact symmetries
of the dynamics.
A little thought shows that the existence of multiple ground states is not really
sufficient to ensure that SSB type behaviour occurs however (later I will argue
that, in quantum systems, it is not necessary either). A simple classical system
which motivates this conclusion is a particle on a two-dimensional plane. Each
point on the plane is a ground state, but the system does not display the kind of
stable asymmetric configurations that are characteristic of SSB (Strocchi, 2008,
4). In order for interesting asymmetric behaviour to emerge there needs be an
energy cost associated with moving from one ground state to another. A toy
model which is often discussed in presentations of SSB is a classical system with
a double well potential (figure 6.1). In this system there are two ground states
which are not parity invariant and are separated by a potential barrier. As long
as the system does not have sufficient energy to traverse the potential barrier it
can be expected to ‘choose’ one side of the potential.8 Finite classical systems
can display the characteristics of SSB phenomena then, but the sense in which
we have stable asymmetric behaviour here is inevitably a matter of degree; there
is no natural answer to the question of how high the potential barrier between
degenerate ground states must be for interesting symmetry breaking behaviour
to arise.
Furthermore, there are contexts in which the existence of a potential barrier of any
8For a discussion of SSB in this kind of simple mechanical model see Lui (2003) and Earman
(2004).
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height does not seem to capture the appropriate notion of stability. The classical
Ising model in one spacial dimension has two asymmetric ground states separated
by a potential barrier but it is usually said not to display SSB. Explaining why
takes us into the account of SSB found in classical statistical mechanics which
rests on the limit of infinite volume. As we shall see, infinite systems yield
a much more clear cut characterisation of SSB than can be provided in finite
systems.
The Ising model is the quintessential toy model of a ferromagnet. In this model,
one takes a d dimensional (cubic) lattice, with N sites and volume V , and asso-
ciates with each site i a variable si = ±1. The values of si can be interpreted
as a naive representation of the orientation of spins inside a ferromagnetic crys-
tal: si = 1 corresponding to a spin aligning ‘up’; si = −1 corresponding to a
spin aligning ‘down’. In keeping with this picture, we can identify the quantity,
m =
∑
i si/V , with the (volume averaged) magnetisation of the system.
9 The
basic Hamiltonian consists of a single term representing short ranged interac-
tions that make it energetically favourable for spins to align parallel with one
another:
H = −J
∑
i,j
sisj, (6.1)
where J is a positive constant parameterising the interaction strength and the
sum is taken over ‘nearest neighbour’ spin pairs.
This Hamiltonian is invariant under a ‘spin flip’ transformation si → −si and
clearly also has two ground states which are mapped into each other under this
transformation: one in which all spins point up, and one in which all point
down. Naively then, we might expect the kind of SSB behaviour found in the
ferromagnet—spins should align either all up or down breaking the spin flip sym-
metry. This turns out not to happen in the case of one spacial dimension however.
Though multiple ground states exist they are not stable under thermal excita-
tions: any non-zero temperature gives rise to purely symmetric behaviour.
In statistical mechanics the natural candidate for identifying stable asymmetric
states are not grounds states but equilibrium macrostates. The equilibrium state
of the classical Ising model is represented by a probability distribution over its
microstates, SV = (s1, ..., sN); in particular, the canonical ensemble takes the
form:
P (SV ) =
e−βH(SV )
Z
, (6.2)
9A note on terminology here. In statistical mechanics the magnetisation is often identified with
the expectation value of the quantity I have called m. Part of the reason for this is that 〈m〉
and m effectively coincide in the thermodynamic limit, as fluctuations vanish. It will be crucial
to my discussion in §6.4 to keep these quantities distinct however, and I refer to the latter
quantity as the magnetisation here.
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where β = 1/kBT is the inverse temperature and Z is the partition function (a
close cousin of the QFT partition function discussed in chapter 1). This distri-
bution is clearly unique and, in fact, the canonical ensemble assigns a unique
equilibrium state to any system with finite degrees of freedom. For the same
reason discussed above in the case of the ground state, this means that it must
respect all of the symmetries of the dynamics.
Things become more interesting in the thermodynamic limit however. Taking
N, V → ∞, with N/V held constant, generates an infinite lattice with a diver-
gent total energy so (2) is no longer a well defined probability distribution. In
the classical context the canonical ensemble is typically generalised to such in-
finite systems by means of the Gibbs measure formalism.10 Roughly speaking,
a Gibbs measure is a probability measure over a system’s microstates which be-
haves locally like the canonical ensemble—in the case of the Ising model, any
finite sub-region of the lattice is stipulated to have a probability distribution de-
fined over its associated microstates which takes the form of (2). Stated precisely,
this definition agrees with the canonical ensemble for systems with finite degrees
of freedom, but infinite systems also admit Gibbs measures in this sense.
What happens in the thermodynamic limit of the Ising model depends on the
dimensionality. The d=1 case was solved exactly by Ising himself and was found
to have a single symmetric Gibbs measure at all temperatures—his verdict was
that no ferromagnetic behaviour occurs. For two dimensions and higher however,
multiple Gibbs measures appear. An elegant argument (originally due to Peierls)
illustrates how this is possible.11 Strictly speaking, the Hamiltonian of a finite
Ising model should include an additional term representing the effects of external
spins at the boundary of the lattice. If we take all of the spins at this boundary
to be ‘up’ it can be shown that, below some critical temperature, the expectation
value of si at the centre of the lattice is positive no matter how large V is.
This means that when we take V → ∞ the boundary goes to spacial infinity
while the expected magnetisation of the system converges to a positive value.
Running the same argument with ‘down’ spins at the boundary, we find that
there are two distinct Gibbs measures, P+ and P−, on the infinite lattice which
assign positive and negative values to the magnetisation respectively. Normalised
linear combinations of these measures are also Gibbs measures of the system. If
we take the thermodynamic limit of a finite lattice with boundary conditions
that are invariant under spin flips,12 for instance, the Gibbs measure converges
10Presentations of the Gibbs measure formalism, and its application to SSB and phase transi-
tions, can be found in Georgii (1988) and Lebowitz (1999).
11See Kindermann and Snell (1980), and references therein, for the details. Note that rigorous
results are, for the most part, not available in three or more dimensions.
12In practice this typically means free or periodic boundary conditions, see Kinderman and
Snell (1980, 34-35).
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Figure 6.2: Expected magnetisation of the two dimensional classical Ising model
in the thermodynamic limit.
to 1/2P+ + 1/2P−. Only P+ and P− satisfy the properties required of genuine
equilibrium states however: in general, systems with infinite degrees of freedom
can have a convex set of Gibbs measures whose extremal elements correspond to
macroscopically distinct equilibrium states of the system.
This leads to the standard definition of SSB commonly employed in statistical
mechanics: SSB occurs if there are multiple equilibrium macrostates in the ther-
modynamic limit which are mapped into each other under an exact symmetry of
the dynamics. Interpretive puzzles immediately arise with this approach to mod-
elling SSB. Real ferromagnets are clearly finite in volume so how do these infinite
systems relate to what is going on in concrete systems? As a piece of first order
science however its success is undeniable.13 The asymmetric equilibrium states
which appear in the thermodynamic limit give an accurate quantitive description
of the macroscopic properties of many concrete systems. And this character-
isation of SSB is intimately tied up with a powerful framework for describing
phase transitions in statistical mechanics. As has already been mentioned, phase
transitions are associated with non-analyticities in macroscopic observables, and
ultimately thermodynamic potentials, which only occur in the thermodynamic
limit. The expected magnetisation of the infinite volume classical Ising model,
for instance, is a discontinuous function of the external magnetic field, h, be-
low the critical temperature, corresponding to the first order phase transition
observed in real ferromagnets when the direction of an external field is reversed
(figure 6.2). The appearance of these non-analyticities is closely related to the
non-uniqueness of the system’s equilibrium state at the phase boundary. In the
case of the Ising model, it is the existence of the P+ and P− equilibrium states
that allows the expected magnetisation to change discontinuously at h = 0. The
interesting question for the philosopher of science, I think, is not whether the infi-
nite systems obtained in the thermodynamic limit are predictive and explanatory
13Its worth mentioning, however, that this account of SSB may have important limitations as
well, in so far as the thermodynamic limit does not exist for all systems.
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in this context, but why.
One lesson we can draw from this discussion of classical systems is that it is
possible to characterise SSB in much more categorical terms in the limit of infinite
degrees of freedom. In finite mechanical models there is always a certain amount
of vagueness in the sense in which we have stable asymmetric behaviour. In the
limit of infinite degrees of freedom this ambiguity disappears. The reason is that
the solution space of classical systems with infinite degrees of freedom can split
into multiple isolated ‘islands’ which cannot be traversed without expending an
infinite amount of energy. It is the appearance of these islands which opens up the
possibility of degenerate equilibrium states in the thermodynamic limit of classical
statistical mechanics, but the same kind of structures are also found in classical
field theories, where degenerate ground states become completely dynamically
isolated from each other.14 As we shall see, there are parallels here with what
happens in infinite quantum systems. There are new features of the quantum
case however, which have often been thought to provide further grounds to attach
special physical significance to the limit of infinite degrees of freedom.
6.2.2 Quantum Systems
The most dramatic difference between the quantum and classical case is that,
while classical systems with finite degrees of freedom can have multiple ground
states, the corresponding quantum systems typically do not. As we have seen, the
classical Ising model has up and down aligned ground states. But the quantum
Ising model (with a transverse magnetic field)15 has a single ground state, which
is a superposition of the states ψ+ and ψ− corresponding to all spins aligned up
and down respectively before the thermodynamic limit is taken. More generally,
a unique quantum ground state can typically be constructed from a superposition
of quantum states associated with classical ground states if the system has finite
degrees of freedom. If degenerate ground states are required for SSB behaviour to
occur then it appears that symmetries cannot be spontaneously broken in finite
quantum systems.
In the limit of infinite degrees of freedom radically new structures emerge however.
14See Strocchi (2008) for more on this perspective on SSB in finite classical systems, and a
detailed discussion of the situation in classical field theories.
15In order to obtain a non-trivial quantum version of the Ising model a transverse magnetic
field term has to be added, so the basic Hamiltonian is:
H = −J
∑
i,j
σzi σ
z
j − hx
∑
i
σxi ,
where {σx, σy, σz} are the Pauli matrices. Henceforth I refer to this model simply as the
‘quantum Ising model’.
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The Stone-von Neumann theorem famously shows (roughly speaking) that all pos-
sible quantisations of a finite classical system, obtained via the usual canonical
commutation relations, are unitarily equivalent. What this means is that, while it
is possible to write down a finite quantum system on a Hilbert space of sequences
of complex numbers, as in Heisenberg’s matrix formulation of quantum mechan-
ics, and on a Hilbert space of complex valued functions, as in Schrodinger’s wave-
function formulation, there is an isomorphism between these structures, which
has typically been taken to invite identifying them as theoretically equivalent.16
This result breaks down in the limit of infinite degrees of freedom. The best way
to see what is going on here is to invoke the algebraic formalisation of quantum
theory. In this framework a quantum system is associated with an abstract C ×
*-algebra which can be instantiated in multiple Hilbert spaces. What happens
in quantum theories with infinite degrees of freedom is that the corresponding
C*-algebra admits multiple unitarily inequivalent Hilbert space representations
which cannot simply be viewed as equivalent encodings of the same physics.
This leads to puzzles with understanding the semantics of these theories. As
Ruetsche (2011) chronicles in detail, the failure of the Stone-von Neumann theo-
rem signals the splintering of previously equivalent strategies for assigning phys-
ical content to quantum systems. But the appearance of unitarily inequivalent
representations also provides resources for representing SSB behaviour. It turns
out that these unitarily inequivalent representations can support distinct ground
states; the considerations sketched above for finite quantum systems no longer
apply in this context because the superposition of states in unitarily inequivalent
representations is blocked by so-called superselection rules. In the thermody-
namic limit, ψ+ and ψ− converge to genuine ground states belonging to unitarily
inequivalent representations of the infinite quantum Ising model. Furthermore,
it is impossible from the system to transition from one of these ground states to
the other, so the sense in which we can expect stable asymmetric behaviour is
especially stark.
In quantum statistical mechanics the existence of unitarily inequivalent repre-
sentations in the thermodynamic limit furnishes an approach to modelling SSB
which is, in other respects, highly analogous to the classical case. The canoni-
cal ensemble of a finite quantum system is traditionally represented by a density
operator,
ρ =
e−βH
Z
. (6.3)
which, again, is not well defined in the thermodynamic limit. In the quantum
16Precisely: a Hilbert space and collection of operators (H,Oi) is unitarily equivalent to another,
(H′,O′i), if there exists a unitary map U : H → H′ such that U−1O′iU = Oi for all i.
See Ruetsche (2011) chapter 2 for a discussion of the connection between the unitary and
theoretical equivalence of quantum theories.
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context the algebraic formulation of quantum statistical mechanics provides a
rigorous framework for generalising the canonical ensemble to infinite systems.17
The analogue of Gibbs measures are so-called KMS states, which agree with (3)
for finite systems, but can also exist in the thermodynamic limit. As in the
classical case, the canonical ensemble of a finite system is unique, but a system
with infinite degrees of freedom can have a convex set of KMS states whose
extremal elements correspond to distinct symmetry breaking equilibrium states.
In the quantum case these symmetry breaking equilibrium states live in unitarily
inequivalent Hilbert space representations afforded by the limit of infinite volume.
Again this approach to SSB has been extremely successful and connects up with
a powerful apparatus for dealing with phase transitions in quantum systems. As
in the classical case however there is a puzzle about why these infinite volume
systems provide a good description of the behaviour of concrete lumps of iron
which are patently finite in extent.
What about high energy physics and the QFT programme: what role does SSB
play in this context and how is it represented? The picture here is complex
and ultimately poorly understood from a foundational perspective. The most
significant, but also most controversial, appeal to the notion of SSB in high
energy physics takes place within the so-called Higgs mechanism, a central pillar
of the standard model. The Higgs mechanism is essentially a method for adding
masses to the gauge bosons associated with weak interactions without explicitly
breaking the underlying gauge symmetries, and is standardly understood in terms
of SSB. Coupling the electroweak sector of the standard model to a scalar field—
the Higgs field—is said to spontaneously break the relevant gauge symmetries
giving rise to massive gauge particles in the process. A gamut of technical and
conceptual issues arise here however. For one thing, many philosophers of physics
have objected to the very idea of spontaneously broken gauge symmetry. The gist
of this critique is that, because gauge freedom is standardly interpreted as a kind
of descriptive redundancy, it just doesn’t make sense to talk about gauge violating
ground and equilibrium states, much less for particles to acquire masses in this
way—see Earman (2004), Healey (2007) and Lyre (2008) for complaints along
these lines.
In addition to these more philosophical worries there are tangible formal bar-
riers to understanding the Higgs mechanism as a case of quantum SSB. What
often happens in high energy physics is that the Higgs mechanism, and the ac-
companying SSB argument, are presented at the level of classical field theory
and perturbative methods are then used to calculate quantum corrections, on
the assumption that the non-perturbative picture is more or less preserved when
17See Bratteli and Robinson (2003) for the details of this approach. Presentations aimed at
philosophers can be found in Emch and Lui (2005) and Ruetsche (2011).
114
6.2. MODELLING SPONTANEOUS SYMMETRY BREAKING
the theory is quantised. Unfortunately indications are that this is simply not
the case. A result known as Elitzur’s theorem seems to show that local gauge
symmetries cannot be spontaneously broken in QFT models (Elitzur, 1975).18
Remnant global gauge symmetries are not touched by this results and can be
spontaneously broken, but all of the evidence suggests this has nothing to do
with imparting mass to gauge particles. As a result of all these difficulties many
working in the foundations of physics have concluded that the Higgs mechanism
needs to be reconceptualised in terms which do not appeal to SSB at all.
Even if we abandon the idea that spontaneously broken gauge symmetry plays an
important role in the standard model however, this does not mean jettisoning the
notion of SSB from the QFT programme entirely. In fact, SSB plays an important
role in less controversial contexts in high energy physics. The spontaneous break-
ing of chiral symmetry in QCD, for instance, is said to account for around 99% of
the mass of nucleons (and therefore most of the mass of ordinary matter). This
case is not touched by gauge related concerns. SSB is also invoked in scalar field
theories which do not involve gauge fields in any way. The spontaneous breaking
of internal rotational symmetries are studied in multi-component generalisations
of the familiar φ4 model known as O(n) models (which are, in fact, closely related
to the Higgs field).19 We do not necessarily need to solve the riddles of the Higgs
mechanism to make progress in understanding the explanatory status of SSB in
contemporary high energy physics then, and I will largely bracket the difficulties
raised by the peculiarities of local gauge symmetries here.
When it comes to giving a precise characterisation of SSB in QFT models there
are two main approaches on the table. On the one hand, a framework for captur-
ing SSB has been developed in the axiomatic approach to QFT, and especially
in the algebraic formulation of continuum QFT models. Just as in the alge-
braic approach to statistical mechanics, this characterisation of SSB makes use
of unitarily inequivalent representations afforded by the limit of infinite degrees
of freedom. In particular, we can see the spontaneous breaking of symmetries in
QFT as arising from the existence of unitarily inequivalent representations that
are related by a symmetry of the underlying algebra and support distinct non-
invariant ground (or in this context, vacuum) states.20 The main drawback of
18Elitzur’s theorem, and its philosophical ramifications are discussed in Freidrich (2013). Note
that the result is proven in the context of lattice gauge theory, but there are heuristic indica-
tions that it should also apply in the continuum limit (if it exists).
19The O(n) models are scalar field theories with the classical Lagrangian density:
L = ∂µφα∂µφα −m2φαφα − λ(φαφα)2
where φα(x), α = 0, n − 1, is a n-vector of scalar fields. For n > 1 there is a O(n) rotation
symmetry, in the internal space of this vector, which can be spontaneously broken if m2 < 0.
Clearly when n = 1 we get back the familiar φ4 theory.
20A detailed discussion of this formalism can be found in Earman (2004) and Strocchi (2008).
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this approach comes as no surprise—we currently do not have continuum formu-
lations of realistic QFT models in the algebraic framework. While it might hope
to illuminate the nature of SSB in QFT at a very high level of abstraction then,
this formalism does not furnish concrete scientific explanations in the way that
the thermodynamic limit of quantum statistical mechanics does.
SSB is studied directly in realistic, four dimensional, lattice QFT models how-
ever. There are strong parallels here with the way that SSB is modelled in the
lattice spin systems already discussed. In fact, there is a direct correspondence
between the aforementioned O(n) scalar field models quantised on a cubic lat-
tice and generalisations of the Ising model (Smit, 2002, 34-35). Assuming zero
temperature, SSB is associated with the existence of degenerate non-invariant
ground states in the infinite volume limit which presumably belong to unitarily
inequivalent representations. The kind of rigorous results pertaining to the Ising
model sketched above are not forthcoming in the case of infinite volume lattice
QFT systems however. On the one hand, various approximation methods im-
ported from statistical mechanics, such as mean field theory techniques, can be
used to estimate some of the relevant properties that obtain in this limit. But
numerical simulations based on finite lattices are also commonly used to study
SSB. Since these systems have a finite number of degrees of freedom unitarily
inequivalent representations and degenerate ground states do not occur, but var-
ious techniques are used to extrapolate numerical results to the infinite volume
limit. One method which is often employed to estimate the value of expectation
values of degenerate vacuum states in the infinite volume limit is to add a sym-
metry breaking perturbation to the Lagrangian and examine what happens as it
is gradually removed as the lattice volume is increased.21 In sum, the limit of
infinite degrees of freedom continues to play a role, if a less direct one, in the way
that SSB is modelled in lattice QFT.
6.3 Motivating the Deflationary View
We have seen that the way that SSB phenomena are modelled in both classical
and quantum physics appeals to novel properties of infinite systems. Ruetsche
(2011) takes the role that resources afforded by multiple unitarily inequivalent
representations play in the quantum case to show that these properties need to
be taken physically seriously—states afforded by multiple inequivalent represen-
tations must to be viewed as genuine possible states for the ferromagnet in order
to account for the onset of symmetry breaking behaviour, for instance. As I
have already alluded to, this perspective is closely allied to Batterman’s (2005)
21See Smit (2002, 64-66) and references therein.
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claims about phase transition theory. According to him the discontinuities in
the thermodynamic potentials that occur in the thermodynamic limit are needed
to represent physical discontinuities which manifest in concrete systems during
a change of phase. Call the general idea that novel properties of infinite sys-
tems must be taken to faithfully represent in order to underwrite the explanatory
capacity of these models the indispensablist view.
In the context of statistical mechanics this position immediately runs into puz-
zles I have already touched on. The infinite volume models obtained in the
thermodynamic limit are highly idealised representations of the concrete systems
which exhibit SSB phenomena—real ferromagnets clearly have a finite volume
and number of constituents. But the indispensablist line cuts against a familiar
view of how idealised models relate to their targets. In calculating the electric
field produced by a long charged wire one often treats it as being infinitely long.
In so far as this model is predictive and explanatory it is presumably because
it captures relevant features of the target system that are preserved when this
infinite length idealisation is corrected—we can easily verify in this case that the
electric field associated with an infinite charged wire provides a good approxima-
tion to the field close to a long finite length wire. The doctrine that idealised
models are successful because the behaviour they aim to describe is robust under
‘de-idealisation’ is most famously associated with McMullin’s notion of Galilean
idealisation (McMullin, 1985). If the indispenablist thesis is right, however, the
role of the thermodynamic limit cannot be understood in these terms. Prop-
erties of infinite systems, which completely disappear when we move to a large
finite volume, are explanatorily essential and representationally faithful on this
account.
The indispensablist then owes us an alternative account of how the infinite mod-
els employed in this context manage to successfully predict and explain. There
are two main routes which philosophers with indispensablist sympathies have
taken here, both of which have their fair share of problems in my view. Bat-
terman has championed the idea that the thermodynamic limit is an instance
of a broader class of essential (or ineliminable, or uncontrollable) idealisations
which contribute to the explanatory power of a model in a radically different way
from familiar Galilean idealisations, the use of continuum descriptions in fluid
mechanics being another putative example of this phenomenon. My central gripe
with this approach is that, while Batterman has consistently maintained that his
conception of essential idealisation cannot be assimilated to established accounts
of scientific explanation (Batterman, 2002) or the applicability of mathematics
(Batterman, 2010), the positive picture of how essential idealisations are actually
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supposed to work remains inchoate.22 If essential idealisations are to provide a
viable alternative to the Galilean paradigm what we need is an explicit account
of why essentially idealised models are successful which does not appeal to their
relation to de-idealised representations of the target system.23 In the absence of
such an account the worry is that calling the thermodynamic limit as essential
idealisation merely gives a name to the problem facing the indispensablist.
While the doctrine of essential idealisation has often been associated with claims
about the failure of reduction relations between models at different level of de-
scription, Earman (2004) puts forward a very different way of understanding the
indispensablist thesis which is thoroughly reductionist in character. As we have
seen, the mathematical structures found in the thermodynamic limit also occur
in a field theoretic context. Assuming that the world is, at base, a continuum
QFT we could take the novel properties that appear in the thermodynamic limit
to correspond to features of this more fundamental physical description which
are missed by models with finite degrees of freedom. On this account the limit
of infinite degrees of freedom is not an idealisation after all! Unfortunately for
Earman, whether we have grounds to take the novel features of continuum QFT
models to faithfully represent is precisely what I am questioning in this chap-
ter. Even if we take this for granted however, there is something ad hoc, or at
least thoroughly programmatic, about this response. What seems to be needed
to meet the idealisation challenge here is not just an assurance that degenerate
equilibrium states are in fact possible but rather a detailed story about why they
occur in the particular materials, and at the particular temperatures, they do.
Prima facie, field theory has nothing to do with ferromagnetism and the boiling
of kettles.24 Ruetsche (2011, 336-339) suggests a less risky way of implement-
ing Earman’s reductionist strategy; the indispensablist can simply claim that the
relevant properties found in the thermodynamic limit will be embedded within fu-
ture physical theories in some way or other. Again though, the idea that advances
in quantum gravity will shed light on the question of why the thermodynamic
limit works seems far fetched and unmotivated.
In the recent debate about phase transition theory a number of philosophers
have argued that a more conservative way of understanding the success of the
22Batterman and Rice (2014) is perhaps the most detailed discussion of how Batterman and
others understand the explanatoriness of essential idealisations to date. See Lange (2015)
for criticisms with which I am sympathetic. Furthermore, it is not clear how the minimal
model account of explanation given there motivates, or responds to concerns about, the
indispensablist claim that novel properties afforded by the thermodynamic limit faithfully
represent.
23Shesh (2013) makes the same point, though he is more optimistic than I that this challenge
can be met.
24Butterfield (2011, 1078) and Mainwood (2006, 228-231) raise similar objections to invoking
field theory to justify the use of the thermodynamic limit.
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thermodynamic limit is available which avoids much of this wrangling. As I
understand them, Butterfield (2011), Norton (2011) and Callender and Menon
(2013) want to say that, despite appearances, the thermodynamic limit is an
ordinary idealisation, not fundamentally unlike the limit of infinite length in
the charged wire case. Note that the fact that novel properties obtain in an
idealised limit does not, in itself, establish that they are indispensable in any
interesting sense. The electric field produced by an infinitely long charged wire has
a translation symmetry that is not respected by any finite length wire, but nobody
claims that this property is explanatorily essential, much less physically real. The
reason being that the success of the infinite wire model is very plausibly accounted
for by other properties which are robust when the infinite length idealisation is
removed. Similarly, according to these authors, it is not the novel properties of
infinite systems but those they share with large finite systems that are doing the
real explanatory and representational work in applications of the thermodynamic
limit. Call this the deflationary view.
The basic observation underlying this position in the phase transition debate has
been that, while the non-analyticities in the free energy disappear when the ther-
modynamic limit is removed, this function can still approximate the changes in
macroscopic properties of a finite system. Recall that, below the critical temper-
ature, the expected magnetisation of the Ising model becomes a discontinuous
function of the external magnetic field in the thermodynamic limit, signalling a
first order phase transition (figure 6.2). General theoretical considerations, and
evidence from numerical simulations, suggest that the expected magnetisation
of a finite Ising model has an abrupt change in sign at h = 0, which becomes
increasingly steep as N increases, so that, if the lattice is sufficiently large, it
will be very well approximated by the discontinuous magnetisation function of
an infinite Ising lattice. We seem to have a simple schema for explaining the
success of the orthodox approach to phase transitions in terms of the behaviour
of large finite systems: a real phase transition is a sharp but smooth change in a
large system’s macroscopic properties that is approximated by the non-analytic
free energy found in the infinite volume limit to accuracies within acceptable
error.
How does this debate about the thermodynamic limit bear on the question we
are interested in: the status of novel properties of infinite systems in QFT?
Ruetsche suggests that the indispensablist thesis goes through much more smoo-
thly in this context. The thought being that, since QFTs actually are infinite
systems, there is no worry about idealisations in this case and the appeal to novel
properties afforded by the limit of infinite degrees of freedom can simply be taken
at face value. There are problems with this line of thought however. In the
statistical mechanics case it is external information about the volume of concrete
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ferromagnets which tells us that the infinite volume limit is an idealisation. In
the QFT case we do not have this kind of information. Still, this clearly does not
mean that the continuum and infinite volume limits should be read realistically
by default. For one thing, whether the universe has a continuum or discrete
structure, and whether it is spatially infinite or finite, seem to be open scientific
questions.25 Even if there were good reasons to believe the universe is infinite
however this does not mean that we should trust what our present QFT models
say about the world at spacial infinity. I have been arguing in this thesis that
the claims that QFT models make about physics at arbitrarily large and small
distance scales are not supported by the extant empirical successes of high energy
physics. On Ruetsche’s account, however, it seems that it is precisely this kind
of structure which needs to be taken physically seriously to account for SSB
phenomena in high energy physics. While there is a less flagrant conflict in
the QFT case than the statistical mechanics case then, there is still something
puzzling about the claim that novel properties afforded by the limit of infinite
degrees of freedom need to be taken to faithfully represent in this context.
Furthermore, there is a tension in the suggestion that one might be a selective
indispensablist, giving in to worries generated by the thermodynamic limit in
the statistical mechanics case while maintaining that novel properties of infinite
systems must be taken representationally seriously in order to account for SSB in
QFT. The challenge posed by the thermodynamic limit’s status as an idealisation,
as I see it, is not that it undermines the explanatoriness of infinite systems—I take
it as read that the standard approach to phase transitions and SSB in statistical
mechanics is genuinely explanatory. The point is rather that it mitigates against
the indispensablist’s claim that the representational success of features only found
in infinite systems underwrite their explanatory success. If we accept that we do
not need to reify these properties to account for the success of the thermodynamic
limit in statistical mechanics, as I take it Butterfield and others do, why should we
think that novel features of infinite systems engender ontological commitment in
high energy physics? To motivate this selective stance we would need to point to
a relevant difference in the explanatory set up in these two cases. In fact however,
philosophers of physics have tended to rely on analogies with the relatively well
understood description of SSB in quantum statistical mechanics to inform their
25It is sometimes suggested that the fact that all present measurements of the energy density
of the universe are consistent with zero space-time curvature gives us reason to believe that
the universe is infinite. This is a simplification however; this inference only goes through if
we assume, as standard cosmological models typically do for reasons of simplicity, that the
topology of the universe is simply connected (Lachieze-Rey and Luminet, 1995). In fact,
zero curvature is perfectly compatible with a finite volume space-time. To my knowledge,
the question of whether the universe has a finite or infinite volume is an open, if heavily
constrained, question.
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understanding of the more controversial case of QFT.26 This suggests a strategy
for responding to the attack on doubly cutoff QFTs we started out with. If we
take a deflationary view of the explanatory role of the thermodynamic limit in
statistical mechanics this will undermine the aforementioned worries about the
representational inadequacies of doubly cutoff QFTs.
There is a hitch here however. It is not at all obvious that the kind of treatment of
phase transitions advocated by Butterfield and others can be extended to the case
of SSB. Pointing to the fact that non-analytic functions can approximate analytic
ones does not help in this case. The issue now is not why we can legitimately
model a ferromagnet’s macroscopic properties as changing discontinuously under
variations in the external magnetic field but why, in the absence of an exter-
nal magnetic field, the system can be successfully represented as having multiple
asymmetric equilibrium states, despite the uniqueness of the equilibrium state of
any finite system. As we have seen, if a system’s ground and equilibrium states
are unique they must be invariant under the same symmetries as the dynamics. In
the statistical mechanics context, this means that the expected values of macro-
scopic observables at equilibrium must be consistent with these symmetries; the
expected magnetisation of a finite Ising model, for instance, is always zero no
matter how large the lattice is. Prima facie then, the description of SSB afforded
by the infinite volume limit cannot approximate behaviour already found in large
finite systems in any reasonable sense. SSB might seem to offer new support to
the indispensablist view then. The next section argues that this is not in fact the
case; there is scope for extending the deflationary view to the case of SSB.
6.4 Spontaneous Symmetry Breaking in Finite Systems
The kind of no-go argument just sketched is misleading. SSB behaviour only ap-
pears to be impossible in finite systems if the modelling assumptions implicit in
standard characterisations of SSB via infinite systems are treated as sacrosanct.
Relaxing the requirement that the system’s ground/equilibrium state is asymmet-
ric (the symmetry breaking part), or the demand that the broken symmetry is
exact (the spontaneous part), allows us to see how systems with finite degrees of
freedom can exhibit the kind of behaviour observed in real ferromagnets. §6.4.1
explores the former route. I point out that a classical system with a unique,
symmetric, equilibrium state can still be expected to exhibit asymmetric states
over long time periods. Similarly, in the quantum case a system with a unique
ground state can nevertheless furnish stable symmetry breaking behaviour. §6.4.2
26See, for instance, Emch and Lui (2005). Fraser (2012) raises worries about applying this
strategy uncritically.
121
CHAPTER 6. SPONTANEOUS SYMMETRY BREAKING AND THE
LIMITS OF INFINITE DEGREES OF FREEDOM
explores the latter route. Landsman (2013) has developed an approach to SSB in
finite quantum systems based on the instability of their ground and equilibrium
states under asymmetric perturbations to the dynamics. The upshot is that, de-
spite initial pessimism, there is a viable programme for accounting for the success
of infinite systems in modelling SSB without reifying them.
6.4.1 Approach I: Long Lived Asymmetric States
The fact that a finite system’s equilibrium state is invariant under the symmetries
of the dynamics does not, in fact, rule out SSB type behaviour: an equilibrated
finite system can still be expected to exhibit asymmetric states over very long
time periods. Once again, the classical Ising model provides a useful reference
point here. The canonical ensemble of the Ising model assigns a probability
distribution, P (m), to the possible magnetisations of the system. Provided the
boundary conditions imposed on a finite lattice do not break the interaction’s
reflection symmetry, P (m) will also respect this symmetry, which, as has already
been noted, implies that the expected magnetisation is zero. This does not mean
however that P (m) must take the form of a normal distribution centred at m = 0;
it can have maxima at positive and negative m. The system would then be
expected to spend most of its time in magnetised microstates.
In the case of the Ising model on a two dimensional lattice it can be shown that
this is exactly what happens below the critical temperature. As was mentioned
in §6.2.1, if the boundary conditions are suitably symmetric the Gibbs measure
of the system is an equal linear combination of the P+ and P− measures. These
extremal measures assign probability one to m = ±a (for some positive a) in
Figure 6.3: Sketch of P (m) below the critical temperature for a classical Ising
model with small, large and infinite N .
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the thermodynamic limit, and can be shown to satisfy central limit theorems
as N → ∞.27 This means that, below the critical temperature, P (m) has two
‘humps’ atm±a, which become increasingly sharply peaked asN increases, finally
converging to Dirac measures at N =∞ (figure 6.3). Though rigorous results are
less forthcoming for more realistic models there are general theoretical grounds
for believing that analogous behaviour will hold whenever the Gibbs measure
is non-unique in the thermodynamic limit. The generic result that statistical
fluctuations scale like 1/
√
N (where N is now the number of constituents) implies
that the canonical ensemble of a large finite system will have most of its mass in
microstates which assign values to macrostate variables close to those associated
with the degenerate equilibrium states that appear in the limit.
Consequently, we can expect such systems to spend long time periods in sym-
metry breaking states. A large finite Ising model below the critical temperature
will enter one of the two regions of its state space in which m ≈ ±a, with
equal probability, and remain there for a very long time. In fact, we can give
heuristic arguments—ultimately based on artificial implementations of the sys-
tem’s dynamics, like the so-called Glauber dynamics—that a finite Ising model
will transition between states of positive and negative magnetisation with a time
period proportional to exp
√
N .28 In the thermodynamic limit the system will
remain in an ‘up’ or ‘down’ aligned state forever—they become distinct equilib-
rium states. But if N is of the order of Avagadro’s number the system can still
be expected to exhibit a magnetisation in a particular direction for a very long
time indeed: much longer than we can feasibly observe real ferromagnets for, and
perhaps longer than the age of the universe!
This points to an explanation of the successful appeal to infinite systems in mod-
elling SSB in classical statistical mechanics in terms of properties they share with
large finite systems. On this view, what we actually observe in real ferromagnets
at low temperatures are long lived asymmetric states whose macroscopic prop-
erties are well approximated by the degenerate equilibrium states found in the
thermodynamic limit. The picture of SSB afforded by the thermodynamic limit,
in which the system must choose between a set of symmetry breaking equilibrium
states, thus provides an appropriate description of the behaviour of large systems
over long, but finite, time periods.29
27See Kindermann and Snell (1980, 34-62) and references therein.
28See Lebowitz (1999, 353) and Kinderman and Snell (1980, 55-61).
29In fact, this way of understanding how the standard account of SSB relates to the behaviour
of finite systems is sometimes found in the statistical physics literature. Commenting on
the non-uniqueness of the Gibbs measure of the Ising model in the thermodynamic limit,
Lebowitz writes:
This means physically that when V is very large the system with “symmet-
ric” [boundary conditions] will, with equal probability, be found in either the
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Can this kind of story be applied to quantum systems as well? There are indica-
tions that it can. Finite quantum systems can support asymmetric states which
are stable over very long time periods, despite the uniqueness of their ground
states, as can be seen in the case of the quantum Ising model. If the potential of
a finite system has multiple minima, the associated asymmetric quantum states
can typically be expressed as superpositions of the ground and first excited states:
in the quantum Ising model, ψ± = 1√2(ψ0 ± ψ1). What happens as N → ∞ is
that the energy gap between these states vanishes. In the case of the quantum
Ising model it can be shown that the energy gap between the ground and first
excited states, ∆E, decays like exp(−N), and Koma and Tasaki (1994) prove
analogous results for a broader class of lattice models which display degenerate
ground states in the thermodynamic limit. This means that, if the system is
large, these asymmetric states will have a very slow time evolution. A quantum
Ising model which is prepared in the ψ+ state will remain in a magnetised state
for an arbitrarily long time, for arbitrarily large N .
In fact, the existence of these slowly precessing asymmetric states has long been
put forward in the physics literature as a way of understanding how finite quantum
systems can exhibit SSB, most notably in Anderson’s famous discussion of the
electric dipole moment of ammonia and sugar (Anderson 1972). The ammonia
molecule is known to fluctuate very quickly between states of opposite polarity,
which correspond to local minima in the potential separated by a small potential
barrier. As Anderson describes however, when we move to larger and larger
molecules the potential barrier between the states of opposite polarity increases
and the gap between the ground and first excited states gets smaller. When we
get to complex molecules the inversion occurs on such long time scales that the
relevant symmetry breaking states can be treated as stationary for all practical
purposes.
In the statistical mechanics context, this suggests that the macroscopic properties
of a large quantum system can be well described by the degenerate ground and
equilibrium states found in the thermodynamic limit. The details of this picture
still need to be filled in however. There remains the question of how the system
enters an asymmetric state in the first place, and why we do not see the true quan-
tum ground state.30 It may be that the canonical ensemble of a finite quantum
“+ state” or the “− state”. Of course as long as the system is finite it will
“fluctuate” between these two pure phases, but the “relaxation times” for such
fluctuations grows exponentially in V , so the either/or description correctly
captures the behavior of macroscopic systems. (Lebowitz, 353)
A similar discussion is found in Binney et al. (1992, 48-51).
30Some authors have suggested that there is a close connection here with the measurement
problem, see Landsman (2013) and Emch and Lui (2005). This is something of a red herring
in my view however and I keep the question of how to understand quantum SSB separate
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system which displays degenerate equilibrium states in the thermodynamic limit
has most of its mass in symmetry breaking pure states at low temperatures, and
the account sketched above for the classical Ising model can be straightforwardly
extended to quantum systems. But it has been suggested by some authors that
one must appeal to additional resources, and specifically the system’s coupling
to the environment, to account for the appearance of SSB behaviour in finite
quantum systems. The next section examines an alternative approach to SSB in
finite systems in this vein which has been explicitly developed in the quantum
context.
6.4.2 Approach II: Instability Under Asymmetric Perturbations
Landsman (2013) has put forward a different approach to SSB in finite quantum
systems. It turns out that the ground and equilibrium states of a quantum system
can be very unstable under small asymmetric perturbations to the dynamics. If
we relax the assumption that the symmetry which is broken at low temperatures
is exact, this provides another way of understanding how SSB phenomena can
manifest in finite systems.
It can be shown that adding a small perturbation to the Hamiltonian of a large
quantum Ising model that favours ‘up’ aligning states causes the system’s ground
state to abruptly shift towards ψ+, and converge to it as N →∞, with analogous
statements holding for the system’s equilibrium state below the critical temper-
ature. One way to see why this occurs is to consider the effective Hamiltonian
governing the ground and first excited states. In the ψ± basis,
H =
(
0 −∆E
−∆E 0
)
, (6.4)
where ∆E is, again, the energy difference between the ground and first excited
state, which, as we have seen, decays exponentially in N . Consequently, any term
added to the upper diagonal element, no matter how small, will dominate the ef-
fective Hamiltonian for sufficiently large N , shifting the ground state close to ψ+.
Of course, the same argument applies to perturbations favouring ‘down’ aligning
spins. More generally, this type of instability under asymmetric perturbations
can be expected to hold if the energy gap between ground and first excited states
is vanishingly small, which, as we saw in the previous section has been shown to
arise in a very wide range of systems with multiple minima in their potentials.
Accordingly, Landsman provides a similar analysis of the quantum double well
potential. What we find in this case is that under parity violating perturba-
from these broader interpretive considerations here.
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tions the quantum ground state collapses towards one of the local minima of the
potential. This is all spelled out in rigorous terms in Landsman (2013).
This provides another way of accounting for the success of the standard approach
to modelling SSB in statistical mechanics by way of the behaviour of large finite
systems. Modelling the symmetry which is broken at low temperatures as an
exact invariance of the target system’s dynamics is often itself an idealisation.
In many concrete systems, small, otherwise empirically negligible, asymmetric
perturbations are very likely to be physically instantiated. In the case of fer-
romagnetic crystals such perturbations might originate in the system’s coupling
to its environment, background magnetic fields, or defects in the lattice struc-
ture. At low temperatures these tiny asymmetries have a dramatic effect on the
behaviour of the system, shifting it into an equilibrium state whose macroscopic
properties are very well approximated by one of the degenerate equilibrium states
found in the thermodynamic limit. Given our ignorance of the details of the per-
turbations affecting a real ferromagnet there is an obvious epistemic sense in
which a ferromagnet has an equal chance of aligning in any particular direction,
and it is appropriate to represent the system as having a number of available
equilibrium states below the critical temperature—thus there remains a sense in
which the symmetry breaking might be said to be spontaneous.
While Landsman’s discussion is grounded in quantum theory, it is plausible that
this approach to SSB in finite systems can also be applied to classical systems.
If the expected magnetisation of a large classical Ising model below the criti-
cal temperature is well approximated by the discontinuous function found in the
thermodynamic limit, as Butterfield and others argue, it will be very sensitive
to changes in the external magnetic field. As a result, a tiny background mag-
netic field will shift the system’s equilibrium state into a magnetised state which
is well approximated by one of the symmetry breaking Gibbs measures found
in the thermodynamic limit.31 This is, of course, a much less general kind of
perturbation to the dynamics than those considered by Landsman, but it does
suggest that the equilibrium states of finite classical systems can display the same
kind of instability properties as their quantum counterparts. SSB behaviour in
finite classical systems may also be produced by small asymmetries arising from
environmental effects then.
A puzzle might seem to arise here. We have now seen two, apparently quite
different, ways of producing the phenomenological features of SSB phenomena in
finite systems: the first based on long lived asymmetric states and the second
on asymmetric perturbations to the dynamics. If both accounts apply to the
31Binney et al (1992, 48-51) gives a characterisation of SSB in finite classical systems along
these lines.
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same model, how are we to understand what actually happens in a concrete
system which displays SSB? There is no real difficulty here however. Following
Lui (2003) we can distinguish between the features of a model which make SSB
possible and the physical mechanism which brings about asymmetric behaviour
in a particular system that model is used to represent. A finite volume model can
display both long lived asymmetric states and the kind of instability properties
cited by Landsman, yet the way that SSB arises in different physical instantiations
of the model may differ from case to case. Furthermore, there is also no reason to
treat these two approaches to SSB in finite systems as in competition. Each can
be viewed as getting around the apparent impossibility of SSB in finite systems by
weakening the symmetry breaking and spontaneous part of the standard definition
of SSB respectively, but it is, of course, also possible to weaken both. It is
plausible that in many concrete systems environmental perturbations and the
stability properties of asymmetric states both play a role in producing SSB type
phenomena.
Another potential concern is that whether or not SSB occurs in finite systems does
not have a precise answer on either of these approaches. On the first approach the
relevant symmetry is not really broken in the system’s full time evolution. While
a finite classical Ising system can display magnetised states over long time peri-
ods, as t→∞ it will spend an equal amount of time in ‘up’ and ‘down’ aligned
states, consistent with the fact that the expected magnetisation is zero. But the
notion of a long lived asymmetric state is clearly a vague one—the difference
between the broken and unbroken phase of the ferromagnet is a matter of degree
rather than kind. The second approach, on the other hand, muddies the conven-
tional distinction between spontaneous and explicit symmetry breaking. Explicit
symmetry breaking, you will recall, refers to asymmetric behaviour produced by
asymmetries in the dynamics, which is exactly what the perturbations appealed
to in Landsman’s approach are. While there is clearly a qualitative difference
between the production of magnetised states by tiny environmental effects and
via the application of an external magnetic field the distinction is not a sharp
one. Admitting that both approaches can play a role in producing symmetry
breaking behaviour further compounds this situation.
As I stressed in §6.2.1 however, SSB behaviour in finite systems is never clear cut.
It is difficult to see how this could be used to object to the approach to SSB in
finite systems developed here unless one has already taken the more categorical
description of SSB afforded by novel features of the infinite volume limit to be
representationally faithful. I should stress again that the deflationary view, as I
understand it, need not have revisionary consequences for scientific practice, and
certainly does not amount to an injunction that physics abandon standard defi-
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nitions of SSB and cease their appeals to infinite systems.32 There are instructive
parallels here with Callender and Menon’s (2013) discussion of extensive quanti-
ties in statistical mechanics. Roughly speaking, a quantity is said to be extensive
if it behaves additively when the system is divided into sub-systems. Strictly
speaking, no quantity satisfies this definition when the system is finite; bound-
ary effects spoil the additivity of quantities like the entropy and the distinction
between extensive and intensive quantities only really applies in the thermody-
namic limit. But, though the notion of extensivity does not carve nature at its
joints, as it were, there is clearly a sense in which it is epistemically beneficial to
treat entropy and other observables as extensive in situations in which boundary
effects are negligible. Similarly, if the approaches to SSB in finite systems put
forward here is borne out it will justify the contemporary practice of statistical
mechanics, not undermine it.
How do these ways of thinking about SSB in finite systems translate into the
QFT context? A great deal more work is needed to answer this question with
any precision but I will make some suggestive remarks here. The kind of rigor-
ous demonstration of the vanishing of the energy gap between ground and first
excited states with increasing volume provided by Landsman (2013) and Koma
and Tasaki (1994) are typically not forthcoming in the case of interesting lattice
QFT models. Nevertheless, numerical simulations do seem to bear out the ex-
pectation that large lattices exhibit very long lived symmetry breaking states—in
many cases we can directly see the appearance of this kind of behaviour in the
numerical data. It is possible that SSB phenomena in high energy physics can be
understood as long lived but ultimately unstable along the same lines I sketched
for the ferromagnet. This is not as radical a suggestion as it might initially seem.
In fact, the possibility that the standard model ‘vacuum’ is not genuinely sta-
tionary and will eventually tunnel to some other minimum in the potential has
long been a live, and much discussed, possibility in high energy physics.33
As for Landsman’s instability approach, there appear to be close connections with
the method of studying SSB in finite lattice QFTs briefly mentioned in §6.2.2,
in which symmetry breaking perturbations are added to the Lagrangian of finite
lattice QFT systems and removed as the volume is increased. Exploring the
formal relations between Landsman’s formalism and this approach to modelling
SSB may also illuminate the question of the existence of a vanishing energy gap.
32It is important to distinguish the kind of deflationary programme advocated here from at-
tempts to offer a new definition of a phase transition in terms of the resources of finite
systems, surveyed in Callender and Menon (2013). I take the deflationary reading of the
thermodynamic limit to be a claim about why infinite systems, and definitions which appeal
to them, are successful in statistical mechanics. Whether an alternative definition of SSB of
any practical use can be provided which only refers to finite systems is another question in
my view.
33See Bednyakov et al (2015) for an up to date discussion of this scenario.
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There is also potential for the physical picture underlying Landsman’s approach
to have currency in the high energy physics context. In the case of spontaneously
broken chiral symmetry, there really are asymmetric perturbations in full QCD
in the form of non-zero quark masses, for instance. On the other hand, the gauge
symmetries of the standard model are supposed to be exact. How all of this bears
on the Higgs mechanism and the embattled notion of spontaneously broken gauge
symmetry I do not dare speculate.
6.5 An Epistemic Role for the Limit of Infinite Degrees of
Freedom
I certainly do not claim to have refuted the indispensablist view of the limit
of infinite degrees of freedom in this chapter. As I flagged at the outset, novel
features of infinite systems play an important role in many theoretical contexts
which have not been considered here. A particularly glaring omission is the
role of infinite systems in the renormalisation group framework, and especially
in renormalisation group explanations of the universality of critical exponents
in second order phase transitions. Batterman has long taken this case to be
the key motivation for his claims about the explanatory indispensability of the
thermodynamic limit.34 Furthermore, the approach to SSB in finite systems put
forward in the previous section is more of a research programme than a stable
theoretical picture. In the statistical mechanics case, it is ultimately a conjecture
that the key statements about large finite models can be generalised to the full
range of systems to which the standard account of SSB is applied, and many of
the details about how SSB behaviour manifests in concrete systems are open to
further investigation. More importantly for the overarching dialectic of this thesis,
many questions about SSB in the QFT programme remain unanswered.
With these caveats in mind however, I have at least developed a strategy for
replying to the objection we started out with. The problem, remember, was that
if novel properties afforded by the limit of infinite degrees of freedom need to be
taken to faithfully represent in order to fulfil the explanatory duties of the QFT
programme then the claim that doubly cutoff QFT systems are representationally
adequate on the basis of present evidence will be undercut. The proceeding
discussion takes much of the bite out of this critique. The idea that SSB behaviour
cannot occur at all in finite quantum systems has turned out to be bogus and we
34Callender and Menon (2013) sketch a deflationist treatment of the thermodynamic limit in
this case which again avoids the conclusion that the novel properties afforded by this limit
should be taken to be physically real. I am sympathetic to their approach but there remains a
great deal to be said about the status of idealisations in renormalisation group explanations.
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have seen that there are prima facie viable ways of accounting for the success of
the limit of infinite degrees of freedom in models of SSB in terms of the properties
of finite systems. While it is possible that further investigation of the nature of
SSB phenomena in high energy physics, and their representation in the QFT,
will vindicate the indispensablist claim, once a prima facie viable programme for
deflating the representational role of the limit of infinite degrees of is on the table
the onus seems to be on the critics of cutoff QFT models to make this case.
I close with some clarificatory remarks about how denying the representational
indispensability of the limit of infinite degrees of freedom should be understood
in the QFT context. In statistical mechanics we (arguably!) have good reason
to believe that the concrete systems we are trying to describe really do have a
finite number of degrees of freedom. In this case then, the deflationist might
legitimately claim that the symmetry breaking states exhibited by these systems
are not truly stationary and/or are produced by otherwise negligible symmetry
breaking effects. As I pointed out however, the representational status of the
limit of infinite degrees of freedom in the QFT context is unknown. The claim is
not that the universe actually has a finite number of degrees of freedom and SSB
phenomena in high energy physics are ontologically on a par with what happens in
a ferromagnet then. Rather, in this case the point is an epistemic one: we simply
aren’t in a position to know whether SSB phenomena in high energy physics
are produced by the existence of degenerate ground states or one of the weaker
characterisations of symmetry breaking behaviour furnished by finite systems.
I am not claiming that unitarily inequivalent representations are categorically
unphysical then, merely that everything we have licensed to believe on the basis
of present evidence can be expressed within a single Hilbert space.
This does not rule out the possibility that the limit of infinite degrees of freedom
plays a crucial epistemic role in the QFT programme however. Defenders of a
deflationary view of the thermodynamic limit in statistical mechanics, such as
Butterfield (2011, 1073), are generally happy to admit that it is “epistemically
indispensable”, in the sense that it facilitates derivations of the properties of
large finite systems which would be difficult, or perhaps even strictly impossible,
without it. It may be that we can say something similar about to the limit of
infinite degrees of freedom in the QFT context. It is plausible (if speculative) that
bringing the infrared behaviour of models like QCD under mathematical control,
and obtaining a proper understanding of the elusive phenomenon of confinement,
will essentially involve the limit of infinite volume, for instance. Though novel
properties afforded by the limit of infinite degrees of freedom do not faithfully
represent on my view, they can still play a role in articulating the belief worthy
content of QFT models then. Applying this moral in the context of foundational
study raises points to another place where Fraser’s and Wallace’s views of the
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QFT programme can be brought closer together. We can maintain the view of
QFTs as coarse-grained representations I have been defending in this thesis while
allowing that the axiomatic approach to QFT provides a convenient, perhaps
essential, framework for deriving foundationally important results about QFT
systems. As with the thermodynamic limit however, if we are going to trust
results obtained in this framework to describe the actual world we need to be
sure that they apply, at least in some approximate sense, to cutoff QFT systems
as well.
Suppose that, in light of further work on these issues, it turns out that we re-
ally do need to take novel properties afforded by the limit of infinite degrees of
freedom to be physically real in order to meet the explanatory ambitions of high
energy physics. Where will this leave us with respect to the perspective on QFT
elaborated in this thesis? It may not be a death blow for realism about cutoff
QFT models. There is still the possibility of going back to Wallace’s original
response to the challenge and advocate a realistic reading of the infinite volume
limit while maintaining a different stance towards the ultraviolet cutoff. We could
then simply accept Ruetsche’s thesis that unitarily inequivalent representations
play a thick, ontologically involved, role in explanations in high energy physics.
As I mentioned in §6.1, Ruetsche claims that the way that unitarily inequivalent
representations feature in explanations leads to a complications with spelling out
the semantic content of infinite quantum systems which are inimical to scientific
realism. Still, it is possible that these arguments can be countered in other ways
from the strategy pursued in this chapter, or that some form of scientific realism
can be defended while accepting Ruetsche’s coalescence approach to the semantics
of QFT.35 I leave these possibilities as avenues for future investigation.
35See French (2012) for suggestions along these lines.
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Chapter 7
A Realist View of Quantum Field
Theory
7.1 The View from the General Philosophy of Science
The past two chapters addressed objections to taking cutoff QFT models seri-
ously which were grounded in theory specific concerns. In this chapter I turn
towards broader issues in the philosophy of science, and especially the scientific
realism debate, which bear on our assessment of cutoff QFT models and the QFT
programme in general.
A number of new challenges arise in this context. In chapter 4 I suggested that
the view of cutoff QFT models which emerged from my examination of the renor-
malisation group approach constitutes a realist stance towards these theories.
There might seem to be a tension here however: scientific realism is naively un-
derstood as the doctrine that our best theories tell us what reality is really like,
but I claimed that we have good reason to take cutoff QFTs to misrepresent
the small scale structure of the world. Indeed, many philosophers of physics see
cutoff QFT models as being inimical to a realist view of science. Butterfield
and Bouatta (2014) claim that imposing a high momentum cutoff amounts to
taking an “opportunistic or instrumentalist attitude to quantum field theories”
and suggest that a genuinely realist view is only viable for QFT models that ad-
mit continuum formulations.1 Similar sentiments about the pragmatic character
of cutoff models can be found dotted throughout the philosophical literature on
1According to Butterfield and Bouatta, it seems, we ought to take a selective attitude to
QFT models, reserving realist commitments for theories which have ultraviolet fixed points,
like QCD, and eschewing those that apparently don’t, like QED, on the grounds that only
the former admit continuum formulations (as we’ve seen, the question of whether continuum
models exist is somewhat more complex than this). This view is put forward most explicitly
in Butterfield and Bouatta (2012).
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QFT—see, for instance, Huggett and Weingard (1995), Fraser (2009, 2011) and
Crowther (2013). One challenge facing advocates of the physical significance of
cutoff QFTs then is the apparent need to reconcile this stance with widely held
intuitions about what realism about fundamental physics amounts to.
Another issue with roots in the scientific realism debate is the existence of a
putative underdetermination problem within the QFT programme. We already
discussed Doreen Fraser’s claims about underdetermination between cutoff and
continuum QFTs in our discussion of relativity in QFT in §5.3, but there are
also more general issues raised by Fraser discussion in the context of the broader
realism debate. According to her the underdetermination we find in the QFT
programme, which is in fact aggravated by renormalisation group results, un-
dermines any kind of no-miracles argument for taking cutoff QFT models to be
approximately true and instead motivates an anti-realist view of these theories
according to which they merely capture the empirical content of QFT (Fraser,
2011). Again, zooming out to consider broader issues in the philosophy of science
yields new ammunition for opponents of the analysis of the QFT programme I
have been expounding.
This chapter turns this assessment of the view from the general philosophy of sci-
ence on its head. Not only does the view of QFT developed in previous chapters
fit well with recent developments in the realism debate in my view, it even helps
address some of the challenges facing contemporary formulations of realism. §7.2
surveys the persistent difficulties associated with formulating a viable version of
scientific realism. I express sympathy with a recent trend in the realism debate
which seeks to solve these problems on a local, theory-by-theory, basis. One
worry with this approach, however, is that it leads to a very weak form of realism
about our current most fundamental theories. In §7.3 I argue that the renormal-
isation group framework helps address this concern in the context of the QFT
programme by providing grounds for identifying which features of current QFT
models faithfully represent without making guesses about the details of future
physical theories. With this machinery in hand, §7.4 addresses Fraser’s claims
about underdetermination in the QFT programme. I claim that the kind of
underdetermination that exists between different QFT models actually supports
my claims about the coarse-grained representational success of QFT models. I
conclude, in §7.5, by clarifying a potentially worrying feature of the view which
emerges from this discussion; QFT does not tell us how the world is at the fun-
damental level. While this leads to important issues for further discussion about
the QFT programme, I claim that it does not undermine the realist credentials
of the view put forward here.2
2The ideas put forward in this chapter bears a strong affinity to a recent approach to realism
about QFTs developed independently by Porter Williams (Williams, 2016). I am grateful to
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7.2 Formulating Scientific Realism
Many philosophers of science, and philosophers of physics in particular, take a
broadly realist view of science. Despite the popularity of scientific realism how-
ever, pinning down what the position actually amounts to continues to be a
matter of considerable controversy. Indeed, many of the most fierce disputes
in the epistemology of science in recent years have been between those defend-
ing different conceptions of realism rather than between realists and anti-realists
(though anti-realist concerns continue to play an important role in the dialectic,
of course, as different versions of realism respond to them in different ways). This
section discusses the overarching structure of this debate and puts forward my
own take on the problem of formulating scientific realism.
We can think of the basic problem here as a dilemma triggered by the untenability
of a naive statement of the realist position. On this reading, scientific realism is
simply the claim that our best confirmed scientific theories are true. Adopting
the orthodox view of the semantic content of theories embodied in the standard
account, this means that to be realist about a theory is to place the actual world
among those which are possible according to the theory.
It quickly becomes obvious that construed in this way realism is a highly implau-
sible doctrine. One often cited reason for doubting that even our best scientific
theories are true simpliciter is the challenge posed by the historical record. Lau-
dan’s (1981) famous pessimistic meta-induction trades on the fact that many
defunct theories were successful in their day but turned out to be false, and while
realists have resisted the claim that this necessarily leads to anti-realism they
have typically admitted that the history of science gives us grounds to doubt
that current scientific theories are right in all their details. Less discussed in
the traditional realism debate, but equally important for our purposes, are the
various indication within contemporary science itself, and theoretical physics in
particular, that our present theories are strictly false. Most dramatically, our
most fundamental physical theories, QFT and general relativity, furnish mutu-
ally inconsistent pictures of reality and there are a complex array of theoretical
arguments which suggest that neither can completely characterise gravitational
phenomena.3 There are also internal issues within both of these frameworks that
physicists take to point to their incompleteness: the naturalness problem with
the standard model and the issue of space-time singularities in general relativity
Porter for sharing this work with me.
3Overviews of the conflict between QFT and general relativity can be found in Callender and
Hugget (2001, 1-33) and Butterfield and Isham (2001)—I will have more to say about this
issue and the search for a theory of quantum gravity in §7.5.
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being two prominent examples.4 Whatever one thinks about the debate surround-
ing the formulation of QFT then, being a realist about this theory clearly cannot
simply mean taking it to exactly describe reality.
If this naive formulation is no good what should the would-be realist replace
it with? What seems to be needed is an epistemic attitude towards suitably
successful theories which is stronger than anti-realism, in that it takes them to
latch onto unobservable features of the world in one way or another, but weaker
than accepting their content wholesale. The obvious suggestion is that the realist
should take suitably successful scientific theories to be approximately true, and
this has indeed become the standard way of outlining the realist position in its
broad brush strokes.5 Ultimately though this answer only postpones the problem,
as the notion of approximate truth is notoriously nebulous. If the realist position
is to have any substance it seems reasonably to expect a more precise account of
the way that scientific theories are purported to relate to the world.
One response to this challenge has been to attempt to formalise the notion of
approximate truth, and in particular the idea that the truthlikeness or verisimil-
itude of a scientific theory is a matter of degree. Starting with Popper’s (1972)
famously flawed account of verisimilitude however, this project has been beset
with technical difficulties and no approach has achieved anything like widespread
acceptance. The best developed framework that have been put forward in this
literature proceeds by defining a metric on the space of possible worlds (Oddie,
1986; Niiniluoto, 1987). Adopting a possible world semantics for scientific the-
ories we can then give a precise, and in principle quantitative, meaning to the
verisimilitude of a theory in terms of the closeness of its possible worlds to actu-
ality. As might be expected however, there are many ways to set up this kind of
framework, and the details quickly become contentious. One apparently worrying
feature of the accounts which have been put forward along these lines is that this
formal notion of approximate truth ends up being a language dependent one—the
same theory formulated in different formal languages will, in general, be assigned
different degrees of verisimilitude (Miller, 1976).6
4Another issue which pushes against the naive formulation of realism is the ubiquity of ideali-
sation in scientific theorising. I will not discuss this point in depth here, except to say that I
think that an important lesson of my analysis of the QFT programme is that realists need to
take this aspect of scientific practice seriously, even in the context of fundamental physics.
5Though this is the basic conception of realism which most contemporary defenders of the
doctrine take as a starting point it is not the only possible response to the failure of the naive
formulation. Van Fraassen tends to characterise realism as a thesis about the basic aim of
science, namely that it seeks truth, which is compatible with admitting that current theories
do not meet this standard. I will have more to say about this axiological reading of realism in
§7.5.
6Some proponents of the truthlikeness approach claim that the language dependence of these
definitions is not a disaster and is in fact consistent with our pre-theoretic intuitions about
approximate truth— see Niiniluoto (1999) and Psillos (1999) for contrasting perspectives.
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Beside these internal issues with the verisimilitude programme however there is
a more fundamental problem with using this kind of definition of approximate
truth as the basis of a formulation of scientific realism. Notice that this approach
to approximate truth is similar in spirit, if not in all its details, to Belot’s (1998)
approach to theory-world relations which I criticised in §2.3. The idea there
was that we should broaden the methodological framework of the philosophy of
physics by adding judgements about the relative closeness to actuality of possible
worlds produced by different semantic interpretations of a theory. My basic worry
with the vermisimilitude programme, as I understand it, is the same objection
I raised against Belot’s proposal. On the possible world approach we have been
discussing verisimilitude is a property of the entire content of a theory. But, as I
have been urging throughout this thesis, our understanding of particular scientific
theories invariably involves more fine grained judgements about which parts of
its content get things right. To return to an example I used in chapter 2, there is
a detailed story to tell about which aspects of Newtonian gravitational theory are
preserved in models of general relativity which should inform the attitude that
the realist ought to take to this theory. The claim that Newtonian gravity worlds
are close to ours, or indeed that the theory can be assigned a verisimilitude of, say
2/3, does not capture this complexity. A viable formulation of scientific realism,
I suggest, needs to accommodate the partial nature of a theory’s representational
success, and extant formal approaches to verisimilitude do not seem to be up to
the task.
In fact, this point seems to have been widely accepted by recent advocates of sci-
entific realism. The orthodox realist response to the pessimistic meta-induction,
in schematic terms, has been to claim that some aspects of successful scientific
theories are preserved through theory change and this is what underlies their
empirical success—this, in a nutshell, is the “divide et impera” move briefly men-
tioned in chapter 2. For this and other reasons, the idea that the realist should
take a selective view of successful scientific theories, accepting some parts of their
content while eschewing others, has become the dominant way of thinking about
how the position should be stated. On this general approach to the formula-
tion problem, the challenge to say something more precise about the sense that
scientific theories are taken to approximately true is answered, at least in part,
by identifying a subset of their claims about the unobservable which hit their
mark—call formulations which fit this mold selective realisms. Accepting this
much, the question is how do we identify the parts of a scientific theory which
the realist should commit themselves to? This issue has been the focus of much
debate over the past few decades, with myriad selective formulations of realism
being put forward and defended against their rivals in the literature. Behind
these disagreements over how the selective strategy should be developed in its
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details however, one can often detect an underlying assumption about the form
that an acceptable account should take which has led defenders of realism astray
in my view. It has typically been thought that what is needed here is a completely
general characterisation of the belief worthy content of scientific theories which
applies to all suitably successful theories—call formulations of this type global
selective realisms.7
One brand of realism which has sometimes been understood in these terms is
structural realism, and in particular Worrall’s (1989) epistemic version of this
doctrine. This formulation of realism was originally motivated by considerations
of revolutionary theory change in physics, the key observation being that, while
theoretical entites are often dropped in these episodes, structural continuities in-
variably exist between earlier theories and their successors. The transition from
Newtonian gravity to general relativity seems to fit this account in its broad
outline; the gravitational field is not retained in relativistic gravity theory, but
mathematical connections exist between Newtonian and relativistic models which
transcend their shared empirical content. Worrall, and others, take these cases to
have wide-reaching implications for the kind of attitude which we ought to take
towards scientific theories, the basic claim being that it is the ‘structure’ of a the-
ory, or its structural claims, which should to be the locus of realist commitment.8
But what is structure exactly? And here lies the rub, for if structuralism is un-
derstood as a global form of selective realism then what is presumably needed
here is a definition of structure that captures what is preserved in all instances of
theory change. Attempts to provide a precise characterisation of the structural
content of a theory, using resources like Ramsey sentences, have arguably failed
to lived up to this lofty ambition.
Much the same can be said of other formulations of realism which are global in
spirit: no general recipe for demarcating the belief worthy content of successful
theories have achieved anything close to general acceptance. One might conclude
from this that the task is a difficult one and more work is needed to find the right
version of global selective realism. In my view, however, seeking such a thing in
the first place was a mistake. It is not just that theory-world relations are partial
in nature, they are also local, in the sense that the kind of representational suc-
cess which can reasonably be ascribed to a theory is sensative to the peculiarities
of its structure, the surrounding scientific context, and perhaps even the specific
7Saatsi (2015) calls this idea “recipe realism” and my criticisms of this approach to the formu-
lation problem follow his lead.
8Note that even putting aside the question of how to define ‘structure’ this strategy does not,
in itself, solve the problem of characterising the sense in which our theories are supposed
to be approximately true. Structuralist still talk about the structure of superseded theories
being ‘approximately retained’ in their successors and there remains a challenge with making
this precise (Saatsi, 2009, 256). The most developed framework which structural realists have
appealed to here is da Costa and French’s (2003) account of partial truth.
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kind of evidential support it enjoys. One motivation for this view is simply the
evident diversity of the sciences. Prima facie, scientific theories relate to the world
in multifarious ways. As I mentioned, Worrall’s version of structural realism is
based on observations about particular instances of theory change in physics, but
it is far from obvious that any lessons drawn in this context should carry over
to theories in chemistry, biology and the social sciences. Physics alone provides
plenty of grounds to be pessimistic about the idea that the representational status
of successful theories can stated in a unified way. Can the complex stories about
what is preserved in the transition from Newtonian gravity to general relativity
and, say, thermodynamics to statistical mechanics, both be captured by a single
definition of ‘structure’, or, for that matter, any general schema?9 The founda-
tional work which has gone into clarifying the relevant intertheoretic relations in
each of these cases is highly theory specific in nature, and in my view the study
of these details ought to inform the kind of representational success the realist
attributes to these theories.
A more fundamental point which cuts against a global formulation of the realist’s
epistemic commitments comes from reconsidering the explanationist intuitions
which typically motivate a realist stance towards science in the first place. The
no-miracles argument is sometimes understood as an inference about science as a
whole, which might seem to favour a global conception of realism; the rough idea
being that, in order to explain the collective empirical successes of mature science
(or the scientific method) we need to take it to be a reliable guide to the truth.10
Whatever one thinks about this global formulation of the argument however, the
same kind of explanationist considerations are typically also taken to have force
at the level of particular scientific theories. We can ask, for instance, why it is
that Newtonian gravity is empirically adequate in the domain that it is, and a
philosopher with realist intuitions will want an answer which turns on how the
theory latches onto the world. It is far from clear, however, that maximally gen-
eral characterisations of the approximate truth of scientific theories, along either
the formal or global selectivist lines I have just sketched, actually furnishes expla-
nations of why particular theories are successful. In what sense does the fact that
Newtonian gravity has a verimisilitude of 2/3, or gets the structure of the world
right, where this is explicated in schematic terms, explain its success? Surely the
relevant explanation of why Newtonian gravity is successful turns on which spe-
cific features of the world the theory gets right and how this underlies the specific
predictive successes which can be obtained from the theory. The explanationist
9This is not to say that what is preserved in each case is not ‘structural’ if this term is construed
sufficiently broadly.
10Boyd (1985) and Psillos (1999) are well known defences of global formulations of the no-
miracles argument. Frost-Arnold (2010) and Fitzpatrick (2013) are recent critiques of this
sort of defence of realism.
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defence of realism then arguably leads us away from a global statement of the
doctrine and towards the details of particular theories.
Where does this leave us with respect to the issue we started out with: the ques-
tion of what the realist should say about the sense in which they take successful
scientific theories to be approximately true. The moral of the discussion so far,
I think, is that this challenge cannot be answered in one fell swoop. Accepting
a broadly selective approach to the formulation problem, my suggestion is that,
instead of making a blanket claim about which aspects of our theories get things
right, the realist should address the question of which parts of their content faith-
fully represent on a theory-by-theory basis. The idea that the approximate truth
of particular scientific theories should be spelled out in local terms has recently
been advocated by Barrett (2008) and Saatsi (2016b). On this view, the question
of which parts of Newtonian gravity get things right should be addressed via a
close study of the theory itself, and its surrounding theoretical context. In partic-
ular, Barrett and Saatsi suggest that it is largely the theory specific story about
how Newtonian gravity’s content is embedded within general relativity which
guides the kind of representational success that should assigned to the theory.
Since general relativity is also strictly false this cannot be the whole story about
how Newtonian gravity theory relates to the world, but it does at least constitute
a precisification of the sense in which it latches onto the unobservable, and this
is arguably the best we can hope to do in our present epistemic situation. The
claim would be that the approximate truth of other scientific theories should be
fleshed out along similarly local lines.
Combining this approach to theory-world relations with the core no-miracles in-
tuition yields the following statement of the realist’s position: scientific theories
are empirically successful (at least for the most part) because of the way they
latch onto unobservable aspects of the world, but which aspects of their con-
tent gets things right, and how this furnishes an explanation of their empirical
accuracy, is a matter to be thrashed out in the context of particular scientific
theories—call this formulation local selective realism. Thus construed realism is
still a general attitude towards the whole of science, but the detailed truth claims
which it engenders are cashed out in piecemeal terms. What makes a realist a
realist on this view is not a global claim about what scientific theories get right,
but rather a commitment to a global explanatory thesis about why the mature
sciences are empirically successful—this marks an important difference between
scientific realism and other sorts of philosophical realism, like moral realism and
realism about universals.11
11This formulation of realism is consonant with a growing tendency to construe and defend
realism in more local terms in recent years. Some papers which advocate a local approach
to the realist debate, for a variety of different reasons, are Magnus and Callender (2004),
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Fleshing out and defending this formulation of scientific realism in detail is not my
project here, but I will touch on two potential objections by way of clarification
(the second issue in particular will be discussed further in the next section when
I return to the case of QFT). One worry is that going local in this way leaves the
philosopher of science with nothing to do. If questions about the approximate
truth of scientific theories are answered by the relevant science won’t we sim-
ply be reciting first-order scientific evidence and arguments? Construed locally
realism might seem to collapse into a something close to the philosophical qui-
etism of Fine’s natural ontological attitude (Fine, 1986). This worry is misplaced
however. For one thing, the core thesis that a scientific theory’s representational
success explains its empirical success is clearly a second-order, and distinctively
philosophical, claim about science, which needs to be defended against anti-realist
concerns.12 Moreover, the local realist stance instigates philosophical engagement
with the relevant science. Making a theory’s representational status precise will
involve bringing general philosophical approaches to representation and explana-
tion to bear on the theory, as well as considering how anti-realist challenges play
out in its local context. The localist does not deny the relevance of the general
philosophical issues discussed in the traditional realism debate then; the claim is
simply that theory specific factors also play an important role in spelling out the
realist’s epistemic commitments.
A perhaps more troubling objection however, is that this formulation of realism
ends up being too weak. Without a systematic account of the parts of our theories
which accurately represent there is a worry that we end up with, at best, a very
attenuated realist stance towards our current best science. Take a theory like
general relativity, for instance. Realists of all stripes will want to say that the
theory is latching onto the world in a way which accounts for its impressive
empirical success, but which aspects of the theory should we take to be getting
things right in this case? A global selective realist will have an answer here; the
global structuralist can say they believe in the structural claims of the theory,
whatever this is taken to mean exactly. But what can the local selective realist,
who eschews this kind of formulaic response, say? The cases which Barret (2008)
and Saatsi (2016b) point to as exemplars for the way that the approximate truth
of theories can be cashed out locally invariably turn on their embedding within
more fundamental theories. Consequently, realism about our current best theories
might seem to end up amounting to little more than a promissory note: the local
selective realist claims that general relativity latches onto reality in a way which
explains its success, but exactly how we cannot yet say. Just as Newton had
no idea which parts of his theory of gravity would be preserved in contemporary
Fitzpatrick (2013), Ruetsche (2014), Saatsi (2009, 2015), and Asay (2016).
12See Saatsi (2015, 12) for more on this point.
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gravitational physics, we seem to be in a similar epistemic situation with respect
to current fundamental physics.
This kind of worry is the essence of Stanford’s (2003, 2006) so-called “trust argu-
ment”. According to Stanford the central problem facing the realist is the need
to tell us what current theories get right about the world now, and not merely in
retrospect. I suspect that the perceived need to respond to this challenge is one
reason why defenders of realism have sought to generalise from a few instances
of theory change to a global claim about what is preserved in all instances of
theory change. An alternative reaction to this line of attack however is to simply
refuse the bait, and deny that the realist needs to state their epistemic commit-
ments prospectively. After all, the claim about general relativity above, though
schematic, seems to be a prima facie viable epistemic stance towards the theory
that clearly goes beyond what the anti-realist would say—they would, of course,
remain entirely agnostic about general relativity’s claims about the unobservable
and the deny the need for any kind of explanation of its empirical success. Saatsi
(2016b) simply bites the bullet here and calls the resulting version of realism
“minimal realism” in recognition of the fact that some intuitions about what a
realist attitude towards current scientific theories amounts to are not necessarily
borne out by this approach. While I think this response is perfectly defensi-
ble, I will suggest in the next section that the statement of the problem itself
is somewhat overblown. In the case of at least some fundamental physical the-
ories, we can make progress in identifying which parts of the theory faithfully
represent without appealing to any global recipes or making guesses about future
physics—my analysis of the QFT programme is the proof.
7.3 The Renormalisation Group as a Weapon for the
Realist
I now return to the case of QFT and consider how the ideas put forward in
previous chapters fit into the broader dialectic just outlined. My claim will be
that the view of QFT I have been elaborating is a genuinely realist one—contra
Butterfield and Bouatta, taking cutoff QFT models representationally seriously
actually fits well with orthodox ideas about how realism should be characterised.
But I will also suggest that my analysis of the QFT programme provides an
instructive case study for the local selective formulation of realism. The role that
the renormalisation group plays in identifying which features of QFT models
ought to be taken to successfully represent exemplifies how resources found in
a particular theoretical context can be crucial in articulating the relationship a
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scientific theory bears to the world. Furthermore, it demonstrates that, in at
least some cases, we can make progress in precisfying the kind of approximate
truth which can be attributed to our most fundamental theories in localist terms.
The worries raised in the previous section were premature then; giving up on
the ambition of a global characterisations of the realists commitments does not
necessarily result in a problematically weak epistemic stance towards the forefront
of science.
From a general philosophy of science perspective, the central claims of the last
four chapters can be seen as flowing from an application of the no-miracles in-
tuition to the case of QFT. How do we account for the spectacular predictive
successes of the QFT programme? I suggested in chapter 3 that this explana-
tory challenge is especially pressing in this case because standard perturbative
calculations, which are the most important source of empirical results in particle
physics phenomenology, are prima facie difficult to make sense of in either realist
or anti-realist terms. I argued in chapter 4 however that we can, in fact, provide
a physical explanation of their success. In brief, the claim was that renormalised
perturbative approximations work because many of the properties of QFT mod-
els are insensitive to the precise values of the cutoffs imposed at large and small
momentum, a fact which is most systematically revealed by the renormalisation
group analysis of these systems. One upshot of this account is that the empiri-
cal success of perturbation theory accrue to cutoff models, and non-perturbative
numerical simulations, which constitute the other key source of successful empir-
ical predictions in contemporary particle physics phenomenology, are also more
directly attributable to these systems. This does not mean that we should accept
the content of cutoff QFT models wholesale however because only some aspects
of these systems really contribute to the relevant predictive successes. In par-
ticular, I argued that the long and short distance structure of QFT models is
irrelevant to the empirical results we are trying to account for. Modulo worries
about the details of this account discussed in chapters 5 and 6, the upshot is
that to account for the extant predictive successes of the QFT programme, we
need to take suitably coarse-grained properties of QFT models to latch onto the
world, while many of their short and long scale features should be viewed as
idealisations.
Looking back at the discussion of the previous section we see that this actually
fits nicely with mainstream ideas about what a realist stance towards a scientific
theory should look like. Putting aside the issue of global vs local construals
of realism for the moment, we saw that most contemporary scientific realists
defend a selective version of the doctrine, according to which being a realist
about a theory means taking some, but not all, of its content to latch onto reality.
This is exactly the kind of stance I have advocated taking towards empirically
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successful cutoff QFT models: some of their properties, namely those associated
with length/momentum scales far away from the cutoffs are taken to faithfully
represent while other aspects of its content are not. In particular, the claim that
cutoff QFT models misrepresent the small scale structure of the world is not in
conflict with a selective formulation of realism. After all, theories like Newtonian
gravity and ordinary non-relativistic quantum mechanics certainly get this wrong
too, yet I take it most contemporary realists would claim that these theories are
approximately true, and do get something right about the way the physical world
is despite their representational inaccuracies.
Furthermore, this view of QFT differentiates itself from an anti-realist stance
in the two most important respects. First, it makes substantive epistemic com-
mitments to unobservable aspects of reality. Anti-realist of all stripes disavow
the claims that scientific theories make about unobservables. The constructive
empiricist, for instance, remains agnostic about all a theory’s content save its
claims about observable matters, where an entity or property posited by a theory
is said to be observable, roughly speaking, if it is a possible object of unmediated
perception by human agents. As I stressed in chapter 4 however, my claim that
QFT models get coarse-grained features of the world right should not be confused
with the claim that it gets observable features of the world right. On my account,
it is the correlation functions of a QFT model over relatively long length scales
which we ought to take representationally seriously, and these quantities are not
observable in this sense, or directly measured in collider experiments. The second
feature of my account which distinguishes it from an anti-realist position is that
it is based on an explanation of the success of the empirical predictions of the
QFT programme in terms of the way the world is. The anti-realist, by contrast,
takes the empirical success of a theory to be something primitive which does not
stand in need of explanation (or at least not that kind of explanation).
In fact, I think that the best way to understand the account of the representational
success of QFT models I have put forward is in terms of the local formulation
of scientific realism I endorsed in the previous section. The key idea with this
approach, remember, was that, instead of trying to give a completely general
characterisation of the sense in which empirically successful scientific theories are
approximately true, the realist should allow that the representational status that
can reasonably be attributed to a theory is sensitive to theory specific factors.
On the picture I have been sketching here, the renormalisation group framework
plays a particularly important role in articulating the kind of representational
success which can reasonably be attributed to QFT models. One way that the
renormalisation group helps to articulate the approximate truth of cutoff QFT
models is by identifying features of these theories which should not be taken to
accurately describe reality. In general, the renormalisation group teaches us that
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we should not trust the claims that current QFT models make about very short
length scale physics, but renormalisation group methods also allow us to identify
more specific defects, produced by a particular implementation of the ultraviolet
cutoff which should not be taken physically seriously. Chapter 5’s discussion
of Poincare symmetry in cutoff systems can be seen as a detailed case study
of this point: we saw that the renormalisation group allows us to systematically
identify the Poincare violating contributions to physical quantities induced by the
ultraviolet cutoff which we have no reason to believe accurately represent.13
But as well as clarifying the relationship cutoff QFT models bear to reality in
this negative sense, the renormalisation group arguably also gives us grounds
to be confident in some aspects of empirically successful QFT models. I have
thus far presented this point in explanationist terms: I claimed, for instance,
that correlation functions over relatively coarse-grained length scales are modally
connected to empirically observed scattering cross sections in the appropriate
way, and consequently need to be taken representational seriously. But we can
also think about how the renormalisation group helps the realist here from the
perspective of theory change and intertheoretic relations.14 We know that the
standard model of particle physics is not an exact description of the world at all
energy scales, and we do not really know what lies at higher energies or even at
what energy new physics might kick in beyond the energies which have so far
been probed at the LHC. Still, in demonstrating that the large scale properties
of a QFT model are insensitive to the high energy dynamics, the renormalisation
group is also telling us that these properties are essentially independent of the
details of future physical theories which describe the dynamics of currently inac-
cessible high energy degrees of freedom. Thus the renormalisation group gives us
a way of identifying properties of our present theories which will be embedded
within future theories, in one way or another.15
As I see it, this is all good news for the local selective formulation of realism.
On the one hand, the role that the renormalisation group plays in explicating
13Williams (2016) gives a similar characterisation of the role of the renormalisation group
in identifying which features of cutoff QFT systems are the appropriate objects of realist
commitment, and examines some other instances of ‘lattice defects’ which are illuminated by
renormalisation group methods, such as the appearance of ‘mirror fermion’ degrees of freedom
when fermionic fields are placed on a lattice.
14We need to be appropriately modest here though. While the renormalisation group helps to
spell out the intertheoretic relations between QFT models at different scales other resources
are also important. The notion of spontaneous symmetry breaking discussed in the previous
chapter also plays an important role in explicating how low energy effective theories emerge
from a more fundamental high energy description, for instance. The claim here is not that
the renormalisation group tells us everything we might want to know about how QFT models
relate to the world, but that it helps.
15The idea that renormalisation theory should be understood as isolating features of our present
theories which are robust under future theory change was advocated in a prescient paper by
Alexander Rueger (1990).
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the relationship that realistic QFT models bear to the world exemplifies the local
realist’s key claim: that resources found in a particular theoretical context can
play an important role in articulating the realist’s epistemic commitments with
respect to a particular theory. While it may be the case that the renormalisation
group, and the ideas I have sketched here, can also help to explicate the sense
in which theories in other branches of physics are approximately true (especially
in condensed matter physics where very similar methods are employed) there is
no claim here that the renormalisation group furnishes anything like a general
approach to theory-world relations. The geometric resources that go into spelling
out how Newtonian gravity theory relates to general relativity, for instance, are
quite different in character from renormalisation group methods, and I suspect
that the sense in which space-time theories like general relativity turn out to
be approximately true will also differ in important respects from the story just
sketched about QFT models.
The discussion also throws new light on the central objection to local selective
realism raised in the previous section. The worry was that, without a general
recipe for identifying the belief worthy content of any scientific theory, the local
realist will only be able to make a highly tentative and provisional claim about
the representational success of our current most fundamental theories. I take my
discussion here to show that this need not be the case. The renormalisation group
framework provides us with resources for identifying which aspects of empirically
successful QFT models get things right without knowing what the quantum grav-
ity programme has in store for us. The upshot seems to be that we are in a better
epistemic situation with respect to the standard model of particle physics than
Newton was with respect to Newtonian gravity. This is, in large part, due to
the wealth of modal information about which features of QFT models can be
varied without affecting their large scale physics provided by the renormalisation
group. Consequently, the renormalisation group framework opens up the pos-
sibility of a more full bodied realist stance towards high energy physics, than
Saatsi’s (2016b) discussion of “minimal realism” would seem to suggest. At least
part of the response to Stanford’s trust argument then is that the demand for a
prospective identification of the features of our theories which will be preserved
through theory change can be met directly in some local scientific contexts.
If I am right, and the renormalisation group, and cutoff QFT models, help to
furnish a realist view of high energy physics, then why have so many philoso-
phers of physics associated them with an anti-realist attitude? The next two
sections offer a diagnosis of this mistake: I first tackle Fraser’s concerns about
underdetermination before turning to a different kind of worry generated by the
fact that, on the view I have been espousing QFT does not provide a complete
or truly fundamental description of reality.
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7.4 Underdetermination in the Quantum Field Theory
Programme
Doreen Fraser’s central argument for advocating an intrumentalist reading of cut-
off QFTs is based on the putative existence of an underdetermination problem
within the QFT programme. As we saw in §5.3, Fraser (2009) claims that the
choice between cutoff and continuum formulations of QFT is underdetermined
by empirical evidence, but argues that the theoretical virtues of the axiomatic
approach to QFT break the underdetermination in favour of continuum mod-
els. I maintained that the argument for this positive claim does not go through,
but whatever one thinks about this issue the presence of an underdetermination
scenario itself might seem to be enough to threaten the realist view of QFT I
have been developing here. Fraser (2011) suggests that the results of renormali-
sation group analysis further amplify this challenge. The renormalisation group
framework shows how theories which are radically different in their short scale
dynamics can nevertheless have very similar large scale behaviour. Consequently,
the empirical success of a QFT model over a limited range of energy scales is
compatible with many distinct theories describing the higher energy degrees of
freedom beyond this domain.
The first step in assessing this objection is to get clear on what the problem is
supposed to be. Prima facie the relationship between cutoff and continuum QFT
models which Fraser points to does not resemble the kind of underdetermination
scenario which has traditionally been focused on in the realism debate. It has
usually been assumed that the really problematic situation for the realist would
be one in which two rival theories are empirically equivalent, in the sense that
they cannot be distinguished by any possible observations. But cutoff and contin-
uum QFT models do not appear to be empirically equivalent. We have seen that,
if a continuum QFT model exists, it will assign values to all observable quantities
which differ from its cutoff counterpart; in many contexts we can estimate the
relevant error as being bound by some power of E/Λ, where Λ is the ultraviolet
cutoff and E is the energy scale at which the relevant correlation functions are
being probed. This means that if the world actually has the structure of a cutoff
QFT model—if space really does become grainy and discrete at some very small
length, say—then this should, in principle, be empirically detectable. As we ap-
proach the physical cutoff scale we will begin to see effects which deviate from
the expected continuum results. What we seem to have then is a case of transient
or weak underdetermination, which has often been thought to be either unprob-
lematic for the realist or reducible to more general philosophical challenges, like
the problem of induction (Ladyman, 2001, 163-167).
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There are two ways that Fraser, or an anti-realist who wants to co-opt her ar-
gument, might shore up their case here however. On the one hand, it might
be pointed out that, while cutoff and continuum models are empirically distin-
guishable given the ability to probe arbitrarily high energies, assuming, as seems
fairly plausible, that there is an in principle limit to the energy scales we can
ever experimentally access we will never be able to tell whether there is a cutoff
beyond this threshold or a continua of high energy degrees of freedom. In this
scenario the cutoff and continuum hypothesis really will be underdetermined by
all possible evidence, at least as far as the QFT programme is concerned. I sus-
pect that it is something along these lines which Fraser has in mind. Another
response is to simply deny that empirical equivalences is a necessary condition to
get a pernicious underdetermination problem going. Stanford (2001, 2006) has
argued that all that is needed is that the choice between two rival theories cannot
be decided by current empirical evidence for the realist to be in trouble.
On either of these precisifications, Fraser’s claim that the renormalisation group
framework exacerbates the situation seems to be apt. From a renormalisation
group perspective the indistinguishability of cutoff and continuum versions of a
QFT models arises because they are drawn to the same region of the space of
possible theories under the action of the renormalisation group transformation.
But this is just one manifestation of the more general decoupling of high and low
energy degrees of freedom captured by this framework. For one thing, different
ways of implementing a high momentum cutoff will also be empirically indis-
cernible in the same way: whether the ultraviolet cutoff is imposed sharply or
smoothly, and the precise value it takes, will not make a detectable difference to
the low energy phenomenology. But we have also seen that theories with different
interactions can exhibit essentially the same low energy behaviour. In particular,
the effects of weak non-renormalisable interactions will invariably become com-
pletely undetectable at sufficiently low energies. As a consequence, there will
be a great number of dynamically distinct QFT models which are empirically
indistinguishable in a limited energy regime. If the kind of underdetermination
revealed by the renormalisation group framework is a problem for the realist it is
a very wide reaching one then, which goes well beyond the indistinguishability of
cutoff and continuum QFT models that Fraser focuses on.
In fact, there is a further puzzle about this particular underdetermination claim
which we discussed already in §5.3: we do not actually have continuum formu-
lations of the empirically successful gauge theories which make up the standard
model. It is this point which Wallace (2011) focuses on in his response to Fraser’s
argument. Wallace apparently concedes that there would be a problem here if
models of the Wightman or Haag-Kastler axioms has been constructed in four di-
mensional Minkowksi space-time but stresses that, as it stands, the cutoff version
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of theories like QED and QCD are the only well defined mathematical systems we
have at our disposal. There simply is no underdetermination scenario between a
cutoff and continuum version of the standard model because, as far as we know,
the latter does not exist.
But Fraser (2011, 133) argues that the fact that continuum formulations of re-
alistic QFTs are in the offing is sufficient to undermine a realist stance towards
the cutoff standard model. This claim is independent of her, I think, less plausi-
ble suggestion that we should take a realist stance towards the constructive field
theory programme in its incomplete state. One way we might make this thought
precise would be suggest that, since constructive field theorists are working to-
wards constructing these continuum theories, and we have at least some idea of
how they will be related to extant cutoff models from successes in lower dimen-
sional space-times, there is contextual evidence that we have not yet exhausted
the space of alternative theories which are supported by the relevant evidence,
along the lines of Stanford’s “unconceivable alternatives” formulation of the un-
derdetermination argument against realism. Whether we find this compelling or
not however, Wallace’s response does not address the more general kind of under-
determination problem which seems to be ushered in by the renormalisation group
framework. While we don’t know whether a continuum version of QED exists it
is straightforward to construct a cutoff model which is empirically indistinguish-
able from cutoff QED at low energies by adding non-renormalisable interactions
to the Lagrangian. Besides the more ethereal underdetermination scenario Fraser
bases her argument on then there are plenty of concrete cases which could also
be used to push against a realist stance towards cutoff formulations of current
QFT models.
There is, I think, a more general reason why the kind of underdetermination
engendered by the renormalisation group is not as troubling for the realist as
it seems however, which, once again, does not hang on the question of whether
continuum formulations of realistic QFT models exist. To motivate the point I
have in mind here it will help to reconsider why (and when) underdetermination
is a problem for the realist in the first place. Roughly speaking, the challenge
is generated by the thought that, if two theories are equally well supported by
empirical evidence then there is no reason to believe one over the other. But
if this situation is to motivate skepticism about all of the claims that a theory
makes about unobservable aspects of reality, as the anti-realist wants, then the
pair of indistinguishable theories must say completely different things about the
world.16 Equally well supported theories become much less troubling for the re-
16This ideal of empirically equivalent theories with completely disjoint content is often realised in
the kind of algorthmic approach to generating underdetermined theories advocated in Kukla
(1996). As Stanford (2001) points out however, this kind of underdetermination scenario
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alist if their content is not disjoint in this sense. On the one hand, this point
is what drives the common realist response when faced with an apparent case
of underdetermination: identify the putative rivals as equivalent formulations of
the same underlying theory.17 If wave and matrix formulations of quantum me-
chanics are just different ways of expressing the same claims about the world,
for instance, there is no dilemma about choosing between them which threatens
realism. Another situation is also possible however; it may be that two indis-
cernible theories are genuinely inequivalent but there is nevertheless a great deal
of overlap in their descriptive content.
Consider a classic example: two Newtonian gravity models TN(0) and TN(v),
formulated on Newtonian space-time, which differ with respect to the absolute
velocity of the universe (van Fraassen, 1980, 44-46). While these two theories
are inequivalent by stipulation, they also share a great deal of content. In fact,
they agree on everything save the absolute velocity of the universe—they assign
the same values to gravitational forces acting on massive bodies, prescribe the
same relative motions between them, and so on. Consequently, it seems perfectly
possible for both TN(0) and TN(v) to be approximately true, which as we have
seen is the only claim that a sane realist wants to make about well confirmed
theories. Even Stanford, a prominent defender of underdetermination challenges
to scientific realism, concedes this point (Stanford, 2001). The natural moral
to draw from this case does not seem to be skepticism about all of Newtonian
gravity’s claims about the world, rather it mitigates against putting stock in the
claims about the absolute velocity of the universe over which these two models
disagree. Underdetermination of theory by evidence is not necessarily a bad
thing for the realist then; it can act as a guide to locating which features of a
model should be taken to faithfully represent. The way that this kind of partial
underdetermination informs the realist’s assessment of a theory’s representational
status is closely related the idea that we should not believe in the parts of a
scientific theory which do not make a difference to its empirical success.
I claim that the underdetermination between QFT models revealed by the renor-
malisation group is like the absolute velocity case in this regard. QFT models
which flow to the same region of the space of possible theories under the action
of the renormalisation group transformation share a great deal of descriptive con-
tent in addition to their empirical predictions. Specifically, they agree about the
values of correlation functions over relatively coarse-grained length scales, which,
as I have stressed, are not directly observable quantities. What the underdetermi-
seems to simply be a restatement of Cartersian skeptical arguments.
17Of course, this strategy brings us back to the problem, discussed in §2.4, about how to char-
acterise theoretical equivalence. See Magnus (2004) for a discussion of how the debate sur-
rounding theoretical equivalence bears on the assessment of underdetermination arguments.
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nation between QFT models described above motivates then is not anti-realism
but rather a selective skepticism about the features which these models disagree
on—namely the very small (and very long) distance structure. But this is exactly
the attitude towards QFT models I have been defending! All this talk about un-
derdetermination is really just another way of stating the core claim of this thesis:
that the small and large scale structure of cutoff QFT models (and continuum
models if they exist) do not contribute to the extant empirical success of the
QFT programme and should not be taken to describe the world. The fact that a
diverse range of currently unconfirmed high energy theories display the same low
energy behaviour as the standard model should bolster our confidence in it as an
accurate description of (relatively) low energy physics, not undermine it.
In sum, the kind of underdetermination we find in the QFT programme has the
opposite moral to the one Fraser wants to draw in my view. It actually supports
the realist reading of cutoff QFTs I have been elaborating.
7.5 Future Physics and Fundamentality
There is, I think, another intuition which drives some philosophers to associate
cutoff QFTs with anti-realism. The unease springs from the fact that, on the
view I have been defending, the successes of the QFT programme only licenses
claims about the world in limited energy regimes and on relatively coarse-grained
length scales: it does not provide us with a complete or truly fundamental picture
of what the world is like. Isn’t this what fundamental physics is supposed to do
however, and isn’t this what the scientific realist is after? It is this feature of the
effective field theory view, I suspect, which leads Butterfield and Boautta (2014)
to describe it as “opportunistic and instrumentalist”.18 Thus stated the problem
is somewhat nebulous however. I will explore two ways of pinning down what
the worry is supposed to be and argue that, while each raises important issues
about the QFT programme that deserve further discussion, neither undermines
the realist credentials of the view I have been defending.
One potential reason for thinking that viewing QFT models as effective theories
is embarrassing for the realist is the perception that this runs counter to the
idea that science is about finding the whole truth about the world. While the
discussion of §7.2 focused on the attitude which the realist takes towards the
current products of scientific theorising, there is another strand of thinking in the
18Another feature of Butterfield and Bouatta’s (2014) discussion which perhaps leads them to
this conclusion is the assumption that cutoff QFTs are purely heuristic and badly defined,
while only continuum QFT models are sufficient rigorous to be called theories in the philoso-
pher’s sense. As I have made clear from the outset I do not agree with this characterisation
of the situation.
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realism debate which focuses on the goals and intended outcomes of the scientific
enterprise. Van Fraassen, in particular, tends to characterise the difference be-
tween the realist and the anti-realist in terms of the fundamental aim of science
rather than its current epistemic achievements: the realist takes it to be true
theories, while the constructive empiricist seeks only empirically adequate ones
(van Fraassen, 1980, 6-7). Imposing a cutoff on the momentum, and taking the
resulting theory to be descriptively accurate in a limited domain, might seem to
amount to giving up on the quest for a theory which exactly describes the world
on all scales. This chimes with Fraser’s complaint that “[r]esting content with the
cutoff variant of QFT because it is empirically adequate at large-distance scales
would be a strategic mistake because it would hinder the search for theory X”
(Fraser, 2009, 563), where “theory X” here refers to a currently unknown theory
which exactly describes the world. The intuition here is that the realist should
not be content with effective theories; they should be striving for this “theory
X”.
As I have argued, however, taking current empirically successful QFT models
to capture salient, but ultimately incomplete, information about the physical
world is on a par with the innocuous claim that Newtonian gravity and non-
relativistic quantum mechanics are approximately true. I have not said that other
theories cannot do a better job, or that we should not seek such theories—taking
cutoff QFTs to provide successful coarse-grained representations of reality does
not amount to “resting content” with these representations. If you think that
scientific realism should entail an optimistic attitude towards future physics, and
the possibility of finding a genuinely complete theory of the physical world, there
is nothing in what I have said thus far in this chapter to contradict this.
Having said this, a great deal remains to be said about how the QFT programme
as it stands bears on the project of constructing future physical theories, and the
problem of quantum gravity in particular. This is another area where there is
scope for reconciling Fraser’s and Wallace’s perspectives on QFT. I am inclined to
agree with Fraser that the axiomatic and constructive approaches to QFT may yet
have lessons for the project of constructing theories of quantum gravity. Recent
developments such as the discovery of the AdS/CFT correspondence and the
progress in asymptotic safety approach to quantum gravity suggest that getting a
better understanding of the space of possible QFT models may be a crucial step in
articulating a viable theory of quantum gravity. I see no reason why philosophical
engagement with what is known about continuum QFT models might not also
play a role here; just as when philosophers engage with speculative proposals in
quantum gravity research we can hope that clarifying conceptual issues internal to
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the QFT programme will help pave the way for future theoretical progress.19
We have to realise however that when it comes to the construction of future the-
ories, we leave behind the question of what we should believe about the world
on the basis of present evidence at the heart of the realism debate. Underde-
termination is not a problem in this context as we are not examining theories
which are candidates for belief. In the context of discovery the more theoretical
frameworks at your disposal the merrier; there is no tension in drawing on both
the axiomatic and effective field theory traditions in the search for an adequate
quantum theory of gravity. It is part and parcel of the decoupling of theories
at different scales that there is unlikely to be a very direct connection between
what we are licensed to believe about the world on the basis of present evidence
and the details of physics at higher energies. To reiterate a claim I have made
several times now, I do not think that constructing a continuum formulation of
the standard model will license any new claims about the world which are not
already captured by a cutoff formulation. But it may provide resources that aid
the construction of future theories, thus contributing to the epistemic progress of
science in a more indirect way. This is yet another way that engagement with the
axiomatic approach to QFT can be justified in a way which is fully compatible
with the realist view of cutoff QFTs I have defended in this thesis.
Another reason why viewing QFT models as effective theories may be unattractive
to some however, is not so much that they don’t capture the whole truth but
that the truths they do capture are not fundamental.20 There seems to be a
pervasive, if rarely explicitly discussed, idea in the philosophy of physics that
what we should primarily be concerned with is the fundamental ontology posited
by physical theories. But it is precisely the fundamental features of QFT models
(assuming these can be assimilated to their claims about the smallest length
scales) which I have argued are not trustworthy as representations of reality. It is
worth pointing out here that this metaphysical notion of fundamentality has not
played much of a role in the traditional realism debate, and it certainly has not
been viewed as part of the definition of realism that scientific theories capture
fundamental truths.21 The reason, presumably, is that realism is supposed to be
19Wallace (2011) suggests considerations of this kind only motivate the “first-order project” of
constructing continuum QFT models, the implication being that the philosophy of physics
has nothing to offer here. But this verdict seems to be based on the unnecessarily restrictive
view that the only legitimate question in the philosophy of QFT is what we ought to believe
about the world given the extant empirical successes of the standard model. I have tried to
make room for internal philosophical questions about physical theories which may well bear
on the construction of future theories.
20What philosophers mean by ‘fundamental’ is not an issue I will discuss much here, safe to
say that it goes beyond what is meant by the more philosophically neutral term ‘fundamental
physics’—See Schaffer (2009), Sider (2012) and Barnes (2013) for contrasting views in the
metaphysics literature.
21Fundamentality talk has increasingly played a role in the debate surrounding ontological
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a philosophical thesis about the whole of science, including fields like biology and
chemistry, as well as non-fundamental physical theories like Newtonian gravity,
which most philosophers do not take to give us information about the fundamental
ontological constituents of reality. I suspect, therefore, that the concern about
the non-fundamentality of current QFT models is not an issue about scientific
realism per se, but is rather triggered by additional assumptions which come into
play when discussing high energy physics.
Why have philosophers of physics attached such importance to the fundamental
structure of physical theories? One diagnosis of this tendency is that it springs
from the influence of the standard account of interpretation. The standard ac-
count, remember, was the doctrine that an interpretation of a theory is a spec-
ification of the possible worlds in which it is true. It is plausible to think that
characterising the worlds in which physical theory is true will involve spelling
out their fundamental ontology. I argued in §4.5 that there is no special problem
with treating cutoff QFTs in standard account terms—lattice QFTs will be ex-
actly true in worlds in which space-time really has a lattice structure. But I also
argued in chapter 2 that, in so far as the standard account is a plausible doc-
trine, what it provides is a purely semantic notion of interpretation. A standard
account interpretation gives us an account of what a theory says, but the epis-
temic question of what we ought to believe about the world given the success of
a theory, which is the concern of the realism debate, is a separate issue. Properly
understood, the standard account has no concrete implications for how physical
theories relate to the world, and certainly does not imply that their fundamental
ontology must get things right.
A more interesting motivation for focusing on the fundamental ontology delin-
eated by a physical theory is an adherence to a specific programme of naturalistic
metaphysics. Many contemporary metaphysicians characterise, and in some cases
even define, their discipline as the subject which concerns itself with the funda-
mental structure of reality.22 If you take this view of metaphysics and also hold
that metaphysics should be deeply informed by physics then it is easy to see why
you would be disappointed with my claim that the QFT programme as it stands
only licenses claims about the non-fundamental—the consequence would seem to
be that QFT tells us nothing about metaphysics.
I think we simply have to bite this bullet: we cannot wish away the limitations of
our current epistemic situation. This suggests that if we want to do metaphysics
based on the QFT programme there are two ways we can go. On the one hand,
structural realism however, see McKenzie (2013).
22The idea that metaphysics is primarily concerned with the fundamental can be found in
papers like Dorr (2005), Schaffer (2009), and Sider (2012). For an interesting critique of this
characterisation of metaphysics see Barnes (2015).
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we can engage in speculative metaphysics: we can address questions about the
possible worlds in which various kinds of QFT models are perfectly fundamental.
I don’t see anything objectionable about this kind of work, indeed, on the stan-
dard account of interpretation this is closely related to the task of specifying a
theory’s physical semantics which is clearly an important task for the philosophy
of physics. One simply has to be careful not to slip into drawing conclusions
about the way the world actually is when working in this mode—in the termi-
nology used in previous chapters, the metaphysical issues being addressed are
internal to a particular theoretical framework. On the other hand, if you want to
make claims about the metaphysics of the actual world based on the successes of
the QFT programme I suggest that, in one way or another, non-fundamental on-
tology will have to be taken seriously. This may seem to be a revisionary message
but it is worth pointing out here that the untenability of the naive formulation
of scientific realism on its own seems to have a similar moral for the metaphysics
of science. We have good reason to believe that no current theory describes real-
ity at the most fundamental level so any metaphysical conclusions warranted by
contemporary science must be about non-fundamental stuff.
I close with a quote from Polchinski (1999) which incapsulates the blunt response
which must ultimately be given to the worries discussed in this section. After
explicating the key results of the renormalisation group approach to QFT he
recounts an imaginary dialogue:
Q: Doesn’t all this mean that quantum field theory, for all its suc-
cesses, is an approximation that may have little to do with the under-
lying theory? And isn’t renormalization a bad thing, since it implies
that we can only probe the high energy theory through a small number
of parameters?
A: Nobody ever promised you a rose garden. (Polchinski 1999,10-11)
The decoupling of physics at different scales revealed by the renormalisation group
is a mixed blessing: it gives us grounds to be confident in the partial represen-
tational success of our present QFT models, but it makes the task of finding a
truly fundamental and comprehensive description of the physical world extremely
difficult. Still, it is a fact about the way the world is structured not a negociable
philosophical doctrine. Continuum formulations of current QFTs would not be
any more capable of describing reality at its fundamental level than the cutoff
structures we have at our disposal. The view of what we learn about the world
from high energy physics elaborated in this thesis is appropriately modest then
and realism enough.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
I started this thesis by pointing out a distinctive methodological challenge which
QFT seems to pose for the philosopher. Perhaps more than any other branch of
physics, the question of what QFT is at the theoretical level has vexed philoso-
phers of physics. My hope is that the foregoing discussion has laid the groundwork
for a response to this problem and, therefore, for a more productive interchange
between high energy physics and philosophy. I conclude here by summarising my
key claims via a comparison with Wallace and Fraser’s approaches to the QFT
programme and making some suggestions about avenues for future enquiry.
My basic strategy has been to dissolve rather than resolve the apparent dilemma
raised by the existence of multiple theoretical approaches to QFT. The hetero-
geneity of the QFT programme only seems to be problematic if we cling to the
idea that the answer to the question ‘what is QFT?’ should take the form of a
precise set of mathematical axioms or structures. I suggested that this expec-
tation is unfounded for quite general reasons. Rather than seeing the issue as
one of identifying the ‘correct’ version of QFT my approach to answering this
question has been to acknowledge the existence of the many strands of the QFT
programme and start to flesh out the relationship they bear to each other and to
broader questions of philosophical interest.
Like Wallace, I have defended the legitimacy and importance of cutoff QFT mod-
els as objects of philosophical study, especially when it comes to the epistemic
question of what we ought to believe about the world on the basis of high energy
physics. The view of cutoff QFTs I have defended here does differ from Wallace’s
in important respects however. In some ways my position is more modest. I have
not claimed that cutoff QFTs are the only systems which the philosophy of QFT
should be interested in. In fact, I think that Wallace’s (2011) presentations of the
axiomatic and renormalisation group approaches to QFTs as rival approaches to
addressing the same issues has limited usefulness. While there are commonalities
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in their origins, in that they were both responding to problems with the original
perturbative formalism, each has developed its own distinct agenda and we can
make room for both in our philosophy of QFT.
In other respects my stance towards cutoff models is more radical than Wallace’s.
Wallace consistently emphasises the fact that we do not currently have contin-
uum formulations of realistic QFTs—Wallace (2006, 54) even suggests that “it
is only because that goal has not been achieved that it is interesting to explore
alternatives [to axiomatic QFT]”. In contrast, my central arguments for taking
cutoff QFTs seriously have been largely independent of the mathematical difficul-
ties associated with constructing continuum QFT models. For me, the epistemic
status of cutoff formulations of QED and QCD will not change much if a proof of
the existence of continuum formulations of these theories is obtained. My case for
taking cutoff QFTs seriously as representations of reality has focused on what we
do know about QFT models, and specifically on the insensitivity of their coarse-
grained behaviour to their small and large scale structure, rather than what we
do not know. This line of reasoning has led me to make stronger claims about the
status of the infrared cutoff than Wallace: I have argued that QFT systems with
both ultraviolet and infrared cutoffs are capable of representing all of the features
of the world we have any right to believe on the basis of current experimental
high energy physics.
As for Fraser, on the face of it our assessments of the formulation problem are
fundamentally opposed. Indeed, I have rejected much of the machinery which
Fraser uses to set up her presentation of the issue. I have resisted Fraser’s claim
that QFT should simply be defined as “the theory that best unifies quantum
theory and the special theory of relativity” (Fraser’s, 2009, 550), because I deny
that QFT can be neatly defined in this way at all. Furthermore, presenting the
whole issue as one of underdetermination of theory by evidence is, in my view,
ultimately unhelpful. In any case, I argued that the kind of underdetermination
between QFT models we do find in the QFT programme does not support the
morals Fraser wants to draw.
Having said this, I have suggested that we can accommodate some of Fraser’s mo-
tivations for focusing on the axiomatic approach to QFT. I identified a number
of ways that philosophical engagement with the axiomatic QFT may illuminate
issues of philosophical import without directly contributing to our picture of what
the world is like. On the one hand, there is the question of the extent to which
quantum theory is compatible with fundamental relativity, an issue which con-
structive field theory promises to tell us a great deal. As far as I am concerned
this is an important issue in its own right, independently of whether the world
actually is fundamentally relativistic, just as the status of determinism in clas-
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sical mechanics is interesting though we do not live in a classical world. More
than this though, I suggested in chapter 6 that study of the axiomatic and con-
structive approaches to QFT may still play an important epistemic role in the
QFT programme in so far as they facilitate the derivation of results which also
apply to cutoff QFT systems. Finally, there is scope for philosophical investiga-
tion of these approaches to inform the construction of future physical theories;
as I sketched in chapter 7, there are multiple ways that learning more about
continuum QFT systems, in both formal and conceptual terms, may impact on
the quantum gravity programme. In this context however we are approaching
axiomatic QFT in an exploratory mood rather than as objects of belief. There
is scope to reconcile at least some of Fraser’s and Wallace’s claims about QFT
within my approach then.
How might the arguments of this thesis be taken forward? Many loose ends
remain from the discussions of previous chapters. Chapters 3 and 4 were pri-
marily concerned with establishing the foundational respectability and interest
of the perturbative and renormalisation group approaches to QFT. Plumbing the
depths of these bodies of theory, which are themselves multifaceted and diverse,
is another project in itself. There is also plenty of scope to sophisticate and chal-
lenge the view of the QFT programme I have developed here. As I emphasised in
chapters 5 and 6 more work is needed on the subject of approximate space-time
symmetries and spontaneous symmetry breaking in QFT, both of which being
crucial issues for defending my claims about the coarse-grained representational
success of QFT models. Only time will tell whether the perspective on QFT
taken here will survive in the face of further investigation of these issues.
If my core claim about the partial representational veracity of QFT models is
accepted however, it seems likely to have knock on implications for many previous
debates in the philosophy of QFT. Much of the extant work in this literature has
been concerned with the fundamental ontology of QFT, and specifically with the
status of particles and fields. Furthermore, the dominant approach to these issues
in recent years has been to address them within the algebraic axiomatisation of
continuum QFT—Fraser (2008) and Baker’s (2009) arguments against particle
and field interpretations of QFT respectively being prime examples of this trend.
My claim that the fundamental ontological claims of QFT models, and the novel
properties afforded by the continuum limit, should not be taken to faithfully
represent raises questions about the appropriate conclusions which can be drawn
from these arguments. While I certainly do not want to say that the many
impressive foundational theorems which have been derived within the algebraic
formalism should simply be discarded as philosophically irrelevant, we do, I think,
need to reassess the significance of these results. One theme of this thesis has
been that philosophers of physics have tended to focus on semantic questions at
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the expense of epistemic ones. The key point here is that we need to carefully
consider what claims about the world are licensed by results obtained in the
algebraic framework. Re-examining previous foundational work on QFT from an
epistemological stand point is a priority for the philosophy of QFT going forward
then.
So much for the technical theory specific debates of the philosophy of physics.
My original motivation for focusing on the formulation problem was that it
seemed to be a key factor obstructing meaningful interactions between high en-
ergy physics and more wide-reaching philosophical issues. What lessons can the
general philosopher of science and the metaphysician glean from the discussion
of this thesis?
When it comes to the general philosophy of science the central take home message
of this thesis has been not to panic. Worries that the QFT programme radically
undermines a conventional, broadly realist, philosophy of science are, I think,
largely unfounded. In a more constructive direction however, my hope is that my
discussion has laid a foundation for further exchange between traditional debates
in the philosophy of science and the details of the QFT programme. Chapter 7
claimed that there are morals to be drawn for the articulation of scientific realism
and I think there are many other debates which can benefit from engagement
with the QFT programme. To name just one, the scientific explanation debate,
and specifically the question of how idealisation and abstraction ought to be
understood in this context, is crying out to be brought into contact with high
energy physics. A recent trend in this literature has been a focus on the notion
of explanatory relevance and the idea that eliminating details which don’t make
a difference to the target explanandum can boost the explanatory power of a
model—see especially Strevens (2008) kairetic account of explanation. The way
that cutoff QFTs, understood as coarse-grained representations, abstract away
information about high energy degrees of freedom which does not impact on
low energy physics appears to exemplify this explanatory practice. My hunch is
that the QFT programme may provides instructive case studies for honing our
understanding of these issues.
What about the metaphysics of science? A key messages of chapter 7 was that
if we are interested in addressing ontological questions about the actual world
on the basis of the basis of the QFT programme then we will need to take non-
fundamental ontology seriously. In my view, this is the way that the debate
surrounding the status of particles in QFT should go. It seems clear, whichever
approach to the theory you look at, that elementary particles are not fundamental
entities in QFT. The key question going forward is how to spell out the kind of
derivative status that they enjoy.
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If we are to make progress in this direction however, we seem to need a frame-
work for discussing non-fundamental ontology. Wallace has made use of Dennett’s
(1991) notion of “real patterns” in this context—see, in particular, Wallace (2012)
chapter 2. It is notable, however, that this language has not been widely adopted
by philosophers of physics, much less analytic metaphysicians. The worry, I sus-
pect, is that while this approach may bolster intuitions about derivate entities
and properties it does not appear to do much to make their ontological status
precise. There are two ways we might go in search of clarification here. On the
one hand, following the localist spirit of chapter 7, we could claim that the sense
in which ontological constituents are emergent (in a weak reduction compatible
sense) is largely substantiated by the details of the relevant physics. Spelling
out the sense in which particles are non-fundamental entities, for instance, will
come down to examining the details of how particle-like behaviour emerges in
QFT systems.1 On the other hand, recent work in analytic metaphysics, and
specifically the burgeoning literatures on meta-ontology and fundamentality, has
thrown up a variety of resources for articulating notions of ontological depen-
dence.2 Though there are certainly challenges with employing these ideas in the
context of physical science recent work, such as McKenzie (2013), suggests it is
not a fools errand. To my mind, pursuing both of these approaches in concert is
the most promising way forward for metaphysical engagement with the QFT pro-
gramme, and may lead to fruitful interactions between the philosophy of physics
and analytic metaphysics.
The picture of how the different parts of the QFT programme presently hang
together put forward in this thesis is ultimately intended in a provisional and
explorative spirit. Perhaps more significant than these positive claims is the
methodological approach I have advocated and attempted to exemplify. There
is no reason for philosophical engagement with the QFT programme to be held
hostage by the formulation problem; we can, and should, draw on the various the-
oretical approaches to QFT in a piecemeal fashion in order to enrich debate in the
philosophy of science without getting caught up on the perceived need to provide
a universally applicable formal answer to the question ‘what is QFT?’.
1Bain (2000) and Wallace (2001) can be understood as contributions to this project.
2See Lowe and Tahko (2015) for a review of this literature.
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